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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 22:02:27 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181019200227.GC31016@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c793fcd092063a68f1de7ce982df2ebb347a3542.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:34AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> Change the argument to set_dumpable from task->mm to task.  This allows us
> to later add hooks to modify a task's property according to whether it is
> a non-dumpable task. Non dumpable tasks demand a higher level of security.
> Changes the dumpable value from in to unsigned int as negative number is
> not allowed.

Per task dumpable doesn't make any kind of sense. Dumpable is about
coredumps, that's an mm property.

If you want to introduce other (per task) state; give that a new name
and check for that explicitly. Don't create confusion like this.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-19 20:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28  9:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29       ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55           ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43   ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38     ` Peter Zijlstra

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