From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6366DC76195 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 20:01:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F98A2145D for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 20:01:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="nYfXtqFp" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732845AbfGOUBa (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:01:30 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f201.google.com ([209.85.215.201]:44997 "EHLO mail-pg1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732711AbfGOUBA (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:01:00 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f201.google.com with SMTP id a21so11081479pgh.11 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:01:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=7AN62uUjggsGkjuR8QbGPFtdpCdy/nAEaFCETV075VE=; b=nYfXtqFp5FLgsTl8pZGFenfAnwsXmlefH7SI4eBPK7rsLgTBTW80J9EyEUmyu/hNt2 NX5HZEqJ2BSuU/Uh6ge6MS58RHOOFFWd3N24Yzd0IXbi/ypUhi5O5gT1tRnYFCa4QsHw J3BbNIAqto+NfQr2Vnh9ewyGrWPdlUUAYbUNfGWd0EwCeswjvLylfuIW1hWdEGyOI8uX mud0kvUHOZjqQykLAaetipJ1/EPph1jHn/GRpJJhN6GW44GhYMFwQrNWO/a0gUeidxbT havga/zHmY1SkUyNyYgRDpfHWudIkh56dDfvZpYE85QVjNHh/rjk+Y8fW/X1SqzyluWH Vzkw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=7AN62uUjggsGkjuR8QbGPFtdpCdy/nAEaFCETV075VE=; b=pIX0a3m4vidtCzv2DFQPeOSAO4DBLJ3dw17AMgzifDDQZcTQ3TOG9d7pO0E7wMumgX 74v8EpLoaU0pRMe/hYjAjoHJwZEQiKlCurjZ8O9YUT76mpQXCfYrCvtg3KEFNCfxAMfw nYHEF9Ggfsl2AN9KyZCn6gYjXAj4McL0GEiR6IMm2AGraG9cGdvssfbnz7B3QMAQh8Xx egOTQSH+XjYIoylZL0eGNAeilTcytVum4XuuPJX0d3KsUceL04dI/1iUnCubqufk6kvn mYNgo8D7R4hjC2v0f6ab7YW65lS3JJWHiP3YPiC3vqjOGEu1vqWyKKJfz/jBoLbp0BXF 6Rzw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVxi4WUyEwlMSHyLCnHiAQy6AF3QDo9hfPI3C9TJ16a4+Vm87r+ yxZ1jvhQgZLd5LGAkJD2klpvrdpcg8v5V84v0yfZOQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw82UEBKJiBPfo6CHgts6BJHnNBk8mmORY2P9YBkhrle331njX7YlHvBzaq4hJ9V3RAeLcJexIq9SecpHpQ0NvkbA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:e54f:: with SMTP id z15mr28757422pgj.4.1563220859521; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:00:59 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:42 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190715195946.223443-26-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog Subject: [PATCH V35 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 12 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index a20ad398d260..1c37f17f7203 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -131,4 +131,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index dd06f1070d66..13c9960a5860 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -228,9 +228,17 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, goto out; } - ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC); - if (ret) + ret = 0; + + /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec + * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked + * down. + */ + if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) && + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) { + ret = -EPERM; goto out; + } break; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 011b91c79351..64dcb11cf444 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); #else diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 584019728660..b9f57503af2c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) return 0; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 6df7f641ff66..827f1e33fe86 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1456,3 +1456,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +/* + * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using + * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel + * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply + * loading additional keys. + */ +bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + bool found = false; + enum ima_hooks func; + + if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) + return false; + + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) + continue; + + /* + * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it + * match the func we're looking for + */ + if (entry->func && entry->func != func) + continue; + + /* + * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA + * hash. + */ + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + found = true; + + /* + * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it + * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does + * won't override it, so would be a false positive. + */ + break; + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); + return found; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ -- 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog