From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47113C282DD for ; Thu, 23 May 2019 19:24:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D4D221850 for ; Thu, 23 May 2019 19:24:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1558639499; bh=cLLt/rInlk/yS1RnHy6KiOCgBywX0s/xE3MlAWS9mKY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=RP1Wvq4SM8JswPfJcYHB+GxD54YsMFPPT5XgpALg8+yO+WVB3/8imj8roOvadfzSP B5wdltSFBYgxM3BoaUbAcBvXxmhdHJRcXfhiNMm1jgzEN3o9Dr49FQlmtDmgP7+SVb y4xmO7MrbfNNmfwlfc+akV+HmU29DGWoL/YZWQHo= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389936AbfEWTY6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 May 2019 15:24:58 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:36118 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2391016AbfEWTYz (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 May 2019 15:24:55 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4009920868; Thu, 23 May 2019 19:24:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1558639494; bh=cLLt/rInlk/yS1RnHy6KiOCgBywX0s/xE3MlAWS9mKY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NoE6keBiJuXJbGi9nwr5kuWZ4EtHODzPOAr+sKn+01X8m9Nh/dOg1nlAFplZ3B5oP 9+1g+jL3WtXWfc5sK4Jrym0jINW/b94Rz7eSdI2KS6maQqQUe+nqiBM3odWSebYft8 v+r/YMRC3ThbRs5H4+Ev+LSJZIAtfvg5yb2FX2QY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Li RongQing , Gary R Hook , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Shishkin , Andrew Morton , Andy Shevchenko , Boris Brezillon , Coly Li , "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , Kees Cook , Kent Overstreet , "luto@kernel.org" , Masahiro Yamada , Matthew Wilcox , "peterz@infradead.org" , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , Thomas Gleixner , x86-ml , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.0 126/139] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 21:06:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20190523181735.737390919@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190523181720.120897565@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190523181720.120897565@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ Upstream commit b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f ] Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'. To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem is initialized. For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot failure. When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c. [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ] Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption") Reported-by: Li RongQing Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Boris Brezillon Cc: Coly Li Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Kent Overstreet Cc: "luto@kernel.org" Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 12 ++++++++++++ lib/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index 140e61843a079..3cb3af51ec897 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -6,6 +6,18 @@ # Produces uninteresting flaky coverage. KCOV_INSTRUMENT_delay.o := n +# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it +ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n + +ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER +CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg +endif + +CFLAGS_cmdline.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) +endif + inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN $@ diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index e1b59da714186..d1f312096bec5 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n +# Early boot use of cmdline, don't instrument it +ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n + +ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER +CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o = -pg +endif + +CFLAGS_string.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) +endif + lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \ idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \ -- 2.20.1