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Thu, 22 Nov 2018 05:13:47 -0800 (PST) Received: by localhost.localdomain (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 7047B180E13; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 11:13:44 -0200 (-02) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 11:13:44 -0200 From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner To: Xin Long Cc: syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, davem , LKML , linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, network dev , Neil Horman , syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, Vlad Yasevich Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in __lock_sock Message-ID: <20181122131344.GD31918@localhost.localdomain> References: <000000000000b98a67057ad7158a@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 05:57:33PM +0900, Xin Long wrote: > On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:18 PM syzbot > wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > HEAD commit: ccda4af0f4b9 Linux 4.20-rc2 > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=156cd533400000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=4a0a89f12ca9b0f5 > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9276d76e83e3bcde6c99 > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > netlink: 5 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process > > `syz-executor5'. > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 > > kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26d60e0 by task syz-executor1/13725 > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 13725 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc2+ #333 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS > > Google 01/01/2011 > > Call Trace: > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > > dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113 > > print_address_description.cold.7+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 > > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] > > kasan_report.cold.8+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 > > __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 > > __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 > > lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3844 > > __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] > > _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 > > spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline] > > __lock_sock+0x203/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2253 > > lock_sock_nested+0xfe/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2774 > > lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1492 [inline] > > sctp_sock_dump+0x122/0xb20 net/sctp/diag.c:324 > > static int sctp_sock_dump(struct sctp_transport *tsp, void *p) > { > struct sctp_endpoint *ep = tsp->asoc->ep; > struct sctp_comm_param *commp = p; > struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; <--- [1] > ... > int err = 0; > > lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] > > Between [1] and [2], an asoc peeloff may happen, still thinking > how to avoid this. This race cannot happen more than once for an asoc, so something like this may be doable: struct sctp_comm_param *commp = p; struct sctp_endpoint *ep; struct sock *sk; ... int err = 0; again: ep = tsp->asoc->ep; sk = ep->base.sk; lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] if (sk != tsp->asoc->ep->base.sk) { /* Asoc was peeloff'd */ unlock_sock(sk); goto again; } Similarly to what we did on cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep"). > > > > > sctp_for_each_transport+0x2b5/0x370 net/sctp/socket.c:5091 > > sctp_diag_dump+0x3ac/0x660 net/sctp/diag.c:527 > > __inet_diag_dump+0xa8/0x140 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1049 > > inet_diag_dump+0x9b/0x110 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1065 > > netlink_dump+0x606/0x1080 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244 > > __netlink_dump_start+0x59a/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352 > > netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:216 [inline] > > inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2ce/0x3f0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1170 > > __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:232 [inline] > > sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31d/0x410 net/core/sock_diag.c:263 > > netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 > > sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:274 > > netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] > > netlink_unicast+0x5a5/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 > > netlink_sendmsg+0xa18/0xfc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 > > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] > > sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 > > sock_write_iter+0x35e/0x5c0 net/socket.c:900 > > call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1857 [inline] > > do_iter_readv_writev+0x8b0/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:680 > > do_iter_write+0x185/0x5f0 fs/read_write.c:959 > > vfs_writev+0x1f1/0x360 fs/read_write.c:1004 > > do_writev+0x11a/0x310 fs/read_write.c:1039 > > __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline] > > __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline] > > __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109 > > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > RIP: 0033:0x457569 > > Code: fd b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 > > 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff > > ff 0f 83 cb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 > > RSP: 002b:00007f2cdabbac78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457569 > > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000002051c000 RDI: 000000000000000e > > RBP: 000000000072c0e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2cdabbb6d4 > > R13: 00000000004c33b1 R14: 00000000004d97c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff > > > > Allocated by task 13672: > > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > > kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 > > kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 > > kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 > > sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2e0 net/core/sock.c:1463 > > sk_alloc+0x10d/0x1690 net/core/sock.c:1523 > > inet_create+0x509/0x1070 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:321 > > __sock_create+0x536/0x930 net/socket.c:1277 > > sock_create net/socket.c:1317 [inline] > > __sys_socket+0x106/0x260 net/socket.c:1347 > > __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1356 [inline] > > __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1354 [inline] > > __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1354 > > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > > > Freed by task 13680: > > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > > __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 > > kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 > > __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] > > kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3760 > > sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1504 [inline] > > __sk_destruct+0x728/0xa80 net/core/sock.c:1588 > > sk_destruct+0x78/0x90 net/core/sock.c:1596 > > __sk_free+0xcf/0x300 net/core/sock.c:1607 > > sk_free+0x42/0x50 net/core/sock.c:1618 > > sock_put include/net/sock.h:1693 [inline] > > sctp_close+0x8d4/0xad0 net/sctp/socket.c:1569 > > inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:428 > > __sock_release+0xd7/0x250 net/socket.c:579 > > sock_close+0x19/0x20 net/socket.c:1141 > > __fput+0x385/0xa30 fs/file_table.c:278 > > ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309 > > task_work_run+0x1e8/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:113 > > get_signal+0x1558/0x1980 kernel/signal.c:2347 > > do_signal+0x9c/0x21c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:816 > > exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2e5/0x380 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162 > > prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline] > > syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline] > > do_syscall_64+0x6be/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d26d6040 > > which belongs to the cache SCTP(33:syz1) of size 1776 > > The buggy address is located 160 bytes inside of > > 1776-byte region [ffff8881d26d6040, ffff8881d26d6730) > > The buggy address belongs to the page: > > page:ffffea000749b580 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881b517f200 index:0x0 > > flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab) > > raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffff8881c6685748 ffffea0007538388 ffff8881b517f200 > > raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8881d26d6040 0000000100000002 ffff8881b6b4e7c0 > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > page->mem_cgroup:ffff8881b6b4e7c0 > > > > Memory state around the buggy address: > > ffff8881d26d5f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > > ffff8881d26d6000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > > ffff8881d26d6080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ^ > > ffff8881d26d6100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ffff8881d26d6180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ================================================================== > > > > > > --- > > This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. > > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. > > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. > > > > syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See: > > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with > > syzbot. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:13:44 +0000 Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in __lock_sock Message-Id: <20181122131344.GD31918@localhost.localdomain> List-Id: References: <000000000000b98a67057ad7158a@google.com> In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: Xin Long Cc: syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, davem , LKML , linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, network dev , Neil Horman , syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, Vlad Yasevich On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 05:57:33PM +0900, Xin Long wrote: > On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:18 PM syzbot > wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > HEAD commit: ccda4af0f4b9 Linux 4.20-rc2 > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=156cd533400000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?xJ0a89f12ca9b0f5 > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9276d76e83e3bcd= e6c99 > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the comm= it: > > Reported-by: syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > netlink: 5 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process > > `syz-executor5'. > > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 > > kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26d60e0 by task syz-executor1/13725 > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 13725 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc2+ #333 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS > > Google 01/01/2011 > > Call Trace: > > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] > > dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113 > > print_address_description.cold.7+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 > > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] > > kasan_report.cold.8+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 > > __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 > > __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 > > lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3844 > > __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] > > _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 > > spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline] > > __lock_sock+0x203/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2253 > > lock_sock_nested+0xfe/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2774 > > lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1492 [inline] > > sctp_sock_dump+0x122/0xb20 net/sctp/diag.c:324 >=20 > static int sctp_sock_dump(struct sctp_transport *tsp, void *p) > { > struct sctp_endpoint *ep =3D tsp->asoc->ep; > struct sctp_comm_param *commp =3D p; > struct sock *sk =3D ep->base.sk; <--- [1] > ... > int err =3D 0; >=20 > lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] >=20 > Between [1] and [2], an asoc peeloff may happen, still thinking > how to avoid this. This race cannot happen more than once for an asoc, so something like this may be doable: struct sctp_comm_param *commp =3D p; struct sctp_endpoint *ep; struct sock *sk; ... int err =3D 0; again: ep =3D tsp->asoc->ep; sk =3D ep->base.sk; lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] if (sk !