[PATCH v5 3/8] lib: crypto: import pkcs7_verify.c from linux

[AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>]

The file, pkcs7_verify.c, will now be imported from linux code
(crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c in 5.7) and modified to fit
into U-Boot environment.

In particular, pkcs7_verify_one() function will be used in a later patch
to rework signature verification logic aiming to support intermediate
certificates in "chain of trust."

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
 lib/crypto/Kconfig        |   3 +
 lib/crypto/Makefile       |   1 +
 lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c | 524 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 528 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c

diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
index 2b221b915aa6..6369bafac07b 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -49,4 +49,7 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 	  This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
 	  signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
 
+config PKCS7_VERIFY
+	bool
+
 endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
index 8267fee0a7b8..f3a414525d2a 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
 pkcs7_message-y := \
 	pkcs7.asn1.o \
 	pkcs7_parser.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_VERIFY) += pkcs7_verify.o
 
 $(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.h
 $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.h
diff --git a/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..192e39bae906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,524 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Imported from crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c of linux 5.7
+ * with modification marked as __UBOOT__.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells at redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#ifdef __UBOOT__
+#include <string.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
+#else
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+#ifdef __UBOOT__
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t desc_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+
+	/* The digest was calculated already. */
+	if (sig->digest)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->digest)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+
+	/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+	ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
+				  sig->digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+
+	/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+	 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+	 * digest we just calculated.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+		u8 tag;
+
+		if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+				 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+			   sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+				 sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+		 * as the contents of the digest instead.  Note that we need to
+		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+		 * hash it.
+		 */
+		memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
+
+		ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
+					 sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+	}
+
+error:
+	kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+		     enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+	*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
+			*hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !__UBOOT__ */
+
+/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes.  These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	unsigned certix = 1;
+
+	kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
+		/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+		 * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+		 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
+		 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+		 */
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
+			continue;
+		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
+			 sinfo->index, certix);
+
+		if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		sinfo->signer = x509;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in
+	 * the trust keyring.
+	 */
+	pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
+		 sinfo->index,
+		 sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
+			 x509->subject,
+			 x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
+		x509->seen = true;
+
+		if (x509->blacklisted) {
+			/* If this cert is blacklisted, then mark everything
+			 * that depends on this as blacklisted too.
+			 */
+			sinfo->blacklisted = true;
+			for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
+				p->blacklisted = true;
+			pr_debug("- blacklisted\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (x509->unsupported_key)
+			goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
+
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+		sig = x509->sig;
+		if (sig->auth_ids[0])
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+				 sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1])
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
+				 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
+
+		if (x509->self_signed) {
+			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
+			 * authority.
+			 */
+			if (x509->unsupported_sig)
+				goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
+			x509->signer = x509;
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+		 * list to see if the next one is there.
+		 */
+		auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
+		if (auth) {
+			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+				pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+					 p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+					goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+			}
+		} else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+			auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
+			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+				if (!p->skid)
+					continue;
+				pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+					 p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+					goto found_issuer;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+		pr_debug("- top\n");
+		return 0;
+
+	found_issuer_check_skid:
+		/* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+		 * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+		 */
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
+		    !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+				sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+	found_issuer:
+		pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
+		if (p->seen) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		x509->signer = p;
+		if (x509 == p) {
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		x509 = p;
+#ifndef __UBOOT__
+		might_sleep();
+#endif
+	}
+
+unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
+	/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
+	 * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
+	 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
+	 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
+	 * trusted copy of.
+	 */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
+ */
+#ifndef __UBOOT__
+static
+#endif
+int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+		     struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
+	 * signed information block
+	 */
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Find the key for the signature if there is one */
+	ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (!sinfo->signer)
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
+		 sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+	 * certificate.  We can't, however, check against the system clock
+	 * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+		if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+		    sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+			pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+	return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
+}
+
+#ifndef __UBOOT__
+/**
+ * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
+ *
+ * Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
+ * matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
+ * of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the
+ * message can be verified.
+ *
+ * This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any
+ * external public keys.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ *      odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
+ *	appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
+ *	crypto modules couldn't be found.
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+		 enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	int actual_ret = -ENOPKG;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	switch (usage) {
+	case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		/* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+		if (sinfo->blacklisted) {
+			if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG)
+				actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+				sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+			kleave(" = %d", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+		actual_ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	kleave(" = %d", actual_ret);
+	return actual_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message.  Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made.  That is left to the caller.  The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			       const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	if (pkcs7->data) {
+		pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	pkcs7->data = data;
+	pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* __UBOOT__ */
-- 
2.27.0