From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AE24C433E0 for ; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:15:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4ED9420671 for ; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:15:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589825702; bh=f7LIGe+YYiWcMQ+JcTrHP3uGIQBRoixlX34vTm7gaRA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=Tj86z+3hXHxO409bv7i8GjgcXlSDRDnyS79YrBD0li+Yumgy8YoM9FNgqwvhLTWOp hWHZpkhogCjI0+P3ZjAhRu5XGh3Jyw/2qRDFlAfopl4ycLedVYVWnrI+DzW9A5P0FI gYij+fm5BnehIyzeJx+5F596kGTlBgfmsgJf70SE= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387459AbgERSPA (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 14:15:00 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:41270 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731719AbgERSAL (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 14:00:11 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AA16E20715; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:00:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589824809; bh=f7LIGe+YYiWcMQ+JcTrHP3uGIQBRoixlX34vTm7gaRA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hCnrjSozpAyfctKeAAnq8e8nExBHXrqrriKeb2KAr021N8yvvmmDCCcMyhBS/RA0S 73znQ1cj6JDXGFY2NLMXNhqa2k0hRfI3+Z9mCzkdFyNozRBg860VYSdD+dpxp9GVNk ZfJo/suiZ9PzMDOaeRt1cWRjbq8n/VfE6CT0IpLI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Chuck Lever , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.6 013/194] SUNRPC: Add "@len" parameter to gss_unwrap() Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 19:35:03 +0200 Message-Id: <20200518173532.728547072@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200518173531.455604187@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200518173531.455604187@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Chuck Lever [ Upstream commit 31c9590ae468478fe47dc0f5f0d3562b2f69450e ] Refactor: This is a pre-requisite to fixing the client-side ralign computation in gss_unwrap_resp_priv(). The length value is passed in explicitly rather that as the value of buf->len. This will subsequently allow gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1() to compute a slack and align value, instead of computing it in gss_unwrap_resp_priv(). Fixes: 35e77d21baa0 ("SUNRPC: Add rpc_auth::au_ralign field") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h | 2 ++ include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h | 6 +++--- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 4 ++-- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c | 3 ++- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 8 ++------ 7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h index 48c1b1674cbf0..e9a79518d6527 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ u32 gss_wrap( u32 gss_unwrap( struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *inbuf); u32 gss_delete_sec_context( struct gss_ctx **ctx_id); @@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ struct gss_api_ops { u32 (*gss_unwrap)( struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf); void (*gss_delete_sec_context)( void *internal_ctx_id); diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h index c1d77dd8ed416..e8f8ffe7448b2 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct gss_krb5_enctype { u32 (*encrypt_v2) (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages); /* v2 encryption function */ - u32 (*decrypt_v2) (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, + u32 (*decrypt_v2) (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip); /* v2 decryption function */ }; @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, struct xdr_buf *outbuf, struct page **pages); u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, +gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, int len, struct xdr_buf *buf); @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct page **pages); u32 -gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, +gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *plainoffset, u32 *plainlen); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index 2dc740acb3bf3..a08a733f2d7c2 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -2041,9 +2041,9 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; - rcv_buf->len = offset + opaque_len; - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, rcv_buf); + maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, + offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index 6f2d30d7b766d..e7180da1fc6a1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -851,8 +851,8 @@ gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, } u32 -gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, - u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) +gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, + struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) { struct xdr_buf subbuf; u32 ret = 0; @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, - (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - + (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)); nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, goto out_err; /* Get the packet's hmac value */ - ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, + ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); if (ret) goto out_err; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index 6c1920eed7717..c7589e35d5d92 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, } static u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf) { int signalg; int sealalg; @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, - buf->len - offset)) + len - offset)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || @@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + buf->len = len; if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; int err; @@ -376,7 +378,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); - buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start); + buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start); if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; @@ -486,7 +488,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, } static u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf) { time64_t now; u8 *ptr; @@ -532,7 +535,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) if (rrc != 0) rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); - err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, + err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf, &headskip, &tailskip); if (err) return GSS_S_FAILURE; @@ -542,7 +545,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) * it against the original */ err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, - buf->len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, + len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); if (err) { dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); @@ -568,14 +571,14 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. */ - movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, buf->len); + movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; if (offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len) return GSS_S_FAILURE; memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; - buf->len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + buf->len = len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ buf->len -= ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip; @@ -603,7 +606,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, } u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; @@ -613,9 +617,9 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf); case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf); } } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c index db550bfc2642e..69316ab1b9fac 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c @@ -411,10 +411,11 @@ gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 gss_unwrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) { return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops - ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, buf); + ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, len, buf); } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 65b67b2573021..559053646e12c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ static int unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) { u32 priv_len, maj_stat; - int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset; + int pad, remaining_len, offset; clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags); @@ -948,12 +948,8 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs buf->len -= pad; fix_priv_head(buf, pad); - /* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */ - saved_len = buf->len; - buf->len = priv_len; - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf); + maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, priv_len, buf); pad = priv_len - buf->len; - buf->len = saved_len; buf->len -= pad; /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries. * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to -- 2.20.1