From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 15:32:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200902133231.GA32133@lst.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200902114348.GA1002@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
On Wed, Sep 02, 2020 at 12:43:48PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> I'll see what I can do.
>
> At first glance it looks like we might need to flesh out or refactor the
> arm64 kernel maccess routines first (since we want the user maccess
> routines to use LDTR/STTR instructions that can't access kernel memory),
> but after that I think the rest is largely mechanical.
Yes, the first thing is to implement __get_kernel_nofaul and
__put_kernel_nofault. I think they should mostly look like the existing
non-UAO versions of get_user and put_user with a fixed address space
limit.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-02 15:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-19 14:50 [PATCH] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Josh Poimboeuf
2020-08-19 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-19 17:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-08-19 21:30 ` David Laight
2020-08-20 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-28 19:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-08-29 13:21 ` David Laight
2020-08-29 19:31 ` David Laight
2020-08-31 17:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-01 8:32 ` David Laight
2020-09-01 14:26 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-01 15:00 ` David Laight
2020-09-01 15:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-01 14:02 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-01 14:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-09-01 14:52 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-01 14:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-09-01 14:54 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-01 15:05 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-09-01 15:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-09-02 11:43 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-02 13:32 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2020-09-02 17:23 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-03 6:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-09-04 16:00 ` Mark Rutland
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