From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_NEOMUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E9E6C43381 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB49220854 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731246AbfCYMWx (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 08:22:53 -0400 Received: from usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:46566 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731231AbfCYMWw (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 08:22:52 -0400 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 938CE80D; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 05:22:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mbp (usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com [217.140.101.70]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 54BBA3F575; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 05:22:50 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:47 +0000 From: Catalin Marinas To: Jeremy Linton Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, will.deacon@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, stefan.wahren@i2e.com, Andre.Przywara@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Message-ID: <20190325122247.5zyinkqmixmqg425@mbp> References: <20190321230557.45107-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190321230557.45107-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:47PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote: > Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable > vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in > /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities > > This series enables that behavior by providing the expected > functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature > states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately > to display the overall machine status. This means that in a > heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated > or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or > mitigated. > > v5->v6: > Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather > than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on > machines that are safe. This can happen when the > mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR. > This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled > other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the > machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown. > Trivial whitespace tweaks. The v6 logic looks fine to me. For the whole series: Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_NEOMUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33C1BC43381 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:23:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1FC820854 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:23:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="i5k0z/OO" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C1FC820854 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=80Q9C1UCszeOvm672gZVMqlroSIfhetKrNsKuB7rXaQ=; b=i5k0z/OOu7DgaQ Zuc3vc6TPCdNjD8+0MsvgpGaNnUujeT4AoyYfbMNJiiKlnux0jRrI5APqbdsGsYZNeQMnuaoyD8mh TzsAwy/kAsdKCv3JczbQap8ovLmkcC3ijVjfJfrSkjAZGDjLZkMJZSuzwrZp7Iy3QpvIE0weRX0Ny TqqifsSsrYx9tCSRwcUKhWjMw41uLYnxaj8WEG6RMgUQag6igKXy8K56BSKTbRA6238tveY80pXBc 5Y6VWkHIAYk9m7y61SdTR5AuK1bqrq6fzAn4Xtgyjc7yCk7d07N3k6Znd++kd+sqkoo+07XxnLdzd kispFkM9WkgUI2pCqUXw==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1h8Od3-0001hW-CQ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:23:01 +0000 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1h8Ocw-0001Z5-Ma for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:59 +0000 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 938CE80D; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 05:22:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mbp (usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com [217.140.101.70]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 54BBA3F575; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 05:22:50 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:47 +0000 From: Catalin Marinas To: Jeremy Linton Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Message-ID: <20190325122247.5zyinkqmixmqg425@mbp> References: <20190321230557.45107-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190321230557.45107-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190325_052254_950170_97C1EEE2 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 13.37 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, Andre.Przywara@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stefan.wahren@i2e.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:47PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote: > Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable > vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in > /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities > > This series enables that behavior by providing the expected > functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature > states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately > to display the overall machine status. This means that in a > heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated > or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or > mitigated. > > v5->v6: > Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather > than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on > machines that are safe. This can happen when the > mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR. > This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled > other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the > machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown. > Trivial whitespace tweaks. The v6 logic looks fine to me. For the whole series: Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel