From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0984C433E5 for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A86EF20775 for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="kkj/1INF" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org A86EF20775 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E29A11F6E70D; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 03:06:27 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: None (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=2001:8b0:10b:1236::1; helo=casper.infradead.org; envelope-from=peterz@infradead.org; receiver= Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2CEE011F6E70B for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 03:06:24 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=K43ZCjJYMy6klub7Xq9DzX6bYQQEbWnMvoQ9/7nSlAU=; b=kkj/1INFxcsjPmAR7HcjcnkS3F gw7royqUQ/ZjChcF6ex998nRsQtVD8spWkTSkg3erjwYnMG/byuVK5dodJVY+nAW6ZP31fbitrYbx XASLEXixb7B5lLt+39tv+EAuZ75Q+jVs04bCADdjSmLIa6K1FEFih8/mS8J+WCt9OGM/80ogi0xe7 Xo8Q2rQXvnhMNB5RooczCx4UaqQye0duLIMEuN1+9eM+0/f9axdcXAkGf9PVove8rnp+8J6aJwjgJ 7IATAvjDIyeylA4nJvrm+w5utE1TjSJIxm2ynBiGTatJOtZYYD5WAttk8FyPDpfucP4CDH6R2FbwN 13hGovbQ==; Received: from j217100.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.217.100] helo=noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jwNFs-0001WA-IX; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:13 +0000 Received: from hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net [192.168.1.225]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CCBFF300446; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: by hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id B678029CF6F57; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 From: Peter Zijlstra To: ira.weiny@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC V2 17/17] x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions Message-ID: <20200717100610.GH10769@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20200717072056.73134-1-ira.weiny@intel.com> <20200717072056.73134-18-ira.weiny@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200717072056.73134-18-ira.weiny@intel.com> Message-ID-Hash: OUZAHKW3VUS7TPJFF7UKOMYYH2XZJZIG X-Message-ID-Hash: OUZAHKW3VUS7TPJFF7UKOMYYH2XZJZIG X-MailFrom: peterz@infradead.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Fenghua Yu , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 12:20:56AM -0700, ira.weiny@intel.com wrote: > First I'm not sure if adding this state to idtentry_state and having > that state copied is the right way to go. It seems like we should start > passing this by reference instead of value. But for now this works as > an RFC. Comments? As long as you keep sizeof(struct idtentry_state_t) <= sizeof(u64) or possibly 2*sizeof(unsigned long), code gen shouldn't be too horrid IIRC. You'll have to look at what the compiler makes of it. > Second, I'm not 100% happy with having to save the reference count in > the exception handler. It seems like a very ugly layering violation but > I don't see a way around it at the moment. So I've been struggling with that API, all the way from pks_update_protection() to that dev_access_{en,dis}able(). I _really_ hate it, but I see how you ended up with it. I wanted to propose something like: u32 current_pkey_save(int pkey, unsigned flags) { u32 *lpkr = get_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); u32 pkr, saved = *lpkr; pkr = update_pkey_reg(saved, pkey, flags); if (pkr != saved) wrpkr(pkr); put_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); return saved; } void current_pkey_restore(u32 pkr) { u32 *lpkr = get_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); if (*lpkr != pkr) wrpkr(pkr); put_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); } Together with: void pkey_switch(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { prev->pkr = this_cpu_read(local_pkr); if (prev->pkr != next->pkr) wrpkr(next->pkr); } But that's actually hard to frob into the kmap() model :-( The upside is that you only have 1 word of state, instead of the 2 you have now. > Third, this patch has gone through a couple of revisions as I've had > crashes which just don't make sense to me. One particular issue I've > had is taking a MCE during memcpy_mcsafe causing my WARN_ON() to fire. > The code path was a pmem copy and the ref count should have been > elevated due to dev_access_enable() but why was > idtentry_enter()->idt_save_pkrs() not called I don't know. Because MCEs are NMI-like and don't go through the normal interrupt path. MCEs are an abomination, please wear all the protective devices you can lay hands on when delving into that. