From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-20.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC43FC433F8 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2020 13:11:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7724206D8 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2020 13:11:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="VG2Osgg9" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730038AbgG1NLO (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:11:14 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:37764 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729126AbgG1NLE (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:11:04 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [47.187.206.220]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F08A20B490A; Tue, 28 Jul 2020 06:11:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 5F08A20B490A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1595941862; bh=OZu1yPFbyEzIVjDAN8OqyOEkz38xe1dWw+AeD/DACgE=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VG2Osgg9paicCBTa6gJkRmLr9Ki9+dDbqrV+zYqWR7A/SsLcPSkA9wYYE1gA6kPjm hC9FEcLgF+8jD9V9A31OBvIYHWE8Km10/AkOh3U4ExKlW7vBlzhzVJNYSU086AdSm+ 6kd70Oqr4vSqDmsjHrXWyaFjTW5WpOmmzKqjLAI0= From: madvenka@linux.microsoft.com To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, madvenka@linux.microsoft.com Subject: [PATCH v1 2/4] [RFC] x86/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 08:10:48 -0500 Message-Id: <20200728131050.24443-3-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200728131050.24443-1-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200728131050.24443-1-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" Implement 32-bit and 64-bit X86 support for the trampoline file descriptor. - Define architecture specific register names - Handle the trampoline invocation page fault - Setup the user register context on trampoline invocation - Setup the user stack context on trampoline invocation Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman --- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 38 +++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c | 313 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 11 + 6 files changed, 366 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index d8f8a1a69ed1..77eb50414591 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -443,3 +443,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 trampfd_create sys_trampfd_create diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index 78847b32e137..9d962de1d21f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common trampfd_create sys_trampfd_create # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h index 85165c0edafc..b031598f857e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h @@ -9,6 +9,44 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +/* + * These register names are to be used by 32-bit applications. + */ +enum reg_32_name { + x32_eax, + x32_ebx, + x32_ecx, + x32_edx, + x32_esi, + x32_edi, + x32_ebp, + x32_eip, + x32_max, +}; + +/* + * These register names are to be used by 64-bit applications. + */ +enum reg_64_name { + x64_rax = x32_max, + x64_rbx, + x64_rcx, + x64_rdx, + x64_rsi, + x64_rdi, + x64_rbp, + x64_r8, + x64_r9, + x64_r10, + x64_r11, + x64_r12, + x64_r13, + x64_r14, + x64_r15, + x64_rip, + x64_max, +}; + #ifdef __i386__ /* this struct defines the way the registers are stored on the stack during a system call. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index e77261db2391..5d968ac4c7d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -157,3 +157,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) endif obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_TRAMPFD) += trampfd.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f6b5507134d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Trampoline File Descriptor - X86 support. + * + * Author: Madhavan T. Venkataraman (madvenka@linux.microsoft.com) + * + * Copyright (c) 2020, Microsoft Corporation. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* ---------------------------- Register Context ---------------------------- */ + +static inline bool is_compat(void) +{ + return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) || + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))); +} + +static void set_reg_32(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ + switch (name) { + case x32_eax: + pt_regs->ax = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ebx: + pt_regs->bx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ecx: + pt_regs->cx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_edx: + pt_regs->dx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_esi: + pt_regs->si = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_edi: + pt_regs->di = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ebp: + pt_regs->bp = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_eip: + pt_regs->ip = (unsigned long)value; + break; + default: + WARN(1, "%s: Illegal register name %d\n", __func__, name); + break; + } +} + +#ifdef __i386__ + +static void set_reg_64(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ +} + +#else + +static void set_reg_64(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ + switch (name) { + case x64_rax: + pt_regs->ax = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rbx: + pt_regs->bx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rcx: + pt_regs->cx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rdx: + pt_regs->dx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rsi: + pt_regs->si = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rdi: + pt_regs->di = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rbp: + pt_regs->bp = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r8: + pt_regs->r8 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r9: + pt_regs->r9 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r10: + pt_regs->r10 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r11: + pt_regs->r11 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r12: + pt_regs->r12 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r13: + pt_regs->r13 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r14: + pt_regs->r14 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r15: + pt_regs->r15 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rip: + pt_regs->ip = (unsigned long)value; + break; + default: + WARN(1, "%s: Illegal register name %d\n", __func__, name); + break; + } +} + +#endif /* __i386__ */ + +static void set_regs(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + bool compat = is_compat(); + + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (compat) + set_reg_32(pt_regs, reg->name, reg->value); + else + set_reg_64(pt_regs, reg->name, reg->value); + } +} + +/* + * Check if the register names are valid. Check if the user PC has been set. + */ +bool trampfd_valid_regs(struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + int min, max, pc_name; + bool pc_set = false; + + if (is_compat()) { + min = 0; + pc_name = x32_eip; + max = x32_max; + } else { + min = x32_max; + pc_name = x64_rip; + max = x64_max; + } + + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (reg->name < min || reg->name >= max || reg->reserved) + return false; + if (reg->name == pc_name && reg->value) + pc_set = true; + } + return pc_set; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_valid_regs); + +/* + * Check if the PC specified in a register context is allowed. + */ +bool trampfd_allowed_pc(struct trampfd *trampfd, struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + struct trampfd_values *allowed_pcs = trampfd->allowed_pcs; + u64 *allowed_values, pc_value = 0; + u32 nvalues, pc_name; + int i; + + if (!allowed_pcs) + return true; + + pc_name = is_compat() ? x32_eip : x64_rip; + + /* + * Find the PC register and its value. If the PC register has been + * specified multiple times, only the last one counts. + */ + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (reg->name == pc_name) + pc_value = reg->value; + } + + allowed_values = allowed_pcs->values; + nvalues = allowed_pcs->nvalues; + + for (i = 0; i < nvalues; i++) { + if (pc_value == allowed_values[i]) + return true; + } + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_allowed_pc); + +/* ---------------------------- Stack Context ---------------------------- */ + +static int push_data(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, struct trampfd_stack *tstack) +{ + unsigned long sp; + + sp = user_stack_pointer(pt_regs) - tstack->size - tstack->offset; + if (tstack->flags & TRAMPFD_SET_SP) { + if (is_compat()) + sp = ((sp + 4) & -16ul) - 4; + else + sp = round_down(sp, 16) - 8; + } + + if (!access_ok(sp, user_stack_pointer(pt_regs) - sp)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (copy_to_user(USERPTR(sp), tstack->data, tstack->size)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (tstack->flags & TRAMPFD_SET_SP) + user_stack_pointer_set(pt_regs, sp); + + return 0; +} + +/* ---------------------------- Fault Handlers ---------------------------- */ + +static int trampfd_user_fault(struct trampfd *trampfd, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct pt_regs *pt_regs) +{ + char buf[TRAMPFD_MAX_STACK_SIZE]; + struct trampfd_regs *tregs; + struct trampfd_stack *tstack = NULL; + unsigned long addr; + size_t size; + int rc = 0; + + mutex_lock(&trampfd->lock); + + /* + * Execution of the trampoline must start at the offset specfied by + * the kernel. + */ + addr = vma->vm_start + trampfd->map.ioffset; + if (addr != pt_regs->ip) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + + /* + * At a minimum, the user PC register must be specified for a + * user trampoline. + */ + tregs = trampfd->regs; + if (!tregs) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + + /* + * Set the register context for the trampoline. + */ + set_regs(pt_regs, tregs); + + if (trampfd->stack) { + /* + * Copy the stack context into a local buffer and push stack + * data after dropping the lock. + */ + size = sizeof(*trampfd->stack) + trampfd->stack->size; + tstack = (struct trampfd_stack *) buf; + memcpy(tstack, trampfd->stack, size); + } +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trampfd->lock); + + if (!rc && tstack) { + mmap_read_unlock(vma->vm_mm); + rc = push_data(pt_regs, tstack); + mmap_read_lock(vma->vm_mm); + } + return rc; +} + +/* + * Handle it if it is a trampoline fault. + */ +bool trampfd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct pt_regs *pt_regs) +{ + struct trampfd *trampfd; + + if (!is_trampfd_vma(vma)) + return false; + trampfd = vma->vm_private_data; + + if (trampfd->type == TRAMPFD_USER) + return !trampfd_user_fault(trampfd, vma, pt_regs); + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_fault); + +/* ------------------------- Arch Initialization ------------------------- */ + +int trampfd_check_arch(struct trampfd *trampfd) +{ + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_check_arch); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 1ead568c0101..a1432ee2a1a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include /* faulthandler_disabled() */ #include /* efi_recover_from_page_fault()*/ #include +#include /* trampoline invocation */ #include /* boot_cpu_has, ... */ #include /* dotraplinkage, ... */ @@ -1142,6 +1143,7 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, struct mm_struct *mm; vm_fault_t fault, major = 0; unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT; + unsigned long tflags = X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_USER; tsk = current; mm = tsk->mm; @@ -1275,6 +1277,15 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, */ good_area: if (unlikely(access_error(hw_error_code, vma))) { + /* + * If it is a user execute fault, it could be a trampoline + * invocation. + */ + if ((hw_error_code & tflags) == tflags && + trampfd_fault(vma, regs)) { + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + