All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
To: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FSDEVEL Mailinglist <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 09:56:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190402075657.GA14882@linux-8ccs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190401090113.22946-1-jthumshirn@suse.de>

+++ Johannes Thumshirn [01/04/19 11:01 +0200]:
>Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not
>thousands of security vulnerabilities.
>
>One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes
>called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then
>abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using
>memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
>
>Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so
>I've decided to put an end to it.
>
>If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM
>indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux
>anymore.
>
>Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>

Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

:-)

>---
> fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644
>--- a/fs/open.c
>+++ b/fs/open.c
>@@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
> 	struct open_flags op;
> 	int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
> 	struct filename *tmp;
>+	char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>+	int i;
>+	static const char * const list[] = {
>+		"syzkaller",
>+		"syz-executor,"
>+		"trinity",
>+		NULL
>+	};
>+
>+	get_task_comm(comm, current);
>+
>+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)
>+		if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))
>+			return -EPERM;
>
> 	if (fd)
> 		return fd;
>-- 
>2.16.4
>

      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-02  7:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-01  9:01 Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:22 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-04-01 11:48   ` Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:53 ` Mukesh Ojha
2019-04-01 13:04 ` Torsten Duwe
2019-04-01 14:14 ` Nikolay Borisov
2019-04-01 17:28   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-04-01 21:27     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-01 17:38 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 20:35 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-04-02  7:56 ` Jessica Yu [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190402075657.GA14882@linux-8ccs \
    --to=jeyu@kernel.org \
    --cc=jthumshirn@suse.de \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --subject='Re: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs' \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.