From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A6EBC38A24 for ; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:47:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3182124964 for ; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:47:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="vpGLwNo6" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726636AbgEGKrD (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2020 06:47:03 -0400 Received: from userp2120.oracle.com ([156.151.31.85]:45664 "EHLO userp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725985AbgEGKrC (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2020 06:47:02 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (userp2120.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp2120.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 047AhlNA049902; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:46:36 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=date : from : to : cc : subject : message-id : references : mime-version : content-type : in-reply-to; s=corp-2020-01-29; bh=c3CT9d7CDjZqtfY6ltfhI8CLldAp3bjyJVEydg/d3JI=; b=vpGLwNo68nsXm6+kzsauk1wvfyn7kVttgfQSGLofSP8wwoVj7QhgnMp8UHL0PSQRbAbs hSlHd7TmkI2F6DsGY82hJnMxMjgkDWl8IUCMQBrW6thk/biyS8wFBMj9ylE8sZvwyMta eHP1jKoBXPijgc2mNo10mVy0+qyJSuDeU4tyYyVYLCF6qtWYrqBsFE+k0c/LgHw7+vIW SQT3JA1qT+rM8reoVGBfFRGJ6AJ4ZJhbWdHjJfl7JAsrWpoADLR09BXlCK4kXLEpHi1P R+Fa5WTqdGlQOv3sM597AMHpW7DEMwPAgzSLKgTdk01zgXJ56gJ66ZYyFo3VHrzrgnn5 Nw== Received: from userp3030.oracle.com (userp3030.oracle.com [156.151.31.80]) by userp2120.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30veckgrus-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 07 May 2020 10:46:36 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (userp3030.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp3030.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 047AforU173085; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:46:35 GMT Received: from userv0121.oracle.com (userv0121.oracle.com [156.151.31.72]) by userp3030.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30t1ra9vr3-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 07 May 2020 10:46:35 +0000 Received: from abhmp0016.oracle.com (abhmp0016.oracle.com [141.146.116.22]) by userv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 047AkWhd030336; Thu, 7 May 2020 10:46:32 GMT Received: from tomti.i.net-space.pl (/10.175.171.83) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Thu, 07 May 2020 03:46:31 -0700 Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 12:46:25 +0200 From: Daniel Kiper To: Matthew Garrett Cc: The development of GNU GRUB , Linux Kernel Mailing List , trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, the arch/x86 maintainers , alexander.burmashev@oracle.com, Andrew Cooper , Ard Biesheuvel , "Daniel P. Smith" , eric.snowberg@oracle.com, Javier Martinez Canillas , kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com, lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com, michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com, "Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko" , pirot.krol@3mdeb.com, Peter Jones , Ross Philipson Subject: Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status to the Linux kernel Message-ID: <20200507104625.dmzqu5ntkdoir7ju@tomti.i.net-space.pl> References: <20200504232132.23570-1-daniel.kiper@oracle.com> <20200504232132.23570-13-daniel.kiper@oracle.com> <20200506133306.xrzplgdt4cckgrqc@tomti.i.net-space.pl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9613 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 mlxscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005070088 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9613 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 malwarescore=0 impostorscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 phishscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 suspectscore=0 priorityscore=1501 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005070088 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 11:36:49AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper wrote: > > > > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper wrote: > > > > > > > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various > > > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot. > > > > > > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI > > > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why > > > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub? > > > > It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2]. > > So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that. > > Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently > necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable. Sure, will do! Daniel