From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9D4CC43441 for ; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 03:20:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C06020825 for ; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 03:20:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=joelfernandes.org header.i=@joelfernandes.org header.b="xq7Vldvk" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5C06020825 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=joelfernandes.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728609AbeKJNDg (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Nov 2018 08:03:36 -0500 Received: from mail-pg1-f195.google.com ([209.85.215.195]:37775 "EHLO mail-pg1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728228AbeKJNDg (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Nov 2018 08:03:36 -0500 Received: by mail-pg1-f195.google.com with SMTP id 80so1661982pge.4 for ; Fri, 09 Nov 2018 19:20:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=joelfernandes.org; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=SwhalELpmKQK1pwDtkb5pSRxXxFuUqJP43YJan5OutI=; b=xq7VldvkCZEHJyxch+k3eLF912iD/rTIOqqL8Vfh+Lq4Ww72VftLxnx+hw2pG7ABiw Yy8/mSK3jYPIXFpuAmw5rz23WIQxacyH7jJ2UzPAVfFOqogdBcXAIigrNbnFqihC9I4r BwgRQPblyifTqihZlim7tpMEWRjiGJCUKvgwM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=SwhalELpmKQK1pwDtkb5pSRxXxFuUqJP43YJan5OutI=; b=mf2qfj8w5d8JTW3CXr0/n/0C9ghT3d1Vter4+KtO+WEVKulhnMV7qJU0turTfsLApo jyrLOcT4puKT2zLRSPG0LkeUv6c7M9irFJR9uV5Z9NYEHxStRxVrco7ZHXRg1/QZ7NVQ vv6Qnj0mZVIhoH4o+z4Qmhc8cvQ/pir9mAQlOA8P2hJrS9VQFACHP2raj4+Ei2OP0gNH oeO/9wnytLix5gwinRlq7smCItk3gkOnnUjcjNt7fH/rsujGnPHANr7rPOL4V1UVdf7f M77t4LsMvg2k8No9gluW58pdSAuI6faV5kEWZOLXE8+om+7gT+EhjxybfJ7UuQJwesGE mz7g== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gJPl6LkSw3YWc0oO8USX92LJlvV0H4gVdujMUstuwE9IqhsQ7Ix pmH+MXyBsaK5umV9HRx1EL8wWg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5cwQ092gw+g7OeOb8kqx9zN5Ka7lxMTFIisRhQLNJTFm0Z0lE4aroEyPPStP6ZB3ToGArDL3w== X-Received: by 2002:a62:682:: with SMTP id 124-v6mr11543056pfg.161.1541820007715; Fri, 09 Nov 2018 19:20:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([2620:0:1000:1601:3aef:314f:b9ea:889f]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q1sm8566556pgs.14.2018.11.09.19.20.05 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 09 Nov 2018 19:20:06 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 19:20:05 -0800 From: Joel Fernandes To: Jann Horn Cc: kernel list , jreck@google.com, John Stultz , Todd Kjos , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Christoph Hellwig , Al Viro , Andrew Morton , Daniel Colascione , Bruce Fields , jlayton@kernel.org, Khalid Aziz , Lei.Yang@windriver.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , marcandre.lureau@redhat.com, Mike Kravetz , minchan@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Hugh Dickins , Linux API Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd Message-ID: <20181110032005.GA22238@google.com> References: <20181108041537.39694-1-joel@joelfernandes.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 09, 2018 at 10:19:03PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 10:06 PM Jann Horn wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 9:46 PM Joel Fernandes (Google) > > wrote: > > > Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward > > > to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly > > > remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also > > > benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers > > > are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime. > > > > > > One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region > > > and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any > > > "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed > > > writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where > > > receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while > > > the sender continues to write to the buffer. > > > See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details: > > > https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow > > > > > > This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal. > > > To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal > > > which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while > > > keeping the existing mmap active. > > > > Please CC linux-api@ on patches like this. If you had done that, I > > might have criticized your v1 patch instead of your v3 patch... > > > > > The following program shows the seal > > > working in action: > > [...] > > > Cc: jreck@google.com > > > Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org > > > Cc: tkjos@google.com > > > Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org > > > Cc: hch@infradead.org > > > Reviewed-by: John Stultz > > > Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) > > > --- > > [...] > > > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > > > index 2bb5e257080e..5ba9804e9515 100644 > > > --- a/mm/memfd.c > > > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > > [...] > > > @@ -219,6 +220,25 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals) > > > } > > > } > > > > > > + if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) && > > > + !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) { > > > + /* > > > + * The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking > > > + * so we need them to be already set, or requested now. > > > + */ > > > + int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) & > > > + (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK); > > > + > > > + if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) { > > > + error = -EINVAL; > > > + goto unlock; > > > + } > > > + > > > + spin_lock(&file->f_lock); > > > + file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE); > > > + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock); > > > + } > > > > So you're fiddling around with the file, but not the inode? How are > > you preventing code like the following from re-opening the file as > > writable? > > > > $ cat memfd.c > > #define _GNU_SOURCE > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > > > int main(void) { > > int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_create, "testfd", 0); > > if (fd == -1) err(1, "memfd"); > > char path[100]; > > sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); > > int fd2 = open(path, O_RDWR); > > if (fd2 == -1) err(1, "reopen"); > > printf("reopen successful: %d\n", fd2); > > } > > $ gcc -o memfd memfd.c > > $ ./memfd > > reopen successful: 4 > > $ > > > > That aside: I wonder whether a better API would be something that > > allows you to create a new readonly file descriptor, instead of > > fiddling with the writability of an existing fd. > > My favorite approach would be to forbid open() on memfds, hope that > nobody notices the tiny API break, and then add an ioctl for "reopen > this memfd with reduced permissions" - but that's just my personal > opinion. I did something along these lines and it fixes the issue, but I forbid open of memfd only when the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal is in place. So then its not an ABI break because this is a brand new seal. That seems the least intrusive solution and it works. Do you mind testing it and I'll add your and Tested-by to the new fix? The patch is based on top of this series. ---8<----------- From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" Subject: [PATCH] mm/memfd: Fix possible promotion to writeable of sealed memfd Jann Horn found that reopening an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd through /proc/self/fd/N symlink as writeable succeeds. The simplest fix without causing ABI breakages and ugly VFS hacks is to simply deny all opens on F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed fds. Reported-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) --- mm/shmem.