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From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
To: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] perf stat: force error in fallback on :k events
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 11:18:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200415091836.GH208694@krava> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200414161550.225588-1-irogers@google.com>

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 09:15:50AM -0700, Ian Rogers wrote:

SNIP

> New behavior with paranoid 2:
> $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
> $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
> Error:
> You may not have permission to collect stats.
> 
> Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,
> which controls use of the performance events system by
> unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
> 
> The current value is 2:
> 
>   -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
>       Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
> >= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>       Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> >= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> 
> To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:
> 
>         kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1
> 
> v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from jolsa@redhat.com.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> ---
>  tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
> index d23db6755f51..b4e8bcb5ab05 100644
> --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
> +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
> @@ -2446,6 +2446,10 @@ bool perf_evsel__fallback(struct evsel *evsel, int err,
>  		char *new_name;
>  		const char *sep = ":";
>  
> +		/* If event has exclude user then don't exclude kernel. */
> +		if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)
> +			return false;
> +

nice, it's much simpler

Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>

thanks,
jirka

>  		/* Is there already the separator in the name. */
>  		if (strchr(name, '/') ||
>  		    strchr(name, ':'))
> -- 
> 2.26.0.110.g2183baf09c-goog
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-15  9:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-14 16:15 [PATCH v2] perf stat: force error in fallback on :k events Ian Rogers
2020-04-15  9:18 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2020-04-16 15:50 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf stat: Force " tip-bot2 for Stephane Eranian

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