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From: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
To: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Subject: [PATCH v4 00/16] efi_loader: add secure boot support
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 08:39:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200117063940.GA372531@apalos.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200117055954.GN28530@linaro.org>


[...]
> > > If we implement secure boot according the UEFI specification, one option
> > > would be to package the device tree as a UEFI driver image and let the
> > > stub install it as a configuration table. The unload callback could be
> > > used to remove the device tree.
> > > 
> > 
> > Sure but this is not in scope for the current patchset is it?
> 
> Exactly.
> 
> > Similarly you can just include the DTB in U-Boot and naturally have it verified.
> > 
> > I am not arguing that DTB verification is needed. We absolutely agree on that.
> > All i am saying is that the extra functionality can be added in the future,
> > since we already have a valid way of providing it with the current patchset.
> 
> BTW, Ilias,
> where should such a discussion about dtb verification be held,
> Boot-arch ML, Linaro Connect, ELC or whatever else conference?
> Otherwise just leave the decision in distributors' hands?

We did send some e-mails on boot-arch ML in the past [1]. The subject is quite
controversial since there are a lot of opinions on this. 
I think Linaro is working on a device tree evolution project at the moment with
one of the subjects being device tree verification.
We can certainly discuss more during Linaro Connect.

[1] https://lists.linaro.org/pipermail/boot-architecture/2019-June/001053.html

Thanks
/Ilias
> 
> Thanks,
> -Takahiro Akashi
> 
> > Regards
> > /Ilias
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Best regards
> > > > > 
> > > > > Heinrich
> > > > 
> > > 

      reply	other threads:[~2020-01-17  6:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-18  0:44 [PATCH v4 00/16] efi_loader: add secure boot support AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:44 ` [PATCH v4 01/16] include: pe.h: add signature-related definitions AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:44 ` [PATCH v4 02/16] efi_loader: add CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT config option AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:44 ` [PATCH v4 03/16] efi_loader: add signature verification functions AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-14 23:43   ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-15  0:13     ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-17  2:20       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-17  5:37         ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-21  6:00           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 04/16] efi_loader: add signature database parser AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 05/16] efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-08 22:54   ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-17  5:35     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 06/16] efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 07/16] efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 08/16] efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-08 23:55   ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-17  5:11     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-17  5:51       ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-21  6:12         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-21  7:15           ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-22  1:13             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-22  7:42               ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-23 17:41                 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-27  6:52                   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 09/16] efi_loader: set up secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 10/16] cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-21  7:13   ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-22  1:01     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-22  6:38       ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-22  7:15         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 11/16] cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" command AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 12/16] efi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environment AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 13/16] efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated variables) AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 14/16] efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image) AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 15/16] sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests AKASHI Takahiro
2019-12-28  2:26   ` Simon Glass
2019-12-18  0:45 ` [PATCH v4 16/16] travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-08 23:11 ` [PATCH v4 00/16] efi_loader: add secure boot support Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-09  0:08 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-09  8:02   ` Ilias Apalodimas
2020-01-09 19:09     ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-01-09 20:03       ` Ilias Apalodimas
2020-01-17  5:59         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2020-01-17  6:39           ` Ilias Apalodimas [this message]

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