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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linus.walleij@linaro.org, rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH for-stable-4.4 28/50] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
Date: Fri,  8 Nov 2019 13:35:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191108123554.29004-29-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191108123554.29004-1-ardb@kernel.org>

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 1d4238c56f9816ce0f9c8dbe42d7f2ad81cb6613 upstream.

Add an implementation of the array_index_mask_nospec() function for
mitigating Spectre variant 1 throughout the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
index edd9e633a84b..8514b70704de 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -108,5 +108,26 @@ do {									\
 #define smp_mb__before_atomic()	smp_mb()
 #define smp_mb__after_atomic()	smp_mb()
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
+						    unsigned long sz)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		"cmp	%1, %2\n"
+	"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"
+	CSDB
+	: "=r" (mask)
+	: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+	: "cc");
+
+	return mask;
+}
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+#endif
+
+#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __ASM_BARRIER_H */
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-11-08 12:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-08 12:35 [PATCH for-stable-4.4 00/50] ARM: spectre v1/v2 mitigations Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 01/50] ARM: 8051/1: put_user: fix possible data corruption in put_user Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 02/50] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 03/50] ARM: 8479/2: add implementation for arm-smccc Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 04/50] ARM: 8480/2: arm64: " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 05/50] ARM: 8481/2: drivers: psci: replace psci firmware calls Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 06/50] ARM: uaccess: remove put_user() code duplication Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 07/50] ARM: Move system register accessors to asm/cp15.h Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 08/50] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 13:11   ` Greg KH
2019-11-08 13:29     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 13:39       ` Greg KH
2019-11-08 13:39     ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2019-11-08 13:48       ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 09/50] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 10/50] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 11/50] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 12/50] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 13/50] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 14/50] arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 15/50] arm/arm64: smccc-1.1: Make return values unsigned long Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 16/50] arm/arm64: smccc-1.1: Handle function result as parameters Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 17/50] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 18/50] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 19/50] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 20/50] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 21/50] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 22/50] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 23/50] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 24/50] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 25/50] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 13:13   ` Greg KH
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 26/50] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 27/50] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 29/50] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 30/50] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 31/50] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 32/50] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 33/50] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 34/50] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 35/50] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 36/50] ARM: 8789/1: signal: copy registers using __copy_to_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 37/50] ARM: 8791/1: vfp: use __copy_to_user() when saving VFP state Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 38/50] ARM: 8792/1: oabi-compat: copy oabi events using __copy_to_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 39/50] ARM: 8793/1: signal: replace __put_user_error with __put_user Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 40/50] ARM: 8794/1: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 41/50] ARM: 8795/1: spectre-v1.1: use put_user() for __put_user() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 42/50] ARM: 8796/1: spectre-v1,v1.1: provide helpers for address sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 43/50] ARM: 8810/1: vfp: Fix wrong assignement to ufp_exc Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 44/50] ARM: make lookup_processor_type() non-__init Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 45/50] ARM: split out processor lookup Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 46/50] ARM: clean up per-processor check_bugs method call Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 47/50] ARM: add PROC_VTABLE and PROC_TABLE macros Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 48/50] ARM: spectre-v2: per-CPU vtables to work around big.Little systems Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 49/50] ARM: ensure that processor vtables is not lost after boot Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 12:35 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 50/50] ARM: fix the cockup in the previous patch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-08 13:15 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.4 00/50] ARM: spectre v1/v2 mitigations Greg KH
2019-11-08 15:43 ` Linus Walleij

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