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CBAEC433E7 for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 030E5207E8 for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="kkj/1INF" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726556AbgGQKGa (ORCPT ); Fri, 17 Jul 2020 06:06:30 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59876 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725864AbgGQKG3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 17 Jul 2020 06:06:29 -0400 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9DBA6C061755; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 03:06:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=K43ZCjJYMy6klub7Xq9DzX6bYQQEbWnMvoQ9/7nSlAU=; b=kkj/1INFxcsjPmAR7HcjcnkS3F gw7royqUQ/ZjChcF6ex998nRsQtVD8spWkTSkg3erjwYnMG/byuVK5dodJVY+nAW6ZP31fbitrYbx XASLEXixb7B5lLt+39tv+EAuZ75Q+jVs04bCADdjSmLIa6K1FEFih8/mS8J+WCt9OGM/80ogi0xe7 Xo8Q2rQXvnhMNB5RooczCx4UaqQye0duLIMEuN1+9eM+0/f9axdcXAkGf9PVove8rnp+8J6aJwjgJ 7IATAvjDIyeylA4nJvrm+w5utE1TjSJIxm2ynBiGTatJOtZYYD5WAttk8FyPDpfucP4CDH6R2FbwN 13hGovbQ==; Received: from j217100.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.217.100] helo=noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jwNFs-0001WA-IX; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 10:06:13 +0000 Received: from hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net [192.168.1.225]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CCBFF300446; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: by hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id B678029CF6F57; Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:06:10 +0200 From: Peter Zijlstra To: ira.weiny@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, Dan Williams , Vishal Verma , Andrew Morton , Fenghua Yu , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC V2 17/17] x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions Message-ID: <20200717100610.GH10769@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20200717072056.73134-1-ira.weiny@intel.com> <20200717072056.73134-18-ira.weiny@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200717072056.73134-18-ira.weiny@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 12:20:56AM -0700, ira.weiny@intel.com wrote: > First I'm not sure if adding this state to idtentry_state and having > that state copied is the right way to go. It seems like we should start > passing this by reference instead of value. But for now this works as > an RFC. Comments? As long as you keep sizeof(struct idtentry_state_t) <= sizeof(u64) or possibly 2*sizeof(unsigned long), code gen shouldn't be too horrid IIRC. You'll have to look at what the compiler makes of it. > Second, I'm not 100% happy with having to save the reference count in > the exception handler. It seems like a very ugly layering violation but > I don't see a way around it at the moment. So I've been struggling with that API, all the way from pks_update_protection() to that dev_access_{en,dis}able(). I _really_ hate it, but I see how you ended up with it. I wanted to propose something like: u32 current_pkey_save(int pkey, unsigned flags) { u32 *lpkr = get_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); u32 pkr, saved = *lpkr; pkr = update_pkey_reg(saved, pkey, flags); if (pkr != saved) wrpkr(pkr); put_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); return saved; } void current_pkey_restore(u32 pkr) { u32 *lpkr = get_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); if (*lpkr != pkr) wrpkr(pkr); put_cpu_ptr(&local_pkr); } Together with: void pkey_switch(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { prev->pkr = this_cpu_read(local_pkr); if (prev->pkr != next->pkr) wrpkr(next->pkr); } But that's actually hard to frob into the kmap() model :-( The upside is that you only have 1 word of state, instead of the 2 you have now. > Third, this patch has gone through a couple of revisions as I've had > crashes which just don't make sense to me. One particular issue I've > had is taking a MCE during memcpy_mcsafe causing my WARN_ON() to fire. > The code path was a pmem copy and the ref count should have been > elevated due to dev_access_enable() but why was > idtentry_enter()->idt_save_pkrs() not called I don't know. Because MCEs are NMI-like and don't go through the normal interrupt path. MCEs are an abomination, please wear all the protective devices you can lay hands on when delving into that.