From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9326C33CA9 for ; Mon, 13 Jan 2020 17:23:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9524F21556 for ; Mon, 13 Jan 2020 17:23:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1578936200; bh=yc2upCJC1oIV4r6mrOZ4qqD4lozYeYb8kOlT9po9Zz4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=ydoZ/jbJPPqH3nWVlFqS9GSwrmltpSESnqc3DL3CVen6T9+yJP88vuQGjg+yLz0cP a/vkF1GV0K0MffCgwcNbqNb/9DQ+J7ae3m4e0aGCuAi65/wYFL1+u98MXxYBBbgD1d t9bkzW7jo6gmxSb2DThjRfkKAT02cPj3U4XrLOc8= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728869AbgAMRXT (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jan 2020 12:23:19 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:41628 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728847AbgAMRXQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jan 2020 12:23:16 -0500 Received: from dogfood.home (amontpellier-657-1-18-247.w109-210.abo.wanadoo.fr [109.210.65.247]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B30E621569; Mon, 13 Jan 2020 17:23:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1578936195; bh=yc2upCJC1oIV4r6mrOZ4qqD4lozYeYb8kOlT9po9Zz4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=OLapDzxIfuetZiW2VU/osuqqHFd+PoxAO7ibvMaSfG9Il5L7MT339KNxbkSymQ3ZP UyQNdkfLuQPPXEZ4zQ32zWGJsUWkh7deJ8fsENgYgkbi/Ukf4ykDm7Z7uWmRgE1id3 TZOWpubOLdUl1IwCpMQrtAb6rlf/bBtBGtYxKz4Y= From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Anshuman Khandual , Arnd Bergmann , Dan Williams , Dave Young , Saravana Kannan Subject: [PATCH 04/13] x86/mm: fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 18:22:36 +0100 Message-Id: <20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200113172245.27925-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20200113172245.27925-1-ardb@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Commit 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 20823392f4f2..62a8ebe72a52 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ int __init kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, .pgd = pgd, .numpages = numpages, .mask_set = __pgprot(0), - .mask_clr = __pgprot(0), + .mask_clr = __pgprot(~page_flags & (_PAGE_NX|_PAGE_RW)), .flags = 0, }; @@ -2224,12 +2224,6 @@ int __init kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)) goto out; - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_NX)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_NX); - - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW); - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC)) cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr); -- 2.20.1