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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	"ehabkost@redhat.com" <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2019 20:05:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190711190541.GU3971@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190710202219.25939-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

* Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
> The SEV VMs have concept of private and shared memory. The private memory
> is encrypted with guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted
> with hyperivosr key. The KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP can be used to get a
> bitmap indicating whether the guest page is private or shared. A private
> page must be transmitted using the SEV migration commands.
> 
> Add a cpu_physical_memory_sync_encrypted_bitmap() which can be used to sync
> the page encryption bitmap for a given memory region.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c     |  38 ++++++++++
>  include/exec/ram_addr.h | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  include/exec/ramlist.h  |   3 +-
>  migration/ram.c         |  28 ++++++-
>  4 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 162a2d5085..c935e9366c 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -504,6 +504,37 @@ static int kvm_get_dirty_pages_log_range(MemoryRegionSection *section,
>  
>  #define ALIGN(x, y)  (((x)+(y)-1) & ~((y)-1))
>  
> +/* sync page_enc bitmap */
> +static int kvm_sync_page_enc_bitmap(KVMMemoryListener *kml,
> +                                    MemoryRegionSection *section,
> +                                    KVMSlot *mem)

How AMD/SEV specific is this? i.e. should this be in a target/ specific
place? 

> +{
> +    unsigned long size;
> +    KVMState *s = kvm_state;
> +    struct kvm_page_enc_bitmap e = {};
> +    ram_addr_t pages = int128_get64(section->size) / getpagesize();
> +    ram_addr_t start = section->offset_within_region +
> +                       memory_region_get_ram_addr(section->mr);
> +
> +    size = ALIGN(((mem->memory_size) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS),
> +                 /*HOST_LONG_BITS*/ 64) / 8;
> +    e.enc_bitmap = g_malloc0(size);
> +    e.start_gfn = mem->start_addr >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +    e.num_pages = pages;
> +    if (kvm_vm_ioctl(s, KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP, &e) == -1) {
> +        DPRINTF("KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl failed %d\n", errno);
> +        g_free(e.enc_bitmap);
> +        return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_lebitmap(e.enc_bitmap,
> +                                               start, pages);
> +
> +    g_free(e.enc_bitmap);
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * kvm_physical_sync_dirty_bitmap - Grab dirty bitmap from kernel space
>   * This function updates qemu's dirty bitmap using
> @@ -553,6 +584,13 @@ static int kvm_physical_sync_dirty_bitmap(KVMMemoryListener *kml,
>          }
>  
>          kvm_get_dirty_pages_log_range(section, d.dirty_bitmap);
> +
> +        if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled() &&
> +            kvm_sync_page_enc_bitmap(kml, section, mem)) {
> +            g_free(d.dirty_bitmap);
> +            return -1;
> +        }
> +
>          g_free(d.dirty_bitmap);
>      }
>  
> diff --git a/include/exec/ram_addr.h b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> index f96777bb99..6fc6864194 100644
> --- a/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> +++ b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct RAMBlock {
>      unsigned long *unsentmap;
>      /* bitmap of already received pages in postcopy */
>      unsigned long *receivedmap;
> +    /* bitmap of page encryption state for an encrypted guest */
> +    unsigned long *encbmap;
>  };
>  
>  static inline bool offset_in_ramblock(RAMBlock *b, ram_addr_t offset)
> @@ -314,9 +316,41 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
>  }
>  
>  #if !defined(_WIN32)
> -static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
> +
> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_range(ram_addr_t start,
> +                                                           ram_addr_t length,
> +                                                           unsigned long val)
> +{
> +    unsigned long end, page;
> +    unsigned long * const *src;
> +
> +    if (length == 0) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
> +    end = TARGET_PAGE_ALIGN(start + length) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +    page = start >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +
> +    rcu_read_lock();
> +
> +    src = atomic_rcu_read(&ram_list.dirty_memory[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED])->blocks;
> +
> +    while (page < end) {
> +        unsigned long idx = page / DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
> +        unsigned long offset = page % DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
> +        unsigned long num = MIN(end - page, DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE - offset);
> +
> +        atomic_xchg(&src[idx][BIT_WORD(offset)], val);
> +        page += num;
> +    }
> +
> +    rcu_read_unlock();
> +}
> +
> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>                                                            ram_addr_t start,
> -                                                          ram_addr_t pages)
> +                                                          ram_addr_t pages,
> +                                                          bool enc_map)
>  {
>      unsigned long i, j;
>      unsigned long page_number, c;
> @@ -349,10 +383,14 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>              if (bitmap[k]) {
>                  unsigned long temp = leul_to_cpu(bitmap[k]);
>  
> -                atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION][idx][offset], temp);
> -                atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA][idx][offset], temp);
> -                if (tcg_enabled()) {
> -                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE][idx][offset], temp);
> +                if (enc_map) {
> +                    atomic_xchg(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED][idx][offset], temp);

It makes me nervous that this is almost but not exactly like the other
bitmaps;  I *think* you're saying the bits here are purely a matter of
state about whether the page is encrypted and not a matter of actually
dirtyness; in particular a page that is encrypted and then becomes dirty
doesn't reset or clear this flag.

> +                } else {
> +                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION][idx][offset], temp);
> +                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA][idx][offset], temp);
> +                    if (tcg_enabled()) {
> +                        atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE][idx][offset], temp);
> +                    }
>                  }
>              }
>  
> @@ -372,6 +410,17 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>           * especially when most of the memory is not dirty.
>           */
>          for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
> +
> +            /* If its encrypted bitmap update, then we need to copy the bitmap
> +             * value as-is to the destination.
> +             */
> +            if (enc_map) {
> +                cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_range(start + i * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE,
> +                                                        TARGET_PAGE_SIZE * hpratio,
> +                                                        leul_to_cpu(bitmap[i]));
> +                continue;
> +            }
> +
>              if (bitmap[i] != 0) {
>                  c = leul_to_cpu(bitmap[i]);
>                  do {
> @@ -387,6 +436,21 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>          }
>      }
>  }
> +
> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
> +                                                              ram_addr_t start,
> +                                                              ram_addr_t pages)
> +{
> +    return cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(bitmap, start, pages, true);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
> +                                                          ram_addr_t start,
> +                                                          ram_addr_t pages)
> +{
> +    return cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(bitmap, start, pages, false);
> +}
> +
>  #endif /* not _WIN32 */
>  
>  bool cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(ram_addr_t start,
> @@ -406,6 +470,7 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_clear_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
>      cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION);
>      cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA);
>      cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE);
> +    cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED);

What are the ordering/consistency rules associated with this data.
Specifically:

  Consider a page that transitions from being shared to encrypted
(does that happen?) - but we've just done the sync's so we know the page
is dirty, but we don't know it's encrypted; so we transmit the page as
unencrypted; what happens?

  I *think* that means we should always sync the encryped bitmap before
the dirty bitmap, so that if it flips we're guaranteed the dirty bitmap
gets flipped again after the flip has happened; but my brain is starting
to hurt....

  But, even if we're guaranteed to have a dirty for the next time
around, I think we're always at risk of transmitting a page that
has just flipped; so we'll be sure to transmit it again correctly,
but we might transmit an encrypted page to a non-encrypted dest or
the reverse - is that OK?


>  }
>  
>  
> @@ -474,5 +539,89 @@ uint64_t cpu_physical_memory_sync_dirty_bitmap(RAMBlock *rb,
>  
>      return num_dirty;
>  }
> +
> +static inline bool cpu_physical_memory_test_encrypted(ram_addr_t start,
> +                                                      ram_addr_t length)
> +{
> +    unsigned long end, page;
> +    bool enc = false;
> +    unsigned long * const *src;
> +
> +    if (length == 0) {
> +        return enc;
> +    }
> +
> +    end = TARGET_PAGE_ALIGN(start + length) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +    page = start >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +
> +    rcu_read_lock();
> +
> +    src = atomic_rcu_read(&ram_list.dirty_memory[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED])->blocks;
> +
> +    while (page < end) {
> +        unsigned long idx = page / DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
> +        unsigned long offset = page % DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
> +        unsigned long num = MIN(end - page, DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE - offset);
> +
> +        enc |= atomic_read(&src[idx][BIT_WORD(offset)]);

I'm confused; I thought what I was about to get there was a long* and
you were going to mask out a bit or set of bits.

> +        page += num;
> +    }
> +
> +    rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +    return enc;
> +}
> +
> +static inline
> +void cpu_physical_memory_sync_encrypted_bitmap(RAMBlock *rb,
> +                                               ram_addr_t start,
> +                                               ram_addr_t length)
> +{
> +    ram_addr_t addr;
> +    unsigned long word = BIT_WORD((start + rb->offset) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> +    unsigned long *dest = rb->encbmap;
> +
> +    /* start address and length is aligned at the start of a word? */
> +    if (((word * BITS_PER_LONG) << TARGET_PAGE_BITS) ==
> +         (start + rb->offset) &&
> +        !(length & ((BITS_PER_LONG << TARGET_PAGE_BITS) - 1))) {
> +        int k;
> +        int nr = BITS_TO_LONGS(length >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS);

Feels odd it's an int.