=3D tsp->asoc->ep->base.sk) { /* Asoc was peeloff'd */ unlock_sock(sk); goto again; } Similarly to what we did on cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep"). >=20 >=20 >=20 > > sctp_for_each_transport+0x2b5/0x370 net/sctp/socket.c:5091 > > sctp_diag_dump+0x3ac/0x660 net/sctp/diag.c:527 > > __inet_diag_dump+0xa8/0x140 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1049 > > inet_diag_dump+0x9b/0x110 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1065 > > netlink_dump+0x606/0x1080 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244 > > __netlink_dump_start+0x59a/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352 > > netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:216 [inline] > > inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2ce/0x3f0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1170 > > __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:232 [inline] > > sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31d/0x410 net/core/sock_diag.c:263 > > netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 > > sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:274 > > netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] > > netlink_unicast+0x5a5/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 > > netlink_sendmsg+0xa18/0xfc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 > > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] > > sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 > > sock_write_iter+0x35e/0x5c0 net/socket.c:900 > > call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1857 [inline] > > do_iter_readv_writev+0x8b0/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:680 > > do_iter_write+0x185/0x5f0 fs/read_write.c:959 > > vfs_writev+0x1f1/0x360 fs/read_write.c:1004 > > do_writev+0x11a/0x310 fs/read_write.c:1039 > > __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline] > > __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline] > > __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109 > > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > RIP: 0033:0x457569 > > Code: fd b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89= f7 > > 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 = ff > > ff 0f 83 cb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 > > RSP: 002b:00007f2cdabbac78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457569 > > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000002051c000 RDI: 000000000000000e > > RBP: 000000000072c0e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2cdabbb6d4 > > R13: 00000000004c33b1 R14: 00000000004d97c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff > > > > Allocated by task 13672: > > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > > kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 > > kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 > > kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 > > sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2e0 net/core/sock.c:1463 > > sk_alloc+0x10d/0x1690 net/core/sock.c:1523 > > inet_create+0x509/0x1070 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:321 > > __sock_create+0x536/0x930 net/socket.c:1277 > > sock_create net/socket.c:1317 [inline] > > __sys_socket+0x106/0x260 net/socket.c:1347 > > __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1356 [inline] > > __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1354 [inline] > > __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1354 > > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > > > Freed by task 13680: > > save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 > > set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] > > __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 > > kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 > > __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] > > kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3760 > > sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1504 [inline] > > __sk_destruct+0x728/0xa80 net/core/sock.c:1588 > > sk_destruct+0x78/0x90 net/core/sock.c:1596 > > __sk_free+0xcf/0x300 net/core/sock.c:1607 > > sk_free+0x42/0x50 net/core/sock.c:1618 > > sock_put include/net/sock.h:1693 [inline] > > sctp_close+0x8d4/0xad0 net/sctp/socket.c:1569 > > inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:428 > > __sock_release+0xd7/0x250 net/socket.c:579 > > sock_close+0x19/0x20 net/socket.c:1141 > > __fput+0x385/0xa30 fs/file_table.c:278 > > ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309 > > task_work_run+0x1e8/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:113 > > get_signal+0x1558/0x1980 kernel/signal.c:2347 > > do_signal+0x9c/0x21c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:816 > > exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2e5/0x380 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162 > > prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline] > > syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline] > > do_syscall_64+0x6be/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d26d6040 > > which belongs to the cache SCTP(33:syz1) of size 1776 > > The buggy address is located 160 bytes inside of > > 1776-byte region [ffff8881d26d6040, ffff8881d26d6730) > > The buggy address belongs to the page: > > page:ffffea000749b580 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881b517f200 index= :0x0 > > flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab) > > raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffff8881c6685748 ffffea0007538388 ffff8881b517f200 > > raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8881d26d6040 0000000100000002 ffff8881b6b4e7c0 > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > page->mem_cgroup:ffff8881b6b4e7c0 > > > > Memory state around the buggy address: > > ffff8881d26d5f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > > ffff8881d26d6000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > > ffff8881d26d6080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ^ > > ffff8881d26d6100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > ffff8881d26d6180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > > > > > --- > > This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. > > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. > > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. > > > > syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See: > > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with > > syzbot.