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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Florent Revest <revest@google.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 20:17:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200327191731.GA9419@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202003271143.71E0C591C1@keescook>

On 27-Mär 11:59, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 27, 2020 at 09:36:15AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > On 3/27/2020 6:43 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On 3/27/20 8:41 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> > >> On 27-Mär 08:27, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > >>>>> +        return -EPERM;

[...]

> > >
> > > I would favor removing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check here, and implementing it in a bpf_prog hook for Smack and AppArmor if they want that.  SELinux would implement its own check in its existing bpf_prog hook.
> > >
> > The whole notion of one security module calling into another for permission
> > to do something still gives me the heebee jeebees, but if more nimble minds
> > than mine think this is a good idea I won't nack it.
> 
> Well, it's a hook into BPF prog creation, not the BPF LSM specifically,
> so that's why I think it's general enough control without it being
> directly weird. :)
> 
> As far as dropping CAP_MAC_ADMIN, yeah, that should be fine. Creating LSM
> BPF programs already requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so for SELinux-less systems,
> that's likely fine. If we need to change the BPF program creation access
> control in the future we can revisit it then.

Sounds good, I will send out v8 carrying James and Andri's
Acks/Review tags, CAP_MAC_ADMIN check removed and some other minor
fixes.

- KP

> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-27 19:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-26 14:28 [PATCH bpf-next v7 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:27   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:28   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:29   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:12   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 19:39     ` KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:24   ` James Morris
2020-03-27 12:27     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-27 12:41       ` KP Singh
2020-03-27 13:43         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-27 14:29           ` KP Singh
2020-03-27 16:36           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-03-27 18:59             ` Kees Cook
2020-03-27 19:17               ` KP Singh [this message]
2020-03-27  3:12   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-03-27 15:06     ` KP Singh
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 5/8] bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:29   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:30   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:24   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 19:44     ` KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:31   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:31   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 20:56     ` KP Singh
2020-03-26 22:01       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-27  0:33   ` James Morris

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