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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
	luto@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com,
	chang.seok.bae@intel.com, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v12 08/18] x86/entry/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 00:53:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200511045311.4785-9-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200511045311.4785-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

On FSGSBASE systems, the way to handle GS base in the paranoid path is
different from the existing SWAPGS-based entry/exit path handling. Document
the reason and what has to be done for FSGSBASE enabled systems.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst b/Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
index a48b3f6ebbe87..0499a40723af3 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
@@ -108,3 +108,12 @@ We try to only use IST entries and the paranoid entry code for vectors
 that absolutely need the more expensive check for the GS base - and we
 generate all 'normal' entry points with the regular (faster) paranoid=0
 variant.
+
+On FSGSBASE systems, however, user space can set GS without kernel
+interaction. It means the value of GS base itself does not imply anything,
+whether a kernel value or a user space value. So, there is no longer a safe
+way to check whether the exception is entering from user mode or kernel
+mode in the paranoid entry code path. So the GS base value needs to be read
+out, saved and the kernel GS base value written. On exit, the saved GS base
+value needs to be restored unconditionally. The non-paranoid entry/exit
+code still uses SWAPGS unconditionally as the state is known.
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-11  4:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-11  4:52 [PATCH v12 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 01/18] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 02/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 03/18] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 04/18] x86/entry/64: Clean up paranoid exit Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 05/18] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:52 ` [PATCH v12 06/18] x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 07/18] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 09/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 10/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions Sasha Levin
2020-05-18 18:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-18 20:24     ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-18 22:59       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 12:20       ` David Laight
2020-05-19 14:48         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-20  9:13           ` David Laight
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 11/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE in switch_to() if available Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 12/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: move save_fsgs to header file Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 13/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 14/18] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 15/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 16/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 17/18] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  4:53 ` [PATCH v12 18/18] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode Sasha Levin
2020-05-15  9:24 ` [PATCH v12 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 16:40   ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-15 17:55     ` Andi Kleen
2020-05-15 23:07       ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-16 12:21       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-16  9:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-18 15:34       ` Andi Kleen
2020-05-18 20:01         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-18 23:03           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 16:48             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-22 20:14               ` Don Porter
2020-05-22 20:55                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-23  0:45                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-24 19:45                   ` hpa
2020-05-24 21:19                     ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-24 23:44                       ` hpa
2020-05-25  7:54                       ` Richard Weinberger
2020-05-25 21:56                         ` Tony Luck
2020-05-26  8:12                         ` David Laight
2020-05-26  8:23                           ` Richard Weinberger
2020-05-27  8:31                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-26 12:42                   ` Don Porter
2020-05-26 20:27                     ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-26 22:03                       ` Don Porter
2020-05-26 22:51                         ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 17:37                           ` Don Porter
2020-05-28 10:29                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-28 17:40                       ` Don Porter
2020-05-28 18:38                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-29 15:27                           ` Wojtek Porczyk
2020-06-25 15:27                             ` Don Porter
2020-06-25 21:37                               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-18 18:19                                 ` Don Porter
2020-07-23  3:23                                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-28 19:19                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-28 19:41                           ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-29  3:07                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-29  3:10                               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-06-25 15:30                                 ` Don Porter
2020-06-25 21:40                                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-23  4:19                 ` Andi Kleen
2020-05-28 10:36                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-27  8:20                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-27 12:42                   ` Wojtek Porczyk
2020-05-18  9:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-18 15:16       ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-18 18:28         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-18 19:36       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-18  6:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-18 12:33   ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-18 14:53 ` Thomas Gleixner

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