[Buildroot] [PATCH v2, 1/1] package/libexif: security bump to version 0.6.22

[Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>]

Fabrice, All,

On 2020-05-19 20:02 +0200, Fabrice Fontaine spake thusly:
> - Switch site to github
> - Drop patches (already in version)
> - Fix the following CVEs:
>   - CVE-2020-13114: Time consumption DoS when parsing canon array
>     markers
>   - CVE-2020-13113: Potential use of uninitialized memory
>   - CVE-2020-13112: Various buffer overread fixes due to integer
>     overflows in maker notes
>   - CVE-2020-0093: read overflow
>   - CVE-2020-12767: fixed division by zero
> 
> https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/tag/libexif-0_6_22-release
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>

Applied to master, thanks.

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

> ---
> Changes v1 -> v2:
>  - Use official tarball
> 
>  ...ll-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch |  65 ----------
>  ...otes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch |  41 ------
>  ...ecursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch |  30 -----
>  ...ursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch | 120 ------------------
>  package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch  |  90 -------------
>  package/libexif/Config.in                     |   2 +-
>  package/libexif/libexif.hash                  |   2 +-
>  package/libexif/libexif.mk                    |  16 +--
>  8 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 360 deletions(-)
>  delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch
>  delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch
>  delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch
>  delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch
>  delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch
> 
> diff --git a/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch b/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c98ed748c5..0000000000
> --- a/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
> -From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
> - makernote entries.
> -
> -This should fix:
> -https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> ----
> - libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
> - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
> -index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
> ---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
> -+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
> -@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
> - 		case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
> - 		  {
> - 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
> --		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
> -+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
> -+
> -+			sizeleft = entry->size;
> - 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
> -+				if (sizeleft < 2)
> -+					break;
> - 				vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
> - 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
> - 				len = strlen(val);
> - 				data += 2;
> -+				sizeleft -= 2;
> - 			}
> - 		  }
> - 		  break;
> - 		case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
> - 		  {
> - 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
> --		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
> -+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
> -+
> -+			sizeleft = entry->size;
> - 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
> -+				if (sizeleft < 4)
> -+					break;
> - 				vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
> - 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
> - 				len = strlen(val);
> - 				data += 4;
> -+				sizeleft -= 4;
> - 			}
> - 		  }
> - 		  break;
> -@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
> - 		break;
> - 	}
> - 
> --	return (val);
> -+	return val;
> - }
> --- 
> -2.20.1
> -
> diff --git a/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch b/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 84c92593bc..0000000000
> --- a/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
> -From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags
> - has a type with 1 byte components.
> -
> -Fixes (at least):
> -	https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130
> -	https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129
> -
> -CVE-2017-7544: libexif through 0.6.21 is vulnerable to out-of-bounds heap
> -read vulnerability in exif_data_save_data_entry function in
> -libexif/exif-data.c caused by improper length computation of the allocated
> -data of an ExifMnote entry which can cause denial-of-service or possibly
> -information disclosure.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> ----
> - libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> -
> -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644
> ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
> -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e,
> - 			exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
> - 			exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
> - 			e->components = e->size;
> -+			if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
> -+				/* e->format is taken from input code,
> -+				 * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
> -+				 * entity due to the multiplication below. */
> -+				e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
> -+			}
> - 		}
> - 	}
> - 
> --- 
> -2.20.1
> -
> diff --git a/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch b/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index e662d6bfc9..0000000000
> --- a/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
> -From 5d28011c40ec86cf52cffad541093d37c263898a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
> -Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 18:05:19 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH] Reduce maximum recursion depth in exif_data_load_data_content
> -
> -This only needs to be a small, single digit integer for normal files,
> -and reducing the maximum closer to this reduces the time and space
> -needed to detect pathological cases.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> ----
> - libexif/exif-data.c | 2 +-
> - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -index 91f4c33..04cdda2 100644
> ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
> -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
> - 	if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
> - 	  return;
> - 
> --	if (recursion_depth > 30) {
> -+	if (recursion_depth > 12) {
> - 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
> - 			  "Deep recursion detected!");
> - 		return;
> --- 
> -2.20.1
> -
> diff --git a/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch b/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ff991541fe..0000000000
> --- a/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
> -From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
> -Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
> - exif_data_load_data_content.
> -
> -The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
> -causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
> -into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
> -but with a very large number of tags.  This improves on commit 5d28011c
> -which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
> -
> -The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
> -Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
> -the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
> -
> -[Peter: drop NEWS change]
> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> ----
> - libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> - 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
> ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
> -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
> - #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
> - #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
> - 
> -+#include <math.h>
> - #include <stdlib.h>
> - #include <stdio.h>
> - #include <string.h>
> -@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
> - 	break;						\
> - }
> - 
> -+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
> -+ *
> -+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
> -+ *   work=1.1**cost
> -+ */
> -+static unsigned int
> -+level_cost(unsigned int n)
> -+{
> -+    static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
> -+
> -+	/* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
> -+	return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
> -+}
> -+
> - /*! Load data for an IFD.
> -  *
> -  * \param[in,out] data #ExifData
> -@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
> -  * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
> -  * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
