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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v14 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 16:23:04 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200124002306.3552-22-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200124002306.3552-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

When there is more than one context displaying security
module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting
the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security
module.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc:linux-audit@redhat.com
---
 kernel/audit.h   |   4 +-
 kernel/auditsc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index f65f516913c6..9a26ba213f6a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	kuid_t			uid;
 	kgid_t			gid;
 	dev_t			rdev;
-	u32			osid;
+	struct lsmblob		oblob;
 	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
 	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
 	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 			kuid_t			uid;
 			kgid_t			gid;
 			umode_t			mode;
-			u32			osid;
+			struct lsmblob		oblob;
 			int			has_perm;
 			uid_t			perm_uid;
 			gid_t			perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 68ae5fa843c1..7dab48661e31 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -659,7 +659,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_isset) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
-					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 								&blob,
 								f->type,
@@ -667,7 +666,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 								f->lsm_rules);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
-						lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
 								&blob,
 								f->type,
@@ -681,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rules))
 					++result;
@@ -956,13 +953,57 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 	kfree(context);
 }
 
+static int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				    struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+	struct lsmcontext context;
+	const char *lsm;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * None of the installed modules have object labels.
+	 */
+	if (security_lsm_slot_name(0) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (blob->secid[0] != 0) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, 0)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything more unless there is more than one LSM
+	 * with a security context to report.
+	 */
+	if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+		lsm = security_lsm_slot_name(i);
+		if (lsm == NULL)
+			break;
+		if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj_%s=?", lsm);
+			continue;
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj_%s=%s", lsm, context.context);
+		security_release_secctx(&context);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
 				 unsigned int sessionid,
 				 struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -972,15 +1013,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
-	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
-			rc = 1;
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
-			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
-		}
-	}
+	rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1207,26 +1240,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				context->socketcall.args[i]);
 		break; }
 	case AUDIT_IPC: {
-		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+		struct lsmblob *oblob = & context->ipc.oblob;
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
 				 context->ipc.mode);
-		if (osid) {
-			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
-			struct lsmblob blob;
-
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
-						     LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
-				*call_panic = 1;
-			} else {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
-				security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
-			}
-		}
+		if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
+			*call_panic = 1;
 		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 			ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1366,20 +1387,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
 				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
 				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		struct lsmblob blob;
-		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
-			if (call_panic)
-				*call_panic = 2;
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
-			security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
-		}
-	}
+	if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
+		*call_panic = 2;
 
 	/* log the audit_names record type */
 	switch (n->type) {
@@ -1929,17 +1938,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
 			     const struct dentry *dentry,
 			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	struct lsmblob blob;
-
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
-	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
@@ -2285,14 +2290,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
 	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
-	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
-	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
 	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
-- 
2.24.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-24  0:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200124002306.3552-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-01-24  0:22 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:21     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:29     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:36     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 16:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 19:28         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 20:16           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 20:05             ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-03 20:54               ` John Johansen
2020-01-27 22:49             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-31 22:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 18:54               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 19:37                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 21:39                   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-04 13:37                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-04 17:14                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 11:56                 ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-10 13:25                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 14:55                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 18:32                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 19:00                         ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 15:59                           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-11 17:58                             ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 18:35                               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-11 19:11                                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-10 18:56                       ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:02             ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:43               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 22:49                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 20:59           ` John Johansen
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 15:05   ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:04   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:49     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-27 16:14       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 16:56         ` KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:34           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-06 14:34           ` BUG: sock_init_data() assumes socket is embedded in socket_alloc, tun/tap does not Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:16         ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler

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