return; + } bad_area_access_error(regs, hw_error_code, address, vma); return; } -- 2.17.1 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A63BC433DF for ; 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Tue, 28 Jul 2020 13:11:07 +0000 Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [47.187.206.220]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F08A20B490A; Tue, 28 Jul 2020 06:11:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 5F08A20B490A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1595941862; bh=OZu1yPFbyEzIVjDAN8OqyOEkz38xe1dWw+AeD/DACgE=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VG2Osgg9paicCBTa6gJkRmLr9Ki9+dDbqrV+zYqWR7A/SsLcPSkA9wYYE1gA6kPjm hC9FEcLgF+8jD9V9A31OBvIYHWE8Km10/AkOh3U4ExKlW7vBlzhzVJNYSU086AdSm+ 6kd70Oqr4vSqDmsjHrXWyaFjTW5WpOmmzKqjLAI0= From: madvenka@linux.microsoft.com To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, madvenka@linux.microsoft.com Subject: [PATCH v1 2/4] [RFC] x86/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 08:10:48 -0500 Message-Id: <20200728131050.24443-3-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200728131050.24443-1-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200728131050.24443-1-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200728_091103_372268_68B51402 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 26.76 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" Implement 32-bit and 64-bit X86 support for the trampoline file descriptor. - Define architecture specific register names - Handle the trampoline invocation page fault - Setup the user register context on trampoline invocation - Setup the user stack context on trampoline invocation Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman --- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 38 +++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c | 313 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 11 + 6 files changed, 366 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index d8f8a1a69ed1..77eb50414591 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -443,3 +443,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 trampfd_create sys_trampfd_create diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index 78847b32e137..9d962de1d21f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common trampfd_create sys_trampfd_create # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h index 85165c0edafc..b031598f857e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h @@ -9,6 +9,44 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +/* + * These register names are to be used by 32-bit applications. + */ +enum reg_32_name { + x32_eax, + x32_ebx, + x32_ecx, + x32_edx, + x32_esi, + x32_edi, + x32_ebp, + x32_eip, + x32_max, +}; + +/* + * These register names are to be used by 64-bit applications. + */ +enum reg_64_name { + x64_rax = x32_max, + x64_rbx, + x64_rcx, + x64_rdx, + x64_rsi, + x64_rdi, + x64_rbp, + x64_r8, + x64_r9, + x64_r10, + x64_r11, + x64_r12, + x64_r13, + x64_r14, + x64_r15, + x64_rip, + x64_max, +}; + #ifdef __i386__ /* this struct defines the way the registers are stored on the stack during a system call. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index e77261db2391..5d968ac4c7d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -157,3 +157,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) endif obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_TRAMPFD) += trampfd.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f6b5507134d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/trampfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Trampoline File Descriptor - X86 support. + * + * Author: Madhavan T. Venkataraman (madvenka@linux.microsoft.com) + * + * Copyright (c) 2020, Microsoft Corporation. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* ---------------------------- Register Context ---------------------------- */ + +static inline bool is_compat(void) +{ + return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) || + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))); +} + +static void set_reg_32(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ + switch (name) { + case x32_eax: + pt_regs->ax = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ebx: + pt_regs->bx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ecx: + pt_regs->cx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_edx: + pt_regs->dx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_esi: + pt_regs->si = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_edi: + pt_regs->di = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_ebp: + pt_regs->bp = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x32_eip: + pt_regs->ip = (unsigned long)value; + break; + default: + WARN(1, "%s: Illegal register name %d\n", __func__, name); + break; + } +} + +#ifdef __i386__ + +static void set_reg_64(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ +} + +#else + +static void set_reg_64(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, u32 name, u64 value) +{ + switch (name) { + case x64_rax: + pt_regs->ax = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rbx: + pt_regs->bx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rcx: + pt_regs->cx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rdx: + pt_regs->dx = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rsi: + pt_regs->si = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rdi: + pt_regs->di = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rbp: + pt_regs->bp = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r8: + pt_regs->r8 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r9: + pt_regs->r9 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r10: + pt_regs->r10 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r11: + pt_regs->r11 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r12: + pt_regs->r12 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r13: + pt_regs->r13 