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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	Linux Next Mailing List <linux-next@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: linux-next: Tree for May 14 (objtool 2/2)
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 12:30:51 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202005291229.37DE69E@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200529175456.tbedus7okjrlkao7@treble>

On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 12:54:56PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 11:06:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
> > index 929211039bac..27bcc2568c95 100644
> > --- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
> > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
> > @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
> >  config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
> >         bool "Enable checks for pointers alignment"
> >         default !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
> > -       depends on !X86 || !COMPILE_TEST
> > +       depends on !UBSAN_TRAP
> >         help
> >           This option enables the check of unaligned memory accesses.
> >           Enabling this option on architectures that support unaligned
> > 
> > How about that?
> 
> But I thought you said the alignment traps might be useful on other
> arches?  Should it be
> 
> 	depends on !X86 || !UBSAN_TRAP
> 
> ?

I was just trying to avoid objtool there, but really, UBSAN_TRAP is
likely insane for unaligned access checks entirely. If anyone ever needs
it, they can adjust. :)

-- 
Kees Cook

      reply	other threads:[~2020-05-29 19:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-14 11:07 linux-next: Tree for May 14 Stephen Rothwell
2020-05-14 16:04 ` linux-next: Tree for May 14 (objtool 1/2) Randy Dunlap
2020-05-14 16:04 ` linux-next: Tree for May 14 (objtool 2/2) Randy Dunlap
2020-05-28 15:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-29  6:06     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-29 16:20       ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-29 17:54       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-29 19:30         ` Kees Cook [this message]

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