> +        unsigned long * const *src;
> +        unsigned long idx = (word * BITS_PER_LONG) / DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
> +        unsigned long offset = BIT_WORD((word * BITS_PER_LONG) %
> +                                        DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE);
> +        unsigned long page = BIT_WORD(start >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> +
> +        rcu_read_lock();
> +
> +        src = atomic_rcu_read(
> +                &ram_list.dirty_memory[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED])->blocks;
> +
> +        for (k = page; k < page + nr; k++) {
> +            unsigned long bits = atomic_read(&src[idx][offset]);
> +            dest[k] = bits;
> +
> +            if (++offset >= BITS_TO_LONGS(DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
> +                offset = 0;
> +                idx++;
> +            }
> +        }
> +
> +        rcu_read_unlock();
> +    } else {
> +        ram_addr_t offset = rb->offset;
> +
> +        for (addr = 0; addr < length; addr += TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
> +            long k = (start + addr) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
> +            if (cpu_physical_memory_test_encrypted(start + addr + offset,
> +                                                   TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
> +                set_bit(k, dest);
> +            } else {
> +                clear_bit(k, dest);
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }
> +}
>  #endif
>  #endif
> diff --git a/include/exec/ramlist.h b/include/exec/ramlist.h
> index bc4faa1b00..2a5eab8b11 100644
> --- a/include/exec/ramlist.h
> +++ b/include/exec/ramlist.h
> @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ typedef struct RAMBlockNotifier RAMBlockNotifier;
>  #define DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA       0
>  #define DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE      1
>  #define DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION 2
> -#define DIRTY_MEMORY_NUM       3        /* num of dirty bits */
> +#define DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED 3
> +#define DIRTY_MEMORY_NUM       4        /* num of dirty bits */
>  
>  /* The dirty memory bitmap is split into fixed-size blocks to allow growth
>   * under RCU.  The bitmap for a block can be accessed as follows:
> diff --git a/migration/ram.c b/migration/ram.c
> index 3c8977d508..d179867e1b 100644
> --- a/migration/ram.c
> +++ b/migration/ram.c
> @@ -1680,6 +1680,9 @@ static void migration_bitmap_sync_range(RAMState *rs, RAMBlock *rb,
>      rs->migration_dirty_pages +=
>          cpu_physical_memory_sync_dirty_bitmap(rb, 0, length,
>                                                &rs->num_dirty_pages_period);
> +    if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
> +        cpu_physical_memory_sync_encrypted_bitmap(rb, 0, length);
> +    }
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2465,6 +2468,22 @@ static bool save_compress_page(RAMState *rs, RAMBlock *block, ram_addr_t offset)
>      return false;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * encrypted_test_bitmap: check if the page is encrypted
> + *
> + * Returns a bool indicating whether the page is encrypted.
> + */
> +static bool encrypted_test_bitmap(RAMState *rs, RAMBlock *block,
> +                                  unsigned long page)
> +{
> +    /* ROM devices contains the unencrypted data */
> +    if (memory_region_is_rom(block->mr)) {
> +        return false;
> +    }
> +
> +    return test_bit(page, block->encbmap);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * ram_save_target_page: save one target page
>   *
> @@ -2491,7 +2510,8 @@ static int ram_save_target_page(RAMState *rs, PageSearchStatus *pss,
>       * will take care of accessing the guest memory and re-encrypt it
>       * for the transport purposes.
>       */
> -     if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
> +     if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled() &&
> +         encrypted_test_bitmap(rs, pss->block, pss->page)) {
>          return ram_save_encrypted_page(rs, pss, last_stage);
>       }
>  
> @@ -2724,6 +2744,8 @@ static void ram_save_cleanup(void *opaque)
>          block->bmap = NULL;
>          g_free(block->unsentmap);
>          block->unsentmap = NULL;
> +        g_free(block->encbmap);
> +        block->encbmap = NULL;
>      }
>  
>      xbzrle_cleanup();
> @@ -3251,6 +3273,10 @@ static void ram_list_init_bitmaps(void)
>                  block->unsentmap = bitmap_new(pages);
>                  bitmap_set(block->unsentmap, 0, pages);
>              }
> +            if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
> +                block->encbmap = bitmap_new(pages);
> +                bitmap_set(block->encbmap, 0, pages);
> +            }
>          }
>      }
>  }
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK


  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-11 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-10 20:22 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/13] Add SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:22 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 01/13] linux-headers: update kernel header to include SEV migration commands Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 03/13] migration/ram: add support to send encrypted pages Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 17:34   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:43     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12  9:27       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:46         ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 02/13] kvm: introduce high-level API to support encrypted page migration Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 17:47   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:46     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 05/13] doc: update AMD SEV API spec web link Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 18:06   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 13:31     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 19:05   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2019-07-12 14:57     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-16 11:44       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-16 15:08         ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/13] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 14:29   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-24 22:21   ` Venu Busireddy
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 07/13] target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12  9:51   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 08/13] misc.json: add migrate-set-sev-info command Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 10:00   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 10:09     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-07-12 15:04       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 09/13] target/i386: sev: add support to encrypt the outgoing page Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 10:43   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:19     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 15:24       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 10/13] target/i386: sev: add support to load incoming encrypted page Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:02   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:20     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 11/13] kvm: introduce high-level API to migrate the page encryption bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 12/13] migration: add support to migrate " Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:30   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:42     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 13/13] target/i386: sev: remove migration blocker Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:37   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/13] Add SEV guest live migration support no-reply
2019-07-10 20:54 ` no-reply
2019-07-11  9:59 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:44   ` Singh, Brijesh

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