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* [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-16 15:29 ` Colin King
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Colin King @ 2020-07-16 15:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto
  Cc: kernel-janitors, linux-kernel

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
memmove instead.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
---
 crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
--- a/crypto/xts.c
+++ b/crypto/xts.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
 				      offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
-	memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
+	memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
 
 	le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
-- 
2.27.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-16 15:29 ` Colin King
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Colin King @ 2020-07-16 15:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto
  Cc: kernel-janitors, linux-kernel

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
memmove instead.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
---
 crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
--- a/crypto/xts.c
+++ b/crypto/xts.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
 				      offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
-	memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
+	memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
 
 	le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
-- 
2.27.0

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
  2020-07-16 15:29 ` Colin King
@ 2020-07-16 15:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-07-16 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Colin King
  Cc: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
>
> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>
> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> memmove instead.
>
> Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> ---
>  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> --- a/crypto/xts.c
> +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
>                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
>
>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);

This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.

If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.


>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
>
>         le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
> --
> 2.27.0
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-16 15:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-07-16 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Colin King
  Cc: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
>
> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>
> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> memmove instead.
>
> Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> ---
>  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> --- a/crypto/xts.c
> +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
>                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
>
>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);

This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.

If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.


>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
>
>         le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
> --
> 2.27.0
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
  2020-07-16 15:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2020-07-16 16:05     ` Colin Ian King
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Colin Ian King @ 2020-07-16 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On 16/07/2020 16:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>>
>> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
>> from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
>> memmove instead.
>>
>> Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
>> Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
>> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>> ---
>>  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
>> index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
>> --- a/crypto/xts.c
>> +++ b/crypto/xts.c
>> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
>>                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
>>
>>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
>> -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
>> +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> 
> This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> 
> If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.

In that case, just leave it as is. Apologies for the noise.

Colin
> 
> 
>>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
>>
>>         le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
>> --
>> 2.27.0
>>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-16 16:05     ` Colin Ian King
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Colin Ian King @ 2020-07-16 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Herbert Xu, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On 16/07/2020 16:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>>
>> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
>> from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
>> memmove instead.
>>
>> Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
>> Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
>> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>> ---
>>  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
>> index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
>> --- a/crypto/xts.c
>> +++ b/crypto/xts.c
>> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
>>                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
>>
>>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
>> -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
>> +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> 
> This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> 
> If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.

In that case, just leave it as is. Apologies for the noise.

Colin
> 
> 
>>         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
>>
>>         le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
>> --
>> 2.27.0
>>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
  2020-07-16 15:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2020-07-17  5:21     ` Herbert Xu
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2020-07-17  5:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> >
> > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> > memmove instead.
> >
> > Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> > Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > ---
> >  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> > index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> > --- a/crypto/xts.c
> > +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
> >                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> >
> >         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> > +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> 
> This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> 
> If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.

How about a comment perhaps?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-17  5:21     ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2020-07-17  5:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> >
> > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> > memmove instead.
> >
> > Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> > Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > ---
> >  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> > index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> > --- a/crypto/xts.c
> > +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
> >                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> >
> >         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> > +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> 
> This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> 
> If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.

How about a comment perhaps?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
  2020-07-17  5:21     ` Herbert Xu
@ 2020-07-17  5:59       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-07-17  5:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Fri, 17 Jul 2020 at 08:21, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > >
> > > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > > from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> > > memmove instead.
> > >
> > > Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> > > Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> > > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > > ---
> > >  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
> > >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> > > index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> > > --- a/crypto/xts.c
> > > +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> > > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
> > >                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> > >
> > >         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > > -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> > > +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> >
> > This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> > sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> >
> > If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> > am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.
>
> How about a comment perhaps?
>

Or change it to b[1] = b[0] (assuming the compiler allows struct
assignment in that way). This will always copy XTS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes,
but we have sufficient space, and it is probably more efficient  too
in most cases.


> Cheers,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-17  5:59       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-07-17  5:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Fri, 17 Jul 2020 at 08:21, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > >
> > > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > > from source b to destination b + 1.  Fix this by using the safer
> > > memmove instead.
> > >
> > > Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> > > Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
> > > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> > > ---
> > >  crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
> > >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> > > index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
> > > --- a/crypto/xts.c
> > > +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> > > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
> > >                                       offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> > >
> > >         scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > > -       memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> > > +       memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
> >
> > This is a false positive: tail is guaranteed to be smaller than
> > sizeof(*b), so memmove() is unnecessary here.
> >
> > If changing to memcpy(&b[1], &b[0], tail) makes the warning go away, i
> > am fine with it, but otherwise we should just leave it as is.
>
> How about a comment perhaps?
>

Or change it to b[1] = b[0] (assuming the compiler allows struct
assignment in that way). This will always copy XTS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes,
but we have sufficient space, and it is probably more efficient  too
in most cases.


> Cheers,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
  2020-07-17  5:59       ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2020-07-17  6:43         ` Herbert Xu
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2020-07-17  6:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 08:59:54AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Or change it to b[1] = b[0] (assuming the compiler allows struct
> assignment in that way). This will always copy XTS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes,
> but we have sufficient space, and it is probably more efficient  too
> in most cases.

Sounds good to me.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
@ 2020-07-17  6:43         ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2020-07-17  6:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Colin King, David S . Miller, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
	kernel-janitors, Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 08:59:54AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Or change it to b[1] = b[0] (assuming the compiler allows struct
> assignment in that way). This will always copy XTS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes,
> but we have sufficient space, and it is probably more efficient  too
> in most cases.

Sounds good to me.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2020-07-17  6:43 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-07-16 15:29 [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy Colin King
2020-07-16 15:29 ` Colin King
2020-07-16 15:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-16 15:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-16 16:05   ` Colin Ian King
2020-07-16 16:05     ` Colin Ian King
2020-07-17  5:21   ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-17  5:21     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-17  5:59     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-17  5:59       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-17  6:43       ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-17  6:43         ` Herbert Xu

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