From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 166B9C43461 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 18:10:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDD9B21973 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 18:10:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727804AbgIPSJs (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 14:09:48 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:12675 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727789AbgIPSJ1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 14:09:27 -0400 IronPort-SDR: RK2LhpBUQ4k9/QnPeyOfkvhKPoTzvUvn47D+OXMWlEd24lVwmsueadaMCzgJ2GudD/1XKFsQdx qX0GoOBd0gRQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9746"; a="156944438" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,433,1592895600"; d="scan'208";a="156944438" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 16 Sep 2020 11:09:18 -0700 IronPort-SDR: c2YZaBfwpgZg0IVWD0z4A32XdPWZkRYKKQ+iJXz1rQh07lGfQ3w0KAyYXU00i8ZDUN/ekyqVN7 +73tVOwYNbhQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,433,1592895600"; d="scan'208";a="483411840" Received: from scusackx-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.45.87]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 16 Sep 2020 11:09:11 -0700 Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 21:09:08 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Eric Snowberg Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, erichte@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries Message-ID: <20200916180908.GG21026@linux.intel.com> References: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 08:49:27PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now > revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure > Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of > EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID > entries. > > Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are > skipped. > > Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID > is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. > Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring > are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Looks good to me. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen /Jarkko From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 18:09:08 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries Message-Id: <20200916180908.GG21026@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: References: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> In-Reply-To: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> To: Eric Snowberg Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, erichte@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 08:49:27PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now > revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure > Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of > EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID > entries. > > Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are > skipped. > > Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID > is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. > Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring > are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Looks good to me. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen /Jarkko