From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82558C4360F for ; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F56820820 for ; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="cTbmRxtu" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728738AbfDDAfZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Apr 2019 20:35:25 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f202.google.com ([209.85.167.202]:40927 "EHLO mail-oi1-f202.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726655AbfDDAdH (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Apr 2019 20:33:07 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f202.google.com with SMTP id q82so345867oif.7 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2019 17:33:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=cTbmRxtu2jUwcJETn1cw2HiL44MplIt+di+W0OqpKWmtj0D+RjaWKI6JUmwDvqOjgc Rl96fi5FPAJb06vs3tp+PtGIXumG8NcOOZdl96kpieo3+S/JUj6mocPiKjl0ZUYS40Gy 9Bi3BAPvZVKk8p6ORLM1tRfxHvU55s9pgGNijeTtpD4/UCgvsJ5LLMGhqk0gLL6/3nSO eZvDEvkUN/JIr/KgnIbcdcF5qWY+SiuWdu8O/9z1tVt2QFjSefCCnpamKII+wI6rIG8c oEPm3tbJ2jTPZch5fe5hzqK76tr/s3RmZkXLbhe92GGHVvJyD0BNCPAMfcmoyIZLa2W5 w+/Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=GPa/WreSAXslP6f4qq8Xotl2usFdAN5lYxDP39lDG7wSviJEPH7uLqwKZKlT7dc+cs gG8ILpWXDGzOlhhBD8p6ejHHCgjCejxbPRKYSGWoVf4zWszrTdG9aLLkQK8xPnepPC0D IOPkDOoTMRElr+9716vkXhvm0c0kkJsH533eRJPyGLdQDbtgp3xCTz9OfX0uzk+fZmuI 1couK7C+TJCkIQLBiaegZPJpEHxw8W3K0Dy8UGJNipBTbtFbdyft6xt+R2PS4CAGxVmw Dh16ZWyNk6btAwVtqV+4CXbFhisn8SO2kY/rL7xS8qc9eMPgDvsoTNaAYnUitywnWoI3 cfkw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVziRh9x5ukKlX2nVzfhAaaz19Q5jWJ+I3w5mAJAKrsSBXd04c2 fgUk/J6QcSOgeS7XBOFqbxhynzWwe8Gd0W6kjhSTMQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzeF/5ARGboj1rgaNG0wh8/NpDdVQj41bbjjfIzlbjV3l72O+FbucqOLXfi3OQDi/HWRtdsLh1FkxcoQ+FI+UeeQA== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6208:: with SMTP id g8mr289988otj.15.1554337987036; Wed, 03 Apr 2019 17:33:07 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:27 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Dave Young , Matthew Garrett , kexec@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Garrett Subject: [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:27 -0700 Message-ID: <20190404003249.14356-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> References: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+glkk-kexec=m.gmane.org-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org To: jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org Cc: linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Matthew Garrett , dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, Dave Young List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett cc: kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mail-ot1-x349.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4864:20::349]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hBqJb-0007ho-C4 for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 04 Apr 2019 00:33:12 +0000 Received: by mail-ot1-x349.google.com with SMTP id j17so298676otp.9 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2019 17:33:07 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:27 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Subject: [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Dave Young From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec