From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B63CC433E0 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 06:20:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10B7920663 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 06:20:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="O4RNW+Dr" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726183AbgGIGUK (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jul 2020 02:20:10 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:37996 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726356AbgGIGUD (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jul 2020 02:20:03 -0400 Received: from sequoia.work.tihix.com (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1AF3320B4909; Wed, 8 Jul 2020 23:20:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 1AF3320B4909 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1594275602; bh=yI0/g2aB0s9h4ACzf3IyT+lQGzmQDlqQ6wtp8tod5FU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=O4RNW+DrHFkTk1qvxZmSQHwG7aRBQp4vhDsW1yFMPo79ZpRJ8OOVgj4kYg6+mERq+ tuRJfg5xOoluwdQYo5LFqbRK/juKp98ioIe5aT2QKHwT3atagUB2EelWMZ2ELjos63 ph6+ujmrG9pZwEhRoL4DOgdpq6xRHWPTAGk3cbSc= From: Tyler Hicks To: Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Prakhar Srivastava , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 04/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 01:19:03 -0500 Message-Id: <20200709061911.954326-5-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200709061911.954326-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200709061911.954326-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of policy load. The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the hook function and not the keyrings conditional since "appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule. Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments") Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks --- * v3 - Add comments to ima_validate_rule() to separate/explain the types of validation checks (section for action checks, section for hook function checks, soon to be a section for combination of options checks, etc.) - Removed the "if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)" conditional around the switch statement in ima_validate_rule() which reduced the overall indention by a tab. This could be removed because entry->func is NONE when the IMA_FUNC flag is not set. We'll explicitly enforce and then leverage that property in a later patch when we start validating all hook functions in ima_validate_rule(). - Add comment explicitly stating that all hook functions except KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK are still being validated in ima_parse_rule(). * v2 - No change security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e458cd47c099..40c28f1a6a5a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -973,6 +973,43 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template) #undef MSG } +static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +{ + /* Ensure that the action is set */ + if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) + return false; + + /* + * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other + * components of the rule + */ + switch (entry->func) { + case NONE: + case FILE_CHECK: + case MMAP_CHECK: + case BPRM_CHECK: + case CREDS_CHECK: + case POST_SETATTR: + case MODULE_CHECK: + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK: + case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK: + case POLICY_CHECK: + /* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */ + break; + case KEXEC_CMDLINE: + case KEY_CHECK: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + break; + default: + return false; + } + + return true; +} + static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -1150,7 +1187,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1; if ((entry->keyrings) || - (entry->action != MEASURE) || (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) || (keyrings_len < 2)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -1356,7 +1392,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } } - if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) + if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry)) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->action == APPRAISE) temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func); -- 2.25.1