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r14: + pt_regs->r14 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_r15: + pt_regs->r15 = (unsigned long)value; + break; + case x64_rip: + pt_regs->ip = (unsigned long)value; + break; + default: + WARN(1, "%s: Illegal register name %d\n", __func__, name); + break; + } +} + +#endif /* __i386__ */ + +static void set_regs(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + bool compat = is_compat(); + + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (compat) + set_reg_32(pt_regs, reg->name, reg->value); + else + set_reg_64(pt_regs, reg->name, reg->value); + } +} + +/* + * Check if the register names are valid. Check if the user PC has been set. + */ +bool trampfd_valid_regs(struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + int min, max, pc_name; + bool pc_set = false; + + if (is_compat()) { + min = 0; + pc_name = x32_eip; + max = x32_max; + } else { + min = x32_max; + pc_name = x64_rip; + max = x64_max; + } + + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (reg->name < min || reg->name >= max || reg->reserved) + return false; + if (reg->name == pc_name && reg->value) + pc_set = true; + } + return pc_set; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_valid_regs); + +/* + * Check if the PC specified in a register context is allowed. + */ +bool trampfd_allowed_pc(struct trampfd *trampfd, struct trampfd_regs *tregs) +{ + struct trampfd_reg *reg = tregs->regs; + struct trampfd_reg *reg_end = reg + tregs->nregs; + struct trampfd_values *allowed_pcs = trampfd->allowed_pcs; + u64 *allowed_values, pc_value = 0; + u32 nvalues, pc_name; + int i; + + if (!allowed_pcs) + return true; + + pc_name = is_compat() ? x32_eip : x64_rip; + + /* + * Find the PC register and its value. If the PC register has been + * specified multiple times, only the last one counts. + */ + for (; reg < reg_end; reg++) { + if (reg->name == pc_name) + pc_value = reg->value; + } + + allowed_values = allowed_pcs->values; + nvalues = allowed_pcs->nvalues; + + for (i = 0; i < nvalues; i++) { + if (pc_value == allowed_values[i]) + return true; + } + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_allowed_pc); + +/* ---------------------------- Stack Context ---------------------------- */ + +static int push_data(struct pt_regs *pt_regs, struct trampfd_stack *tstack) +{ + unsigned long sp; + + sp = user_stack_pointer(pt_regs) - tstack->size - tstack->offset; + if (tstack->flags & TRAMPFD_SET_SP) { + if (is_compat()) + sp = ((sp + 4) & -16ul) - 4; + else + sp = round_down(sp, 16) - 8; + } + + if (!access_ok(sp, user_stack_pointer(pt_regs) - sp)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (copy_to_user(USERPTR(sp), tstack->data, tstack->size)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (tstack->flags & TRAMPFD_SET_SP) + user_stack_pointer_set(pt_regs, sp); + + return 0; +} + +/* ---------------------------- Fault Handlers ---------------------------- */ + +static int trampfd_user_fault(struct trampfd *trampfd, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct pt_regs *pt_regs) +{ + char buf[TRAMPFD_MAX_STACK_SIZE]; + struct trampfd_regs *tregs; + struct trampfd_stack *tstack = NULL; + unsigned long addr; + size_t size; + int rc = 0; + + mutex_lock(&trampfd->lock); + + /* + * Execution of the trampoline must start at the offset specfied by + * the kernel. + */ + addr = vma->vm_start + trampfd->map.ioffset; + if (addr != pt_regs->ip) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + + /* + * At a minimum, the user PC register must be specified for a + * user trampoline. + */ + tregs = trampfd->regs; + if (!tregs) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto unlock; + } + + /* + * Set the register context for the trampoline. + */ + set_regs(pt_regs, tregs); + + if (trampfd->stack) { + /* + * Copy the stack context into a local buffer and push stack + * data after dropping the lock. + */ + size = sizeof(*trampfd->stack) + trampfd->stack->size; + tstack = (struct trampfd_stack *) buf; + memcpy(tstack, trampfd->stack, size); + } +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&trampfd->lock); + + if (!rc && tstack) { + mmap_read_unlock(vma->vm_mm); + rc = push_data(pt_regs, tstack); + mmap_read_lock(vma->vm_mm); + } + return rc; +} + +/* + * Handle it if it is a trampoline fault. + */ +bool trampfd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct pt_regs *pt_regs) +{ + struct trampfd *trampfd; + + if (!is_trampfd_vma(vma)) + return false; + trampfd = vma->vm_private_data; + + if (trampfd->type == TRAMPFD_USER) + return !trampfd_user_fault(trampfd, vma, pt_regs); + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_fault); + +/* ------------------------- Arch Initialization ------------------------- */ + +int trampfd_check_arch(struct trampfd *trampfd) +{ + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trampfd_check_arch); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 1ead568c0101..a1432ee2a1a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include /* faulthandler_disabled() */ #include /* efi_recover_from_page_fault()*/ #include +#include /* trampoline invocation */ #include /* boot_cpu_has, ... */ #include /* dotraplinkage, ... */ @@ -1142,6 +1143,7 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, struct mm_struct *mm; vm_fault_t fault, major = 0; unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT; + unsigned long tflags = X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_USER; tsk = current; mm = tsk->mm; @@ -1275,6 +1277,15 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, */ good_area: if (unlikely(access_error(hw_error_code, vma))) { + /* + * If it is a user execute fault, it could be a trampoline + * invocation. + */ + if ((hw_error_code & tflags) == tflags && + trampfd_fault(vma, regs)) { + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + return; + } bad_area_access_error(regs, hw_error_code, address, vma); return; } -- 2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel