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From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
To: grub-devel@gnu.org
Cc: 93sam@debian.org, alexander.burmashev@oracle.com,
	amakhalov@vmware.com, chris.coulson@canonical.com,
	cjwatson@debian.org, cperry@redhat.com, darren.kenny@oracle.com,
	darren.moffat@oracle.com, dave.miner@oracle.com,
	degranit@microsoft.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
	ilya.okomin@oracle.com, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
	jerecox@microsoft.com, jesse@eclypsium.com,
	john.haxby@oracle.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com, mbenatto@redhat.com,
	mickey@eclypsium.com, msrc57813grub@microsoft.com,
	phcoder@gmail.com, pjones@redhat.com, sajacobu@microsoft.com,
	todd.vierling@oracle.com, xnox@ubuntu.com
Subject: [SECURITY PATCH 01/28] yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 19:00:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200729170041.14082-2-daniel.kiper@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200729170041.14082-1-daniel.kiper@oracle.com>

From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

When presented with a command that can't be tokenized to anything
smaller than YYLMAX characters, the parser calls YY_FATAL_ERROR(errmsg),
expecting that will stop further processing, as such:

  #define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \
        yyg->yytext_ptr = yy_bp; \
        yyleng = (int) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \
        yyg->yy_hold_char = *yy_cp; \
        *yy_cp = '\0'; \
        if ( yyleng >= YYLMAX ) \
                YY_FATAL_ERROR( "token too large, exceeds YYLMAX" ); \
        yy_flex_strncpy( yytext, yyg->yytext_ptr, yyleng + 1 , yyscanner); \
        yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yy_cp;

The code flex generates expects that YY_FATAL_ERROR() will either return
for it or do some form of longjmp(), or handle the error in some way at
least, and so the strncpy() call isn't in an "else" clause, and thus if
YY_FATAL_ERROR() is *not* actually fatal, it does the call with the
questionable limit, and predictable results ensue.

Unfortunately, our implementation of YY_FATAL_ERROR() is:

   #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg)                     \
     do {                                          \
       grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));     \
     } while (0)

The same pattern exists in yyless(), and similar problems exist in users
of YY_INPUT(), several places in the main parsing loop,
yy_get_next_buffer(), yy_load_buffer_state(), yyensure_buffer_stack,
yy_scan_buffer(), etc.

All of these callers expect YY_FATAL_ERROR() to actually be fatal, and
the things they do if it returns after calling it are wildly unsafe.

Fixes: CVE-2020-10713

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
 grub-core/script/yylex.l | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/grub-core/script/yylex.l b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
index 7b44c37b7..b7203c823 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/yylex.l
+++ b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
 
 /* 
  * As we don't have access to yyscanner, we cannot do much except to
- * print the fatal error.
+ * print the fatal error and exit.
  */
 #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg)                     \
   do {                                          \
-    grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));     \
+    grub_fatal (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));\
   } while (0)
 
 #define COPY(str, hint)                         \
-- 
2.11.0



  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-29 17:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-29 17:00 [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` Daniel Kiper [this message]
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 02/28] safemath: Add some arithmetic primitives that check for overflow Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 03/28] calloc: Make sure we always have an overflow-checking calloc() available Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 04/28] calloc: Use calloc() at most places Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 05/28] malloc: Use overflow checking primitives where we do complex allocations Daniel Kiper
2021-09-10 16:10   ` Glenn Washburn
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 06/28] iso9660: Don't leak memory on realloc() failures Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 07/28] font: Do not load more than one NAME section Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 08/28] gfxmenu: Fix double free in load_image() Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 09/28] xnu: Fix double free in grub_xnu_devprop_add_property() Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 10/28] json: Avoid a double-free when parsing fails Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 11/28] lzma: Make sure we don't dereference past array Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 12/28] term: Fix overflow on user inputs Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 13/28] udf: Fix memory leak Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 14/28] multiboot2: Fix memory leak if grub_create_loader_cmdline() fails Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 15/28] tftp: Do not use priority queue Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 16/28] relocator: Protect grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr() input args against integer underflow/overflow Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 17/28] relocator: Protect grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_align() max_addr against integer underflow Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 18/28] script: Remove unused fields from grub_script_function struct Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 19/28] script: Avoid a use-after-free when redefining a function during execution Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 20/28] relocator: Fix grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_align() top memory allocation Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 21/28] hfsplus: Fix two more overflows Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 22/28] lvm: Fix two more potential data-dependent alloc overflows Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 23/28] emu: Make grub_free(NULL) safe Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 24/28] efi: Fix some malformed device path arithmetic errors Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 25/28] efi/chainloader: Propagate errors from copy_file_path() Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 26/28] efi: Fix use-after-free in halt/reboot path Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 27/28] loader/linux: Avoid overflow on initrd size calculation Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 17:00 ` [SECURITY PATCH 28/28] linux: Fix integer overflows in initrd size handling Daniel Kiper
2020-07-29 20:12 ` [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole Christian Hesse
2020-07-29 20:20   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2020-07-29 21:20     ` Dimitri John Ledkov
2020-07-29 21:33       ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz

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