From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A8CBC3F2D3 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F1A6246AE for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:14:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1582892062; bh=j0jQomfQwf0XLg1eJ1AcFhL8AU87eiF4dHiCjHirt70=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=VVRta6s2eGYZSe7ySlMDNS/57VLZDKszktxNNoPNXFm3xggzS45I7gPCXUDqCvlRv tB2ObnYz4/oGN0fm52lVyzzT+i9BkFnl2IezQmeZRMzwAGZqg/lFzLRIaH//RdbMq7 v4sVOW+RW0DsO7YPDPlRD8VLwC/sI7wWwC5aAPU8= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726700AbgB1MOU (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 07:14:20 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45306 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726614AbgB1MOT (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 07:14:19 -0500 Received: from e123331-lin.home (amontpellier-657-1-18-247.w109-210.abo.wanadoo.fr [109.210.65.247]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A269F246B0; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:14:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1582892058; bh=j0jQomfQwf0XLg1eJ1AcFhL8AU87eiF4dHiCjHirt70=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=YDORTpNYO5YE0Pb6l/ATyH560SOvndNXfxvsX1d3MemeKdsrHGOuO4GBgvOtXyAGr jJaRByryUrghIpZcXD1t2rXYcrsJeWPQ1UnTbJsqcDYU6gXVmySr0np6/QbhH1TThN h26b8Ki5cib4aAbJojVwolXK8lKwCD8o7oBqM39Q= From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand , Heinrich Schuchardt , Tom Lendacky Subject: [PATCH 2/6] efi/x86: Add RNG seed EFI table to unencrypted mapping check Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:14:04 +0100 Message-Id: <20200228121408.9075-3-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200228121408.9075-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20200228121408.9075-1-ardb@kernel.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Tom Lendacky When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for the EFI RNG seed table. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b64385fc13e5d7ad4b459216524f138e7879234f.1582662842.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 0a8117865430..aca9bdd87bca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { #endif &efi.tpm_log, &efi.tpm_final_log, + &efi_rng_seed, }; u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 69a585106d30..1e79f77d4e6c 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); -static unsigned long __ro_after_init rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; +unsigned long __ro_after_init efi_rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; static unsigned long __initdata mem_reserve = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; static unsigned long __initdata rt_prop = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = { {SMBIOS3_TABLE_GUID, "SMBIOS 3.0", &efi.smbios3}, {EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE_GUID, "ESRT", &efi.esrt}, {EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi_mem_attr_table}, - {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &rng_seed}, + {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi_rng_seed}, {LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, "TPMEventLog", &efi.tpm_log}, {LINUX_EFI_TPM_FINAL_LOG_GUID, "TPMFinalLog", &efi.tpm_final_log}, {LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID, "MEMRESERVE", &mem_reserve}, @@ -519,11 +519,11 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables, pr_cont("\n"); set_bit(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES, &efi.flags); - if (rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + if (efi_rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed; u32 size = 0; - seed = early_memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed)); + seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed)); if (seed != NULL) { size = seed->size; early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed)); @@ -531,7 +531,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables, pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); } if (size > 0) { - seed = early_memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size); + seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, + sizeof(*seed) + size); if (seed != NULL) { pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n"); add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size); @@ -923,7 +924,7 @@ static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, if (!kexec_in_progress) return NOTIFY_DONE; - seed = memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed), MEMREMAP_WB); + seed = memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed), MEMREMAP_WB); if (seed != NULL) { size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE); memunmap(seed); @@ -931,7 +932,8 @@ static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); } if (size > 0) { - seed = memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size, MEMREMAP_WB); + seed = memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size, + MEMREMAP_WB); if (seed != NULL) { seed->size = size; get_random_bytes(seed->bits, seed->size); @@ -949,7 +951,7 @@ static struct notifier_block efi_random_seed_nb = { static int __init register_update_efi_random_seed(void) { - if (rng_seed == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) + if (efi_rng_seed == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) return 0; return register_reboot_notifier(&efi_random_seed_nb); } diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 2ab33d5d6ca5..e8a08a499131 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ typedef struct { efi_time_t time_of_revocation; } efi_cert_x509_sha256_t; +extern unsigned long __ro_after_init efi_rng_seed; /* RNG Seed table */ + /* * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure: */ -- 2.17.1