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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: Encrypted Message
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 11:17:21 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190304171721.e6qyv722i32ilza4@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <03c35306-dca6-9299-3db6-7396ba82674a@redhat.com>

On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 10:58:01PM -0500, speck for Jon Masters wrote:

> On 3/3/19 8:24 PM, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > +		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> > +			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
> 
> It's never fully safe to use SMT. I get that if we only had MSBDS then
> it's unlikely we'll hit the e.g. power state change cases needed to
> exploit it but I think it would be prudent to display something anyway?

My understanding is that the idle state changes are mitigated elsewhere
in the MDS patches, so it should be safe in theory.

-- 
Josh

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-05 14:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-04  1:21 [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 0/4] Proposed cmdline improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  1:23 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  3:55   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 17:06     ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  7:30   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Greg KH
2019-03-04  7:45     ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04  1:24 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 2/4] 2 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  7:31   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-03-04 17:11     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  1:24 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  3:58   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 17:17     ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-03-06 16:22       ` Jon Masters
2019-03-04  7:33   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3 Greg KH
2019-03-04 17:18     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  1:25 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 4/4] 4 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  4:07   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-02-24 15:07 [MODERATED] [PATCH v6 00/43] MDSv6 Andi Kleen
2019-02-24 15:07 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v6 31/43] MDSv6 Andi Kleen
2019-02-25 15:19   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 15:34     ` Andi Kleen
2019-02-25 15:49       ` Greg KH
2019-02-25 15:52         ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-25 16:00           ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-21 23:44 [patch V3 0/9] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-21 23:44 ` [patch V3 4/9] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22  7:45   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-22 17:16     ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2019-02-21 19:26 [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2019-02-21 21:07 ` [MODERATED] " Jiri Kosina

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