From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B287C38BE2 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:16:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9925D20CC7 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:16:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="KTFm4RnG" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 9925D20CC7 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 540B210FC33F8; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:16:58 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=205.139.110.61; helo=us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com; envelope-from=vgoyal@redhat.com; receiver= Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-1.mimecast.com [205.139.110.61]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 786DF10FC33E5 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:16:55 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1582578962; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=T/bRivFiGpClNtEOWHTcviboSrUxJjgHOk7i6qPQd+k=; b=KTFm4RnGR7a+DZvdKHlm1GMkiVbEMS4ehF1XqX8qlmBa708oj9l+Mb42stoosVcXKtUQpy i9f5lMz+Ky0Myw4pX/+pewz6l3DA2USdIWtUj7gCkUrc0gZSK7ch/1wYurk3QJFPswp1+U Ti6UgNEsqcP4p8HsSM4rr5P9yLCFQIk= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-324-GCAzGIclOau4N7_Ba8MtAg-1; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:58 -0500 X-MC-Unique: GCAzGIclOau4N7_Ba8MtAg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 34B19801E53; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:15:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (unknown [10.18.25.35]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D79290085; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:15:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id 0CC61220A24; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:54 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:53 -0500 From: Vivek Goyal To: Dan Williams Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] drivers/pmem: Allow pmem_clear_poison() to accept arbitrary offset and len Message-ID: <20200224211553.GD14651@redhat.com> References: <20200218214841.10076-1-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200218214841.10076-3-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200220215707.GC10816@redhat.com> <20200221201759.GF25974@redhat.com> <20200223230330.GE10737@dread.disaster.area> <20200224201346.GC14651@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Message-ID-Hash: PHGTWCJCU7HXHTCUSS7ZKMLL3X4JUVXJ X-Message-ID-Hash: PHGTWCJCU7HXHTCUSS7ZKMLL3X4JUVXJ X-MailFrom: vgoyal@redhat.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; suspicious-header CC: Dave Chinner , linux-fsdevel , linux-nvdimm , Christoph Hellwig , device-mapper development X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:52:13PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:13 PM Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 10:03:30AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 03:17:59PM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 01:32:48PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > > > Vivek Goyal writes: > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 04:35:17PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > > > >> Vivek Goyal writes: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Currently pmem_clear_poison() expects offset and len to be sector aligned. > > > > > >> > Atleast that seems to be the assumption with which code has been written. > > > > > >> > It is called only from pmem_do_bvec() which is called only from pmem_rw_page() > > > > > >> > and pmem_make_request() which will only passe sector aligned offset and len. > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > Soon we want use this function from dax_zero_page_range() code path which > > > > > >> > can try to zero arbitrary range of memory with-in a page. So update this > > > > > >> > function to assume that offset and length can be arbitrary and do the > > > > > >> > necessary alignments as needed. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What caller will try to zero a range that is smaller than a sector? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Jeff, > > > > > > > > > > > > New dax zeroing interface (dax_zero_page_range()) can technically pass > > > > > > a range which is less than a sector. Or which is bigger than a sector > > > > > > but start and end are not aligned on sector boundaries. > > > > > > > > > > Sure, but who will call it with misaligned ranges? > > > > > > > > create a file foo.txt of size 4K and then truncate it. > > > > > > > > "truncate -s 23 foo.txt". Filesystems try to zero the bytes from 24 to > > > > 4095. > > > > > > This should fail with EIO. Only full page writes should clear the > > > bad page state, and partial writes should therefore fail because > > > they do not guarantee the data in the filesystem block is all good. > > > > > > If this zeroing was a buffered write to an address with a bad > > > sector, then the writeback will fail and the user will (eventually) > > > get an EIO on the file. > > > > > > DAX should do the same thing, except because the zeroing is > > > synchronous (i.e. done directly by the truncate syscall) we can - > > > and should - return EIO immediately. > > > > > > Indeed, with your code, if we then extend the file by truncating up > > > back to 4k, then the range between 23 and 512 is still bad, even > > > though