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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>,
	Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 11/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE by default and add a chicken bit
Date: Fri,  1 Feb 2019 12:53:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190201205319.15995-13-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190201205319.15995-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

Now that FSGSBASE is fully supported, remove unsafe_fsgsbase, enable
FSGSBASE by default, and add nofsgsbase to disable it.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 35 ++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 871260e3e832..20ab1ba22a3e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2760,8 +2760,7 @@
 	no5lvl		[X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
 			kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
 
-	unsafe_fsgsbase	[X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions.  This will be
-			replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+	nofsgsbase	[X86] Disables FSGSBASE instructions.
 
 	no_console_suspend
 			[HW] Never suspend the console
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 6e2cba21328f..3d7d4ca1a29e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -365,24 +365,21 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
 }
 
-/*
- * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
- * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally. Setting
- * unsafe_fsgsbase and TAINT_INSECURE flags will allow the series to be
- * bisected if necessary.
- *
- * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
- * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
- */
-static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
-
-static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
 {
-	unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
-	add_taint(TAINT_INSECURE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	/* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
+	if (strlen(arg))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+		return 1;
+
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+	pr_info("nofsgsbase: FSGSBASE disabled\n");
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);
 
 /*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
@@ -1372,12 +1369,8 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_umip(c);
 
 	/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
-		if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
-			cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
-		else
-			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
-	}
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
 
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
-- 
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-01 20:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-01 20:53 [PATCH v5 00/13] x86: Enable FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] taint: Introduce a new taint flag (insecure) Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02  2:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-05 21:21     ` Andrew Morton
2019-02-05 22:46       ` Randy Dunlap
2019-02-05 23:07         ` hpa
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] kbuild: Raise the minimum required binutils version to 2.21 Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02  2:45   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-05  0:08     ` Andrew Morton
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02  2:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics/macros " Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in the helper functions Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02  2:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Preserve FS/GS state in __switch_to() if FSGSBASE is on Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: When copying a thread, use the FSGSBASE instructions if available Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02 17:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Chang S. Bae
2019-02-02 17:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-13 18:46     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use the per-CPU base as GSBASE at the paranoid_entry Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test WRGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add documentation for FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-02-01 23:02 ` [PATCH v5 00/13] x86: Enable FSGSBASE instructions Andi Kleen
2019-02-02  2:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-05  6:26   ` hpa

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