From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4ECCC43331 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 13:01:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC80B20757 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 13:01:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388130AbgDBNBX (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 09:01:23 -0400 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([193.142.43.55]:37717 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729033AbgDBNBX (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 09:01:23 -0400 Received: from p5de0bf0b.dip0.t-ipconnect.de ([93.224.191.11] helo=nanos.tec.linutronix.de) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1jJzSw-0004G0-3I; Thu, 02 Apr 2020 15:01:02 +0200 Received: from nanos.tec.linutronix.de (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by nanos.tec.linutronix.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63184FFAA7; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 15:01:01 +0200 (CEST) Message-Id: <20200402124205.334622628@linutronix.de> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 14:33:00 +0200 From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: x86@kernel.org, "Kenneth R. Crudup" , Paolo Bonzini , Fenghua Yu , Xiaoyao Li , Nadav Amit , Thomas Hellstrom , Sean Christopherson , Tony Luck , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Jessica Yu , Steven Rostedt Subject: [patch 2/2] x86/kvm/vmx: Prevent split lock detection induced #AC wreckage References: <20200402123258.895628824@linutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-transfer-encoding: 8-bit X-Linutronix-Spam-Score: -1.0 X-Linutronix-Spam-Level: - X-Linutronix-Spam-Status: No , -1.0 points, 5.0 required, ALL_TRUSTED=-1,SHORTCIRCUIT=-0.0001 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Without at least minimal handling for split lock detection induced #AC, VMX will just run into the same problem as the VMWare hypervisor, which was reported by Kenneth. It will inject the #AC blindly into the guest whether the guest is prepared or not. Add the minimal required handling for it: - Check guest state whether CR0.AM is enabled and EFLAGS.AC is set. If so, then the #AC originated from CPL3 and the guest has is prepared to handle it. In this case it does not matter whether the #AC is due to a split lock or a regular unaligned check. - Invoke a minimal split lock detection handler. If the host SLD mode is sld_warn, then handle it in the same way as user space handling works: Emit a warning, disable SLD and mark the current task with TIF_SLD. With that resume the guest without injecting #AC. If the host mode is sld_fatal or sld_off, emit a warning and deliver the exception to user space which can crash and burn itself. Mark the module with MOD_INFO(sld_safe, "Y") so the module loader does not force SLD off. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "Kenneth R. Crudup" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: Xiaoyao Li Cc: Nadav Amit Cc: Thomas Hellstrom Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Tony Luck --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int s extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn); extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code); +extern bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip); extern void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end); #else static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {} --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -1102,13 +1102,10 @@ static void split_lock_init(void) split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off); } -bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) +static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip) { - if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal) - return false; - pr_warn_ratelimited("#AC: %s/%d took a split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n", - current->comm, current->pid, regs->ip); + current->comm, current->pid, ip); /* * Disable the split lock detection for this task so it can make @@ -1117,6 +1114,27 @@ bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_re */ sld_update_msr(false); set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SLD); +} + +bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip) +{ + if (sld_state == sld_warn) { + split_lock_warn(ip); + return true; + } + + pr_warn_once("#AC: %s/%d %s split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n", + current->comm, current->pid, + sld_state == sld_fatal ? "fatal" : "bogus", ip); + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_guest_split_lock); + +bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) +{ + if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal) + return false; + split_lock_warn(regs->ip); return true; } --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y"); #ifdef MODULE static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = { @@ -4623,6 +4624,22 @@ static int handle_machine_check(struct k return 1; } +static bool guest_handles_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + /* + * If guest has alignment checking enabled in CR0 and activated in + * eflags, then the #AC originated from CPL3 and the guest is able + * to handle it. It does not matter whether this is a regular or + * a split lock operation induced #AC. + */ + if (vcpu->arch.cr0 & X86_CR0_AM && + vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC) + return true; + + /* Add guest SLD handling checks here once it's supported */ + return false; +} + static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); @@ -4688,9 +4705,6 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct k return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code); switch (ex_no) { - case AC_VECTOR: - kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code); - return 1; case DB_VECTOR: dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & @@ -4719,6 +4733,26 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct k kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip; kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no; break; + case AC_VECTOR: + if (guest_handles_ac(vcpu)) { + kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code); + return 1; + } + /* + * Handle #AC caused by split lock detection. If the host + * mode is sld_warn, then it warns, marks current with + * TIF_SLD and disables split lock detection. So the guest + * can just continue. + * + * If the host mode is fatal, the handling code warned. Let + * qemu kill itself. + * + * If the host mode is off, then this #AC is bonkers and + * something is badly wrong. Let it fail as well. + */ + if (handle_guest_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu))) + return 1; + /* fall through */ default: kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION; kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;