we've successfully zeroed it and the user knows it. An > > > attempt to read anywhere in this range (e.g. 10 bytes at offset 100) > > > will fail with EIO, but reading 10 bytes at offset 2000 will > > > succeed. > > > > > > That's *awful* behaviour to expose to userspace, especially when > > > they look at the fs config and see that it's using both 4kB block > > > and sector sizes... > > > > > > The only thing that makes sense from a filesystem perspective is > > > clearing bad page state when entire filesystem blocks are > > > overwritten. The data in a filesystem block is either good or bad, > > > and it doesn't matter how many internal (kernel or device) sectors > > > it has. > > > > > > > > And what happens to the rest? The caller is left to trip over the > > > > > errors? That sounds pretty terrible. I really think there needs to be > > > > > an explicit contract here. > > > > > > > > Ok, I think is is the contentious bit. Current interface > > > > (__dax_zero_page_range()) either clears the poison (if I/O is aligned to > > > > sector) or expects page to be free of poison. > > > > > > > > So in above example, of "truncate -s 23 foo.txt", currently I get an error > > > > because range being zeroed is not sector aligned. So > > > > __dax_zero_page_range() falls back to calling direct_access(). Which > > > > fails because there are poisoned sectors in the page. > > > > > > > > With my patches, dax_zero_page_range(), clears the poison from sector 1 to > > > > 7 but leaves sector 0 untouched and just writes zeroes from byte 0 to 511 > > > > and returns success. > > > > > > Ok, kernel sectors are not the unit of granularity bad page state > > > should be managed at. They don't match page state granularity, and > > > they don't match filesystem block granularity, and the whacky > > > "partial writes silently succeed, reads fail unpredictably" > > > assymetry it leads to will just cause problems for users. > > > > > > > So question is, is this better behavior or worse behavior. If sector 0 > > > > was poisoned, it will continue to remain poisoned and caller will come > > > > to know about it on next read and then it should try to truncate file > > > > to length 0 or unlink file or restore that file to get rid of poison. > > > > > > Worse, because the filesystem can't track what sub-parts of the > > > block are bad and that leads to inconsistent data integrity status > > > being exposed to userspace. > > > > > > > > > > IOW, if a partial block is being zeroed and if it is poisoned, caller > > > > will not be return an error and poison will not be cleared and memory > > > > will be zeroed. What do we expect in such cases. > > > > > > > > Do we expect an interface where if there are any bad blocks in the range > > > > being zeroed, then they all should be cleared (and hence all I/O should > > > > be aligned) otherwise error is returned. If yes, I could make that > > > > change. > > > > > > > > Downside of current interface is that it will clear as many blocks as > > > > possible in the given range and leave starting and end blocks poisoned > > > > (if it is unaligned) and not return error. That means a reader will > > > > get error on these blocks again and they will have to try to clear it > > > > again. > > > > > > Which is solved by having partial page writes always EIO on poisoned > > > memory. > > > > Ok, how about if I add one more patch to the series which will check > > if unwritten portion of the page has known poison. If it has, then > > -EIO is returned. > > > > > > Subject: pmem: zero page range return error if poisoned memory in unwritten area > > > > Filesystems call into pmem_dax_zero_page_range() to zero partial page upon > > truncate. If partial page is being zeroed, then at the end of operation > > file systems expect that there is no poison in the whole page (atleast > > known poison). > > > > So make sure part of the partial page which is not being written, does not > > have poison. If it does, return error. If there is poison in area of page > > being written, it will be cleared. > > No, I don't like that the zero operation is special cased compared to > the write case. I'd say let's make them identical for now. I.e. fail > the I/O at dax_direct_access() time. So basically __dax_zero_page_range() will only write zeros (and not try to clear any poison). Right? > I think the error clearing > interface should be an explicit / separate op rather than a > side-effect. What about an explicit interface for initializing newly > allocated blocks, and the only reliable way to destroy poison through > the filesystem is to free the block? Effectively pmem_make_request() is already that interface filesystems use to initialize blocks and clear poison. So we don't really have to introduce a new interface? Or you are suggesting separate dax_zero_page_range() interface which will always call into firmware to clear poison. And that will make sure latent poison is cleared as well and filesystem should use that for block initialization instead? I do like the idea of not having to differentiate between known poison and latent poison. Once a block has been initialized all poison should be cleared (known/latent). I am worried though that on large devices this might slowdown filesystem initialization a lot if they are zeroing large range of blocks. If yes, this sounds like two different patch series. First patch series takes care of removing blkdev_issue_zeroout() from __dax_zero_page_range() and couple of iomap related cleans christoph wanted. And second patch series for adding new dax operation to zero a range and always call info firmware to clear poison and modify filesystems accordingly. Thanks Vivek _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D2B8C38BE2 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:16:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65CC021556 for ; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:16:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="KTFm4RnG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726996AbgBXVQD (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:16:03 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.61]:34489 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726722AbgBXVQD (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:16:03 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1582578962; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=T/bRivFiGpClNtEOWHTcviboSrUxJjgHOk7i6qPQd+k=; b=KTFm4RnGR7a+DZvdKHlm1GMkiVbEMS4ehF1XqX8qlmBa708oj9l+Mb42stoosVcXKtUQpy i9f5lMz+Ky0Myw4pX/+pewz6l3DA2USdIWtUj7gCkUrc0gZSK7ch/1wYurk3QJFPswp1+U Ti6UgNEsqcP4p8HsSM4rr5P9yLCFQIk= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-324-GCAzGIclOau4N7_Ba8MtAg-1; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:58 -0500 X-MC-Unique: GCAzGIclOau4N7_Ba8MtAg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 34B19801E53; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:15:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (unknown [10.18.25.35]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D79290085; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 21:15:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id 0CC61220A24; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:54 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 16:15:53 -0500 From: Vivek Goyal To: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Chinner , Jeff Moyer , linux-fsdevel , linux-nvdimm , Christoph Hellwig , device-mapper development Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] drivers/pmem: Allow pmem_clear_poison() to accept arbitrary offset and len Message-ID: <20200224211553.GD14651@redhat.com> References: <20200218214841.10076-1-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200218214841.10076-3-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20200220215707.GC10816@redhat.com> <20200221201759.GF25974@redhat.com> <20200223230330.GE10737@dread.disaster.area> <20200224201346.GC14651@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:52:13PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:13 PM Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 10:03:30AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 03:17:59PM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 01:32:48PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > > > Vivek Goyal writes: > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 04:35:17PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote: > > > > > >> Vivek Goyal writes: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > Currently pmem_clear_poison() expects offset and len to be sector aligned. > > > > > >> > Atleast that seems to be the assumption with which code has been written. > > > > > >> > It is called only from pmem_do_bvec() which is called only from pmem_rw_page() > > > > > >> > and pmem_make_request() which will only passe sector aligned offset and len. > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > Soon we want use this function from dax_zero_page_range() code path which > > > > > >> > can try to zero arbitrary range of memory with-in a page. So update this > > > > > >> > function to assume that offset and length can be arbitrary and do the > > > > > >> > necessary alignments as needed. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What caller will try to zero a range that is smaller than a sector? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Jeff, > > > > > > > > > > > > New dax zeroing interface (dax_zero_page_range()) can technically pass > > > > > > a range which is less than a sector. Or which is bigger than a sector > > > > > > but start and end are not aligned on sector boundaries. > > > > > > > > > > Sure, but who will call it with misaligned ranges? > > > > > > > > create a file foo.txt of size 4K and then truncate it. > > > > > > > > "truncate -s 23 foo.txt". Filesystems try to zero the bytes from 24 to > > > > 4095. > > > > > > This should fail with EIO. Only full page writes should clear the > > > bad page state, and partial writes should therefore fail because > > > they do not guarantee the data in the filesystem block is all good. > > > > > > If this zeroing was a buffered write to an address with a bad > > > sector, then the writeback will fail and the user will (eventually) > > > get an EIO on the file. > > > > > > DAX should do the same thing, except because the zeroing is > > > synchronous (i.e. done directly by the truncate syscall) we can - > > > and should - return EIO immediately. > > > > > > Indeed, with your code, if we then extend the file by truncating up > > > back to 4k, then the range between 23 and 512 is still bad, even > > > though we've successfully zeroed it and the user knows it. An > > > attempt to read anywhere in this range (e.g. 10 bytes at offset 100) > > > will fail with EIO, but reading 10 bytes at offset 2000 will > > > succeed. > > > > > > That's *awful* behaviour to expose to userspace, especially when > > > they look at the fs config and see that it's using both 4kB block > > > and sector sizes... > > > > > > The only thing that makes sense from a filesystem perspective is > > > clearing bad page state when entire filesystem blocks are > > > overwritten. The data in a filesystem block is either good or bad, > > > and it doesn't matter how many internal (kernel or device) sectors > > > it has. > > > > > > > > And what happens to the rest? The caller is left to trip over the > > > > > errors? That sounds pretty terrible. I really think there needs to be > > > > > an explicit contract here. > > > > > > > > Ok, I think is is the contentious bit. Current interface > > > > (__dax_zero_page_range()) either clears the poison (if I/O is aligned to > > > > sector) or expects page to be free of poison. > > > > > > > > So in above example, of "truncate -s 23 foo.txt", currently I get an error > > > > because range being zeroed is not sector aligned. So > > > > __dax_zero_page_range() falls back to calling direct_access(). Which > > > > fails because there are poisoned sectors in the page. > > > > > > > > With my patches, dax_zero_page_range(), clears the poison from sector 1 to > > > > 7 but leaves sector 0 untouched and just writes zeroes from byte 0 to 511 > > > > and returns success. > > > > > > Ok, kernel sectors are not the unit of granularity bad page state > > > should be managed at. They don't match page state granularity, and > > > they don't match filesystem block granularity, and the whacky > > > "partial writes silently succeed, reads fail unpredictably" > > > assymetry it leads to will just cause problems for users. > > > > > > > So question is, is this better behavior or worse behavior. If sector 0 > > > > was poisoned, it will continue to remain poisoned and caller will come > > > > to know about it on next read and then it should try to truncate file > > > > to length 0 or unlink file or restore that file to get rid of poison. > > > > > > Worse, because the filesystem can't track what sub-parts of the > > > block are bad and that leads to inconsistent data integrity status > > > being exposed to userspace. > > > > > > > > > > IOW, if a partial block is being zeroed and if it is poisoned, caller > > > > will not be return an error and poison will not be cleared and memory > > > > will be zeroed. What do we expect in such cases. > > > > > > > > Do we expect an interface where if there are any bad blocks in the range > > > > being zeroed, then they all should be cleared (and hence all I/O should > > > > be aligned) otherwise error is returned. If yes, I could make that > > > > change. > > > > > > > > Downside of current interface is that it will clear as many blocks as > > > > possible in the given range and leave starting and end blocks poisoned > > > > (if it is unaligned) and not return error. That means a reader will > > > > get error on these blocks again and they will have to try to clear it > > > > again. > > > > > > Which is solved by having partial page writes always EIO on poisoned > > > memory. > > > > Ok, how about if I add one more patch to the series which will check > > if unwritten portion of the page has known poison. If it has, then > > -EIO is returned. > > > > > > Subject: pmem: zero page range return error if poisoned memory in unwritten area > > > > Filesystems call into pmem_dax_zero_page_range() to zero partial page upon > > truncate. If partial page is being zeroed, then at the end of operation > > file systems expect that there is no poison in the whole page (atleast > > known poison). > > > > So make sure part of the partial page which is not being written, does not > > have poison. If it does, return error. If there is poison in area of page > > being written, it will be cleared. > > No, I don't like that the zero operation is special cased compared to > the write case. I'd say let's make them identical for now. I.e. fail > the I/O at dax_direct_access() time. So basically __dax_zero_page_range() will only write zeros (and not try to clear any poison). Right? > I think the error clearing > interface should be an explicit / separate op rather than a > side-effect. What about an explicit interface for initializing newly > allocated blocks, and the only reliable way to destroy poison through > the filesystem is to free the block? Effectively pmem_make_request() is already that interface filesystems use to initialize blocks and clear poison. So we don't really have to introduce a new interface? Or you are suggesting separate dax_zero_page_range() interface which will always call into firmware to clear poison. And that will make sure latent poison is cleared as well and filesystem should use that for block initialization instead? I do like the idea of not having to differentiate between known poison and latent poison. Once a block has been initialized all poison should be cleared (known/latent). I am worried though that on large devices this might slowdown filesystem initialization a lot if they are zeroing large range of blocks. If yes, this sounds like two different patch series. First patch series takes care of removing blkdev_issue_zeroout() from __dax_zero_page_range() and couple of iomap related cleans christoph wanted. And second patch series for adding new dax operation to zero a range and always call info firmware to clear poison and modify filesystems accordingly. Thanks Vivek