> -  * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
> -- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
> -- * recursively called without returning
> -+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
> -+ * call could be
> -  */
> - static void
> - exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
> - 			     const unsigned char *d,
> --			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
> -+			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
> - {
> - 	ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
> - 	ExifShort n;
> -@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
> - 	if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
> - 	  return;
> - 
> --	if (recursion_depth > 12) {
> -+	if (recursion_cost > 170) {
> -+		/*
> -+		 * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
> -+		 * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
> -+		 * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
> -+		 * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
> -+		 * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
> -+		 * causing recursion.
> -+		 * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
> -+		 * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
> -+		 * many tags) to only 2.
> -+		 */
> - 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
> --			  "Deep recursion detected!");
> -+			  "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
> - 		return;
> - 	}
> - 
> -@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
> - 			switch (tag) {
> - 			case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
> - 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
> --				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
> -+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
> -+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
> - 				break;
> - 			case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
> - 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
> --				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
> -+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
> -+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
> - 				break;
> - 			case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
> - 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
> --				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
> -+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
> -+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
> - 				break;
> - 			case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
> - 				thumbnail_offset = o;
> --- 
> -2.20.1
> -
> diff --git a/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch b/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index f708b2ae54..0000000000
> --- a/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
> -From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
> -Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
> -
> -avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
> -
> -check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
> -document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
> -
> -fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> ----
> - libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
> - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
> ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
> -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
> -@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
> - 		doff = offset + 8;
> - 
> - 	/* Sanity checks */
> --	if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
> -+	if (doff >= size) {
> - 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
> --				  "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);	
> -+				  "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
> -+		return 0;
> -+	}
> -+
> -+	if (s > size - doff) {
> -+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
> -+				  "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
> - 		return 0;
> - 	}
> - 
> -@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
> - 			       unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
> - {
> - 	/* Sanity checks */
> --	if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
> --		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
> --			  "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
> --			  o, s);
> -+	if (o >= ds) {
> -+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
> -+		return;
> -+	}
> -+	if (s > ds - o) {
> -+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
> - 		return;
> - 	}
> --
> - 	if (data->data) 
> - 		exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
> - 	if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
> -@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
> - 	exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", 
> - 		  "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
> - 
> --	/* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
> -+	/* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
> - 	if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
> - 		return;
> - 
> -@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
> - 
> - 	/* IFD 1 offset */
> - 	n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
> -+	/* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit@most, so this op will not overflow */
> - 	if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
> - 		return;
> - 
> -@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
> - 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
> - 			  "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
> - 
> --		/* Sanity check. */
> --		if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
> -+		/* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
> -+		if (offset > ds - 6) {
> - 			exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
> - 				  "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
> - 		} else {
> --- 
> -2.20.1
> -
> diff --git a/package/libexif/Config.in b/package/libexif/Config.in
> index 8a38b477b8..8064c2e9f9 100644
> --- a/package/libexif/Config.in
> +++ b/package/libexif/Config.in
> @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ config BR2_PACKAGE_LIBEXIF
>  	  image. The EXIF library allows you to parse an EXIF file
>  	  and read the data from those tags.
>  
> -	  http://libexif.sf.net
> +	  https://libexif.github.io
> diff --git a/package/libexif/libexif.hash b/package/libexif/libexif.hash
> index aa9fcc8d89..1a2157b3f5 100644
> --- a/package/libexif/libexif.hash
> +++ b/package/libexif/libexif.hash
> @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
>  # Locally computed:
> -sha256  16cdaeb62eb3e6dfab2435f7d7bccd2f37438d21c5218ec4e58efa9157d4d41a  libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2
> +sha256  5048f1c8fc509cc636c2f97f4b40c293338b6041a5652082d5ee2cf54b530c56  libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz
>  sha256  36b6d3fa47916943fd5fec313c584784946047ec1337a78b440e5992cb595f89  COPYING
> diff --git a/package/libexif/libexif.mk b/package/libexif/libexif.mk
> index 643d9ed893..c945c275a7 100644
> --- a/package/libexif/libexif.mk
> +++ b/package/libexif/libexif.mk
> @@ -4,21 +4,13 @@
>  #
>  ################################################################################
>  
> -LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.21
> -LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.bz2
> -LIBEXIF_SITE = http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/libexif/libexif/$(LIBEXIF_VERSION)
> +LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.22
> +LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.xz
> +LIBEXIF_SITE = \
> +	https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$(subst .,_,$(LIBEXIF_VERSION))-release
>  LIBEXIF_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
>  LIBEXIF_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf
>  LIBEXIF_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+
>  LIBEXIF_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
>  
> -# 0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch
> -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2016-6328
> -# 0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch
> -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2017-7544
> -# 0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch
> -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20030
> -# 0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch
> -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-9278
> -
>  $(eval $(autotools-package))
> -- 
> 2.26.2
> 
> _______________________________________________
> buildroot mailing list
> buildroot at busybox.net
> http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/buildroot

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|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
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