From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83FECC433E0 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 11:30:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D8BF206C3 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 11:30:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732376AbgFWLaP (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jun 2020 07:30:15 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:44866 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732191AbgFWLaL (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jun 2020 07:30:11 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EE4AAF83; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 11:30:09 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 13:30:07 +0200 From: Joerg Roedel To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Joerg Roedel , Dave Hansen , Tom Lendacky , Mike Stunes , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , "H. Peter Anvin" , Juergen Gross , Jiri Slaby , Kees Cook , kvm list , LKML , Thomas Hellstrom , Linux Virtualization , X86 ML , Sean Christopherson , Andrew Cooper Subject: Re: Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace) Message-ID: <20200623113007.GH31822@suse.de> References: <20200425191032.GK21900@8bytes.org> <910AE5B4-4522-4133-99F7-64850181FBF9@amacapital.net> <20200425202316.GL21900@8bytes.org> <20200428075512.GP30814@suse.de> <20200623110706.GB4817@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200623110706.GB4817@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 01:07:06PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 09:55:12AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote: > So what happens if this #VC triggers on the first access to the #VC > stack, because the malicious host has craftily mucked with only the #VC > IST stack page? > > Or on the NMI IST stack, then we get #VC in NMI before the NMI can fix > you up. > > AFAICT all of that is non-recoverable. I am not 100% sure, but I think if the #VC stack page is not validated, the #VC should be promoted to a #DF. Note that this is an issue only with secure nested paging (SNP), which is not enabled yet with this patch-set. When it gets enabled a stack recursion check in the #VC handler is needed which panics the VM. That also fixes the #VC-in-early-NMI problem. Regards, Joerg