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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH V32 25/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
Date: Wed,  3 Apr 2019 17:32:47 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190404003249.14356-26-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit.  This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.

The message now patterned something like:

        Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
 security/lock_down.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
index 9913fff09ad0..2659722784cc 100644
--- a/security/lock_down.c
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, enum lockdown_level level,
 			     bool first)
 {
 	if ((kernel_locked_down >= level) && what && first)
-		pr_notice("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
-			  what);
+		pr_notice("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+			  current->comm, what);
 	return (kernel_locked_down >= level);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_is_locked_down);
-- 
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-04  0:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-04  0:32 [PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-04-16  8:40   ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-16  8:40     ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-18  6:38     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-18  6:38       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-18 19:35     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-18 19:35       ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-29  0:06       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-29  0:06         ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-29  4:54         ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-29  4:54           ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-30  5:15           ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-30  5:15             ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-29 22:56   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-02 21:07     ` James Morris
2019-05-02 21:15       ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-02 23:19         ` James Morris
2019-05-03  0:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 08/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 09/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  7:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 16/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 17/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 18/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  1:33   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-04-04  7:47   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 20/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 21/27] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-30 19:19   ` Jann Horn
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 23/27] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 24/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04  0:32 ` [PATCH V32 27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 13:39   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-04-04 20:09     ` Matthew Garrett

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