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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC/RFT PATCH 04/18] crypto: skcipher - restore default skcipher_walk::iv on error
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 13:04:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190331200428.26597-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190331200428.26597-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

When the user-provided IV buffer is not aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, skcipher_walk_virt() allocates an aligned buffer and copies
the IV into it.  However, skcipher_walk_virt() can fail after that
point, and in this case the buffer will be freed.

This causes a use-after-free read in callers that read from walk->iv
unconditionally, e.g. the LRW template.  For example, this can be
reproduced by trying to encrypt fewer than 16 bytes using "lrw(aes)".

Fix it by making skcipher_walk_first() reset walk->iv to walk->oiv if
skcipher_walk_next() fails.

This addresses a similar problem as commit 2b4f27c36bcd ("crypto:
skcipher - set walk.iv for zero-length inputs"), but that didn't
consider the case where skcipher_walk_virt() fails after copying the IV.

This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation, when the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel.

Fixes: b286d8b1a690 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/skcipher.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index bcf13d95f54ac..0f639f018047d 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -426,19 +426,27 @@ static int skcipher_copy_iv(struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 
 static int skcipher_walk_first(struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
+	int err;
+
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(in_irq()))
 		return -EDEADLK;
 
 	walk->buffer = NULL;
 	if (unlikely(((unsigned long)walk->iv & walk->alignmask))) {
-		int err = skcipher_copy_iv(walk);
+		err = skcipher_copy_iv(walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
 
 	walk->page = NULL;
 
-	return skcipher_walk_next(walk);
+	err = skcipher_walk_next(walk);
+
+	/* On error, don't leave 'walk->iv' pointing to freed buffer. */
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		walk->iv = walk->oiv;
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int skcipher_walk_skcipher(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-31 20:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-31 20:04 [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/18] crypto: fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 01/18] crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix overflow during partial reduction Eric Biggers
2019-04-01  7:52   ` Martin Willi
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 02/18] crypto: crct10dif-generic - fix use via crypto_shash_digest() Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 03/18] crypto: x86/crct10dif-pcl " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-04-08  6:23   ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 04/18] crypto: skcipher - restore default skcipher_walk::iv on error Herbert Xu
2019-04-08 17:27     ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-09  6:37       ` Herbert Xu
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 05/18] crypto: skcipher - don't WARN on unprocessed data after slow walk step Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 06/18] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - set cra_name correctly Eric Biggers
2019-04-01  7:57   ` Martin Willi
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 07/18] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 15:56   ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 08/18] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-02 15:48   ` Sasha Levin
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 09/18] crypto: streebog - fix unaligned memory accesses Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 21:47   ` Vitaly Chikunov
2019-04-02 16:15     ` Vitaly Chikunov
2019-04-02 16:57       ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 10/18] crypto: cts - don't support empty messages Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 11/18] crypto: arm64/cbcmac - handle empty messages in same way as template Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 12/18] crypto: testmgr - expand ability to test for errors Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 13/18] crypto: testmgr - identify test vectors by name rather than number Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 14/18] crypto: testmgr - add helpers for fuzzing against generic implementation Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 15/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz hashes against their " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 16/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz skciphers " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 17/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz AEADs " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 18/18] crypto: run initcalls for generic implementations earlier Eric Biggers
2019-04-08  5:53   ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-08 17:44     ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-09  6:24       ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-09 18:16         ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-11  6:26           ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-08  6:44 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/18] crypto: fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation Herbert Xu

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