From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga01.intel.com (mga01.intel.com [192.55.52.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC135211EABB3 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 07:12:27 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:12:23 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Message-ID: <20190325141223.GA13766@linux.intel.com> References: <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com> <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com> <20190322101227.GB3122@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" To: Dan Williams Cc: Silviu Vlasceanu , linux-nvdimm , James Bottomley , Roberto Sassu , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 08:24:01AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 3:12 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:45:47PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On 3/21/2019 5:30 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for > > > > > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail > > > > > > > trusted-key operations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") > > > > > > > Cc: Roberto Sassu > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: James Bottomley > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: Mimi Zohar > > > > > > > Cc: David Howells > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams > > > > > > > > > > > > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that > > > > > > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics > > > > > > are kind of inconsistent. > > > > > > > > > > If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key > > > > > instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems > > > > > sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until > > > > > module unloading, since we incremented the reference count. > > > > > > > > > > I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls > > > > > to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted(). > > > > > > > > > > trusted_instantiate() should look like: > > > > > --- > > > > > if (!chip) { > > > > > chip = tpm_default_chip(); > > > > > if (!chip) > > > > > return -ENODEV; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > if (!digests) { > > > > > ret = init_digests(); > > > > > if (ret < 0) > > > > > return ret; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail > > > > and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL. > > > > > > In addition, the changes I proposed would allow users to create trusted > > > keys if a TPM is added later. CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y and > > > CONFIG_TCG_TPM=m is a valid configuration. > > > > > > Jarkko, Dan's patch seems sufficient to fix the issue. He could include > > > the changes I proposed in his patch. What is your opinion? > > > > Agreed. > > What changes? > > Robert, please feel free to re-author the proposed patch however you > see fit, I just want whatever will get libnvdimm operational again in > the shortest amount of time. I've decided go with a patch of least innovation i.e. one that simply reverts the old behavior. Sending patch soon. /Jarkko _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:12:23 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Message-Id: <20190325141223.GA13766@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: References: <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com> <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com> <20190322101227.GB3122@linux.intel.com> In-Reply-To: To: Dan Williams Cc: Silviu Vlasceanu , linux-nvdimm , James Bottomley , Roberto Sassu , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 08:24:01AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 3:12 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:45:47PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On 3/21/2019 5:30 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for > > > > > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail > > > > > > > trusted-key operations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") > > > > > > > Cc: Roberto Sassu > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: James Bottomley > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: Mimi Zohar > > > > > > > Cc: David Howells > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams > > > > > > > > > > > > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that > > > > > > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics > > > > > > are kind of inconsistent. > > > > > > > > > > If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key > > > > > instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems > > > > > sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until > > > > > module unloading, since we incremented the reference count. > > > > > > > > > > I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls > > > > > to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted(). > > > > > > > > > > trusted_instantiate() should look like: > > > > > --- > > > > > if (!chip) { > > > > > chip = tpm_default_chip(); > > > > > if (!chip) > > > > > return -ENODEV; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > if (!digests) { > > > > > ret = init_digests(); > > > > > if (ret < 0) > > > > > return ret; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail > > > > and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL. > > > > > > In addition, the changes I proposed would allow users to create trusted > > > keys if a TPM is added later. CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y and > > > CONFIG_TCG_TPM=m is a valid configuration. > > > > > > Jarkko, Dan's patch seems sufficient to fix the issue. He could include > > > the changes I proposed in his patch. What is your opinion? > > > > Agreed. > > What changes? > > Robert, please feel free to re-author the proposed patch however you > see fit, I just want whatever will get libnvdimm operational again in > the shortest amount of time. I've decided go with a patch of least innovation i.e. one that simply reverts the old behavior. Sending patch soon. /Jarkko From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF2DCC43381 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:12:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BB892084D for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:12:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729009AbfCYOMb (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:12:31 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:23489 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725355AbfCYOMb (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:12:31 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Mar 2019 07:12:27 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,269,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="158193995" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.237.50.97]) by fmsmga001.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 25 Mar 2019 07:12:24 -0700 Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:12:23 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Dan Williams Cc: Roberto Sassu , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Silviu Vlasceanu Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Message-ID: <20190325141223.GA13766@linux.intel.com> References: <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com> <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com> <20190322101227.GB3122@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 08:24:01AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 3:12 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:45:47PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > On 3/21/2019 5:30 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for > > > > > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail > > > > > > > trusted-key operations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") > > > > > > > Cc: Roberto Sassu > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: James Bottomley > > > > > > > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > > > > > > > Cc: Mimi Zohar > > > > > > > Cc: David Howells > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams > > > > > > > > > > > > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that > > > > > > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics > > > > > > are kind of inconsistent. > > > > > > > > > > If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key > > > > > instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems > > > > > sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until > > > > > module unloading, since we incremented the reference count. > > > > > > > > > > I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls > > > > > to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted(). > > > > > > > > > > trusted_instantiate() should look like: > > > > > --- > > > > > if (!chip) { > > > > > chip = tpm_default_chip(); > > > > > if (!chip) > > > > > return -ENODEV; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > if (!digests) { > > > > > ret = init_digests(); > > > > > if (ret < 0) > > > > > return ret; > > > > > } > > > > > > > > This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail > > > > and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL. > > > > > > In addition, the changes I proposed would allow users to create trusted > > > keys if a TPM is added later. CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y and > > > CONFIG_TCG_TPM=m is a valid configuration. > > > > > > Jarkko, Dan's patch seems sufficient to fix the issue. He could include > > > the changes I proposed in his patch. What is your opinion? > > > > Agreed. > > What changes? > > Robert, please feel free to re-author the proposed patch however you > see fit, I just want whatever will get libnvdimm operational again in > the shortest amount of time. I've decided go with a patch of least innovation i.e. one that simply reverts the old behavior. Sending patch soon. /Jarkko