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 446942677cd4..5b378c486b8f 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3611,7 +3611,25 @@ static const struct address_space_operations shmem_aops = { .error_remove_page = generic_error_remove_page, }; +/* Could arrive here for memfds opened through /proc/ */ +int shmem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + + /* + * memfds for which future writes have been prevented + * should not be reopened, say, through /proc/pid/fd/N + * symlinks otherwise it can cause a sealed memfd to be + * promoted to writable. + */ + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} + static const struct file_operations shmem_file_operations = { + .open = shmem_open, .mmap = shmem_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area, #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS -- 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: joel at joelfernandes.org (Joel Fernandes) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 19:20:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd In-Reply-To: References: <20181108041537.39694-1-joel@joelfernandes.org> Message-ID: <20181110032005.GA22238@google.com> On Fri, Nov 09, 2018 at 10:19:03PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 10:06 PM Jann Horn wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 9:46 PM Joel Fernandes (Google) > > wrote: > > > Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward > > > to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly > > > remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also > > > benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers > > > are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime. > > > > > > One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region > > > and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any > > > "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed > > > writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where > > > receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while > > > the sender continues to write to the buffer. > > > See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details: > > > https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow > > > > > > This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal. > > > To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal > > > which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while > > > keeping the existing mmap active. > > > > Please CC linux-api@ on patches like this. If you had done that, I > > might have criticized your v1 patch instead of your v3 patch... > > > > > The following program shows the seal > > > working in action: > > [...] > > > Cc: jreck at google.com > > > Cc: john.stultz at linaro.org > > > Cc: tkjos at google.com > > > Cc: gregkh at linuxfoundation.org > > > Cc: hch at infradead.org > > > Reviewed-by: John Stultz > > > Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) > > > --- > > [...] > > > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > > > index 2bb5e257080e..5ba9804e9515 100644 > > > --- a/mm/memfd.c > > > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > > [...] > > > @@ -219,6 +220,25 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals) > > > } > > > } > > > > > > + if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) && > > > + !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) { > > > + /* > > > + * The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking > > > + * so we need them to be already set, or requested now. > > > + */ > > > + int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) & > > > + (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK); > > > + > > > + if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) { > > > + error = -EINVAL; > > > + goto unlock; > > > + } > > > + > > > + spin_lock(&file->f_lock); > > > + file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE); > > > + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock); > > > + } > > > > So you're fiddling around with the file, but not the inode? How are > > you preventing code like the following from re-opening the file as > > writable? > > > > $ cat memfd.c > > #define _GNU_SOURCE > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > > > int main(void) { > > int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_create, "testfd", 0); > > if (fd == -1) err(1, "memfd"); > > char path[100]; > > sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); > > int fd2 = open(path, O_RDWR); > > if (fd2 == -1) err(1, "reopen"); > > printf("reopen successful: %d\n", fd2); > > } > > $ gcc -o memfd memfd.c > > $ ./memfd > > reopen successful: 4 > > $ > > > > That aside: I wonder whether a better API would be something that > > allows you to create a new readonly file descriptor, instead of > > fiddling with the writability of an existing fd. > > My favorite approach would be to forbid open() on memfds, hope that > nobody notices the tiny API break, and then add an ioctl for "reopen > this memfd with reduced permissions" - but that's just my personal > opinion. I did something along these lines and it fixes the issue, but I forbid open of memfd only when the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal is in place. So then its not an ABI break because this is a brand new seal. That seems the least intrusive solution and it works. Do you mind testing it and I'll add your and Tested-by to the new fix? The patch is based on top of this series. ---8<----------- From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" Subject: [PATCH] mm/memfd: Fix possible promotion to writeable of sealed memfd Jann Horn found that reopening an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd through /proc/self/fd/N symlink as writeable succeeds. The simplest fix without causing ABI breakages and ugly VFS hacks is to simply deny all opens on F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed fds. Reported-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) --- mm/shmem.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 446942677cd4..5b378c486b8f 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3611,7 +3611,25 @@ static const struct address_space_operations shmem_aops = { .error_remove_page = generic_error_remove_page, }; +/* Could arrive here for memfds opened through /proc/ */ +int shmem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + + /* + * memfds for which future writes have been prevented + * should not be reopened, say, through /proc/pid/fd/N + * symlinks otherwise it can cause a sealed memfd to be + * promoted to writable. + */ + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} + static const struct file_operations shmem_file_operations = { + .open = shmem_open, .mmap = shmem_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area, #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS -- 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: joel@joelfernandes.org (Joel Fernandes) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 19:20:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd In-Reply-To: References: <20181108041537.39694-1-joel@joelfernandes.org> Message-ID: <20181110032005.GA22238@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Message-ID: <20181110032005.YrvgV0STzUm3qovmgYPxXzr5kAiaZHzapnuFrDNeBcg@z> On Fri, Nov 09, 2018@10:19:03PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018@10:06 PM Jann Horn wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 9:46 PM Joel Fernandes (Google) > > wrote: > > > Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward > > > to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly > > > remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also > > > benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers > > > are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime. > > > > > > One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region > > > and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any > > > "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed > > > writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where > > > receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while > > > the sender continues to write to the buffer. > > > See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details: > > > https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow > > > > > > This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal. > > > To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal > > > which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while > > > keeping the existing mmap active. > > > > Please CC linux-api@ on patches like this. If you had done that, I > > might have criticized your v1 patch instead of your v3 patch... > > > > > The following program shows the seal > > > working in action: > > [...] > > > Cc: jreck at google.com > > > Cc: john.stultz at linaro.org > > > Cc: tkjos at google.com > > > Cc: gregkh at linuxfoundation.org > > > Cc: hch at infradead.org > > > Reviewed-by: John Stultz > > > Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) > > > --- > > [...] > > > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > > > index 2bb5e257080e..5ba9804e9515 100644 > > > --- a/mm/memfd.c > > > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > > [...] > > > @@ -219,6 +220,25 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals) > > > } > > > } > > > > > > + if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) && > > > + !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) { > > > + /* > > > + * The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking > > > + * so we need them to be already set, or requested now. > > > + */ > > > + int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) & > > > + (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK); > > > + > > > + if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) { > > > + error = -EINVAL; > > > + goto unlock; > > > + } > > > + > > > + spin_lock(&file->f_lock); > > > + file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE); > > > + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock); > > > + } > > > > So you're fiddling around with the file, but not the inode? How are > > you preventing code like the following from re-opening the file as > > writable? > > > > $ cat memfd.c > > #define _GNU_SOURCE > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > > > int main(void) { > > int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_create, "testfd", 0); > > if (fd == -1) err(1, "memfd"); > > char path[100]; > > sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); > > int fd2 = open(path, O_RDWR); > > if (fd2 == -1) err(1, "reopen"); > > printf("reopen successful: %d\n", fd2); > > } > > $ gcc -o memfd memfd.c > > $ ./memfd > > reopen successful: 4 > > $ > > > > That aside: I wonder whether a better API would be something that > > allows you to create a new readonly file descriptor, instead of > > fiddling with the writability of an existing fd. > > My favorite approach would be to forbid open() on memfds, hope that > nobody notices the tiny API break, and then add an ioctl for "reopen > this memfd with reduced permissions" - but that's just my personal > opinion. I did something along these lines and it fixes the issue, but I forbid open of memfd only when the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal is in place. So then its not an ABI break because this is a brand new seal. That seems the least intrusive solution and it works. Do you mind testing it and I'll add your and Tested-by to the new fix? The patch is based on top of this series. ---8<----------- From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" Subject: [PATCH] mm/memfd: Fix possible promotion to writeable of sealed memfd Jann Horn found that reopening an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd through /proc/self/fd/N symlink as writeable succeeds. The simplest fix without causing ABI breakages and ugly VFS hacks is to simply deny all opens on F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed fds. Reported-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) --- mm/shmem.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 446942677cd4..5b378c486b8f 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3611,7 +3611,25 @@ static const struct address_space_operations shmem_aops = { .error_remove_page = generic_error_remove_page, }; +/* Could arrive here for memfds opened through /proc/ */ +int shmem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + + /* + * memfds for which future writes have been prevented + * should not be reopened, say, through /proc/pid/fd/N + * symlinks otherwise it can cause a sealed memfd to be + * promoted to writable. + */ + if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} + static const struct file_operations shmem_file_operations = { + .open = shmem_open, .mmap = shmem_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area, #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS -- 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog