From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
nhorman@tuxdriver.com,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Subject: Re: Non-random RDRAND Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 11:12:24 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190815151224.GB18727@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190814232434.GA31769@amd>
On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 01:24:35AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Burn it with fire!
>
> I mean... people were afraid RDRAND would be backdoored, and you now
> confirm ... it indeed _is_ backdoored? /., here's news for you!
To be fair to AMD, I wouldn't call it a backdoor. Hanlon's razor is
applicable here:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately
explained by neglect."
(Sometimes other words are used instead of neglect, but i'm trying to
be nice.)
- Ted
P.S. Also applicable:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZxzJGgox_E
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-15 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-14 21:17 [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h Lendacky, Thomas
2019-08-14 23:24 ` Non-random RDRAND " Pavel Machek
2019-08-14 23:38 ` Pavel Machek
2019-08-15 13:01 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-08-15 15:12 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2019-08-16 9:07 ` Pavel Machek
2019-08-16 14:42 ` Neil Horman
2019-08-15 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-15 13:47 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-08-15 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-15 20:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-15 20:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-08-15 21:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-15 21:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-15 21:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-08-17 8:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-17 11:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-08-18 16:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 15:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
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