From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-20.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DD29C433E4 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2020 09:45:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 270F420771 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2020 09:45:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="tWR9rnlY" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728990AbgGUJpG (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Jul 2020 05:45:06 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38420 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726089AbgGUJpE (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Jul 2020 05:45:04 -0400 Received: from mail-wm1-x344.google.com (mail-wm1-x344.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::344]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4AFCC061794 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wm1-x344.google.com with SMTP id j18so2158959wmi.3 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=O5bPnopOLq11q64kzXObPPX3zXeboctA7LnF6OeX/Us=; b=tWR9rnlYloerCveUYnUsgHR6uCRBFYzwqBsetdUug9EvMRIwBXaG4SCjOMjVtauMUJ 97N1WZ621rikPNoHQXNmrVmESpg0gZnwcNLiH60UOxggwcfd4lAZ6EYDxsBtqU3x9EYS Y7Exsd59gYnIzinxGWKObN+zfguxbE7NftfkR2U02GA1SsvSbV8d+qC3Bno2dVpbGuDQ adG6BsK3byX4yKpmDko9Usb+E4ha4gtYeYEf3lYAUSUkxD2CtRzicn8iWMWaf0ivy4p7 Xp+2/knS7ku/h2J4ZPmygJeDRN0zN0AJf4u5D2FkFmKcY58v7CfFg5L0yCEre3Dwa1GQ 7UZg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=O5bPnopOLq11q64kzXObPPX3zXeboctA7LnF6OeX/Us=; b=ko2N/INZeV9n4dN2pc3c4luoM4euYFbe//xVkwOh8qziKg6t7+521PStjdEMV4VWro vYhoM7qgCsRtNhTXsI5KeBja1UD1104DsIqJxAIYEfaXaUGl37/bx1xZa+ikZryh7vqZ UaeRLvibAnOdtHWUQh5t7HeqS6DqUZqlZv049FmgJP1RYSmLDrqHzinQMB2Vl9soW2ya 5txwk9mVb9LdDMJfunekjJ1aUdsCa7bw+xQMm9K2simvr/bmVtIajmoiQhlw8iLC2zL4 WuMRp3mhM4q3lREF0tdN0oTQ/FUwDb2qJPgzibz5QF5gZO5TVnIXlVKp/UiMidzNgVhI YO/g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5316Hz+8jKiwlBM8vuaH0cXIPk+MoMUVhDclqA6NjZ2kDq6eEXHg 6JR0Rp8bRTz8nBHZLyDrf3mtzA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwAbje3FiMydnF5IO/xJvjntypm8jgHonmXqBcBqkgG96tfrwMxDpijIOUo3wHwTBkkF6mM/A== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:48d:: with SMTP id 135mr3387581wme.102.1595324702381; Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([2a01:4b00:8523:2d03:cd93:4ca4:af31:19e5]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s203sm2809491wms.32.2020.07.21.02.45.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:01 -0700 (PDT) From: David Brazdil To: Marc Zyngier , Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , James Morse , Julien Thierry , Suzuki K Poulose Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, android-kvm@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, David Brazdil Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Substitute RANDOMIZE_BASE for HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:44:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20200721094445.82184-3-dbrazdil@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> References: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS config maps vectors at a fixed location on cores which are susceptible to Spector variant 3a (A57, A72) to prevent defeating hyp layout randomization by leaking the value of VBAR_EL2. Since this feature is only applicable when EL2 layout randomization is enabled, unify both behind the same RANDOMIZE_BASE Kconfig. Majority of code remains conditional on a capability selected for the affected cores. Signed-off-by: David Brazdil --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 ---------------- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 66dc41fd49f2..527d217baf55 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1182,22 +1182,6 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can - be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base - register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout - randomization. - - This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location, - independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2 - to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This - only gets enabled on affected CPUs. - - If unsure, say Y. - config ARM64_SSBD bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT default y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 8444df000181..e26542c0e79e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -45,12 +45,10 @@ struct bp_hardening_data { bp_hardening_cb_t fn; }; -#if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \ - defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) - +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs[]; extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot; -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 79728bfb5351..6bd1d3ad037a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ has_neoverse_n1_erratum_1542419(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, return is_midr_in_range(midr, &range) && has_dic; } -#if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE static const struct midr_range ca57_a72[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, .matches = check_branch_predictor, }, -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE { .desc = "EL2 vector hardening", .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig index 13489aff4440..318c8f2df245 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU virtual machines. config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS - def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS + def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || RANDOMIZE_BASE endif # KVM -- 2.27.0 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA00FC433E5 for ; 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Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([2a01:4b00:8523:2d03:cd93:4ca4:af31:19e5]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s203sm2809491wms.32.2020.07.21.02.45.