From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 367D8C76191 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 20:02:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0713920665 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 20:02:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="AxSl7ByC" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732903AbfGOUCf (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:02:35 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-f201.google.com ([209.85.210.201]:53380 "EHLO mail-pf1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732275AbfGOUAM (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:00:12 -0400 Received: by mail-pf1-f201.google.com with SMTP id 191so10839112pfy.20 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:00:12 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=Ze1m51/U9qyeKdYZTkURxXHO7/2Jq1vWiS2UsV2hr9c=; b=AxSl7ByC571hgB4NOLtS7SsxUTZj2nJz1kjFEvu6QXZNWkTAq4ckIZ3uMUWLg+omXa gQCF60SO+5FhvuloODfitEKxnqK2Ud9Ke7Ut2KXrASynck2/yJDhEmUCv/SiCL/LnS6Z foFn7LR0MludcBbwvt/rK79Awp3YN1kE+UStUw6ZmdDsTm4ffGswjufyLrxfXF6AE/NN 7a+spbgSULZAlT5LjRxTXyiyoO5QMa8kyRslayysR0pLUMt4Sna3aoVdhhA3DgT6uj94 DwwivdBwt/SuDS6eAWJhtbrGn7o2yongnexmhT6mrymBMoRm2BEZbfvlnh4PW+U/EQ41 XlvQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=Ze1m51/U9qyeKdYZTkURxXHO7/2Jq1vWiS2UsV2hr9c=; b=rGjMMkQuCkkSyIcE2OE61ao1YJa77z9zeF1Magfz0/him/QVnIEzlFaW8d/sWFXzxU uvgD8lnBuZfF8olhT5rWA0VPtxqWy0yjUBKBPND0WHy8iKK30nZqI1AHJ4ufuJ2mqUMJ m5wycJ5FkLdGyptcNSkno5vBYcQO/ZrKLnBwiuFdKK8kXZVFkAqWHLp49CfpL4nVdrFl CWzxOPEGujYtIuaZk3WWk7Lv5PKjEE11KrE80R1doyIt2ofYMq3/0vJeLFaw5pV65pNF 1pOzASt+F1uFQfpuZf/gJvUJ0LmY4aZMDso8YwReIfY2tZ+tRho4hziHat02Wxb81Jh1 zlmA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAX3cZio0EZ/P9V5/dXvATV6J+XRGb8MnN9KQpL7ZyJyeaRdmGTV e9Rm5KimBUMJB4lUcbFUhLXr+Ov2Z7LhmHKLoaRRng== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw3kz8vxqJr04RTj1gLbL27dI8ApTISQuqjlO54p7acDyqHccEy7zqlCPthKqcQRy7/95xxR7ZdHBOEJmGBPjFQUA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:2ad5:: with SMTP id q204mr15899633pgq.140.1563220811612; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:00:11 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young , David Howells , Matthew Garrett , Kees Cook , kexec@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Garrett Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 Message-ID: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> References: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+glkk-kexec=m.gmane.org-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org To: jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org Cc: Kees Cook , linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Matthew Garrett , David Howells , linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Dave Young List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mail-pl1-x649.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4864:20::649]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hn78x-0002Hf-Ov for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 20:00:17 +0000 Received: by mail-pl1-x649.google.com with SMTP id k9so8812278pls.13 for ; Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:00:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: Kees Cook , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , David Howells , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec