From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AC7AC4332B for ; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 13:17:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5740420754 for ; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 13:17:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727522AbgCTNRQ (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Mar 2020 09:17:16 -0400 Received: from 8bytes.org ([81.169.241.247]:54470 "EHLO theia.8bytes.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727502AbgCTNRL (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Mar 2020 09:17:11 -0400 Received: by theia.8bytes.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id EDAE0364; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 14:17:09 +0100 (CET) Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 14:17:07 +0100 From: Joerg Roedel To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: X86 ML , "H. Peter Anvin" , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Hellstrom , Jiri Slaby , Dan Williams , Tom Lendacky , Juergen Gross , Kees Cook , LKML , kvm list , Linux Virtualization , Joerg Roedel Subject: [RFC PATCH v2.1] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State Message-ID: <20200320131707.GF5122@8bytes.org> References: <20200319091407.1481-1-joro@8bytes.org> <20200319091407.1481-71-joro@8bytes.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 08:35:59AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > 1. Just put the NMI unmask in do_nmi(). The kernel *already* knows > how to handle running do_nmi() with NMIs unmasked. This is much, much > simpler than your code. Okay, attached is the updated patch which implements this approach. I tested it in an SEV-ES guest with 'perf top' running for a little more than 30 minutes and all looked good. I also removed the dead code from the patch. >From ec3b021c5d9130fd66e00d823c4fabc675c4b49e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joerg Roedel Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 17:31:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State When running under SEV-ES the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor. Add code to the kernels NMI handler to send this message right at the beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h index 63acf50e6280..441ec1ba2cc7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h @@ -82,11 +82,13 @@ struct real_mode_header; #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh); +void sev_es_nmi_complete(void); #else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; } +static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT*/ #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h index 20a05839dd9a..0f837339db66 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ /* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */ #define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002 +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE 0x80000003 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP 0x80000004 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c index 54c21d6abd5a..fc872a7e0ed1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include @@ -510,6 +511,13 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(is_debug_stack); dotraplinkage notrace void do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { + /* + * Re-enable NMIs right here when running as an SEV-ES guest. This might + * cause nested NMIs, but those can be handled safely. + */ + if (sev_es_active()) + sev_es_nmi_complete(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && cpu_is_offline(smp_processor_id())) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index 3c22f256645e..a7e2739771e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -270,6 +270,24 @@ static phys_addr_t vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, long vaddr) /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */ #include "sev-es-shared.c" +void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) +{ + struct ghcb_state state; + struct ghcb *ghcb; + + ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state); + + vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb); + ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE); + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0); + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0); + + sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb)); + VMGEXIT(); + + sev_es_put_ghcb(&state); +} + static u64 sev_es_get_jump_table_addr(void) { struct ghcb_state state; -- 2.16.4