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:01 -0700 (PDT) From: David Brazdil To: Marc Zyngier , Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , James Morse , Julien Thierry , Suzuki K Poulose Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Substitute RANDOMIZE_BASE for HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:44:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20200721094445.82184-3-dbrazdil@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> References: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Cc: android-kvm@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-BeenThere: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: Where KVM/ARM decisions are made List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: kvmarm-bounces@lists.cs.columbia.edu Sender: kvmarm-bounces@lists.cs.columbia.edu The HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS config maps vectors at a fixed location on cores which are susceptible to Spector variant 3a (A57, A72) to prevent defeating hyp layout randomization by leaking the value of VBAR_EL2. Since this feature is only applicable when EL2 layout randomization is enabled, unify both behind the same RANDOMIZE_BASE Kconfig. Majority of code remains conditional on a capability selected for the affected cores. Signed-off-by: David Brazdil --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 ---------------- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 66dc41fd49f2..527d217baf55 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1182,22 +1182,6 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can - be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base - register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout - randomization. - - This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location, - independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2 - to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This - only gets enabled on affected CPUs. - - If unsure, say Y. - config ARM64_SSBD bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT default y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 8444df000181..e26542c0e79e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -45,12 +45,10 @@ struct bp_hardening_data { bp_hardening_cb_t fn; }; -#if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \ - defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) - +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs[]; extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot; -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 79728bfb5351..6bd1d3ad037a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ has_neoverse_n1_erratum_1542419(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, return is_midr_in_range(midr, &range) && has_dic; } -#if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE static const struct midr_range ca57_a72[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, .matches = check_branch_predictor, }, -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE { .desc = "EL2 vector hardening", .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig index 13489aff4440..318c8f2df245 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU virtual machines. config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS - def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS + def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || RANDOMIZE_BASE endif # KVM -- 2.27.0 _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDEB5C433E4 for ; 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Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([2a01:4b00:8523:2d03:cd93:4ca4:af31:19e5]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s203sm2809491wms.32.2020.07.21.02.45.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 21 Jul 2020 02:45:01 -0700 (PDT) From: David Brazdil To: Marc Zyngier , Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , James Morse , Julien Thierry , Suzuki K Poulose Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Substitute RANDOMIZE_BASE for HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:44:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20200721094445.82184-3-dbrazdil@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> References: <20200721094445.82184-1-dbrazdil@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200721_054503_972902_E7831F3E X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.55 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: android-kvm@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Brazdil , kernel-team@android.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org The HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS config maps vectors at a fixed location on cores which are susceptible to Spector variant 3a (A57, A72) to prevent defeating hyp layout randomization by leaking the value of VBAR_EL2. Since this feature is only applicable when EL2 layout randomization is enabled, unify both behind the same RANDOMIZE_BASE Kconfig. Majority of code remains conditional on a capability selected for the affected cores. Signed-off-by: David Brazdil --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 ---------------- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 66dc41fd49f2..527d217baf55 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1182,22 +1182,6 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can - be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base - register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout - randomization. - - This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location, - independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2 - to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This - only gets enabled on affected CPUs. - - If unsure, say Y. - config ARM64_SSBD bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT default y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 8444df000181..e26542c0e79e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -45,12 +45,10 @@ struct bp_hardening_data { bp_hardening_cb_t fn; }; -#if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \ - defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) - +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs[]; extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot; -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 79728bfb5351..6bd1d3ad037a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ has_neoverse_n1_erratum_1542419(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, return is_midr_in_range(midr, &range) && has_dic; } -#if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE static const struct midr_range ca57_a72[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, .matches = check_branch_predictor, }, -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE { .desc = "EL2 vector hardening", .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig index 13489aff4440..318c8f2df245 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU virtual machines. config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS - def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS + def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || RANDOMIZE_BASE endif # KVM -- 2.27.0 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel