All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization
Date: Wed,  9 Jan 2019 10:10:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190109091028.24485-2-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190109091028.24485-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
initializing the security data for newly created pseudo filesystem
objects (such as kernfs nodes) that provide a way of storing a
non-default security context, but need to operate independently from
mounts.

The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
for handling the creation of new nodes.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  5 +++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/security.c       |  8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index aaeb7fa24dc4..f2b4c0bf4a7b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1556,6 +1556,10 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 	int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
 
+	int (*object_init_security)(void *parent_ctx, u32 parent_ctxlen,
+				    const struct qstr *qstr, u16 mode,
+				    void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
 	int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
 	void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1855,6 +1859,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct hlist_head inode_getsecid;
 	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up;
 	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
+	struct hlist_head object_init_security;
 	struct hlist_head file_permission;
 	struct hlist_head file_alloc_security;
 	struct hlist_head file_free_security;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d170a5b031f3..e20d1f378ea4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -315,6 +315,9 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
+int security_object_init_security(void *parent_ctx, u32 parent_ctxlen,
+				  const struct qstr *qstr, u16 mode,
+				  void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -815,6 +818,15 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int security_object_init_security(void *parent_ctx,
+						u32 parent_ctxlen,
+						const struct qstr *qstr,
+						u16 mode, void **ctx,
+						u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 04d173eb93f6..56e77368b87f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -879,6 +879,14 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
+int security_object_init_security(void *parent_ctx, u32 parent_ctxlen,
+				  const struct qstr *qstr, u16 mode,
+				  void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(object_init_security, 0, parent_ctx, parent_ctxlen,
+			     qstr, mode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int ret;
-- 
2.20.1

  reply	other threads:[~2019-01-09  9:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09  9:10 [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09  9:10 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2019-01-09 14:35   ` [PATCH 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization Stephen Smalley
2019-01-09 16:06     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 16:06       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09  9:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:40   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11  1:58     ` Paul Moore
2019-01-09  9:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] kernfs: Initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 15:44   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11  2:08     ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 20:50 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Tejun Heo
2019-01-14  9:14   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-14  9:29     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
     [not found]       ` <64977013-e2a5-809d-7a3f-bffbda9276aa@redhat.com>
2019-01-17 16:15         ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-17 16:39           ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-17 20:30             ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-17 20:35           ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-14 15:50     ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-15 14:36   ` Stephen Smalley

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190109091028.24485-2-omosnace@redhat.com \
    --to=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.