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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
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	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
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	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 07:56:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200925145649.5438-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200925145649.5438-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.

The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v13:
- Change X86_INTEL_* to X86_*.

v10:
- Change CONFIG_X86_64 to CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET.

v9:
- Add Shadow Stack pointer to the fault printout.

 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h    |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index a43366191212..6293d94b9b66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -532,6 +532,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS,	exc_stack_segment);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_GP,	exc_general_protection);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_AC,	exc_alignment_check);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP, exc_control_protection);
+#endif
+
 /* Raw exception entries which need extra work */
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_UD,		exc_invalid_op);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_BP,		exc_int3);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 7ecf9babf0cb..34f2a7383d5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
 	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		asm_exc_control_protection),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 81a2fb711091..97a049258e33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -597,6 +597,65 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
 	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application.  Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode.  This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+		       error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+		return;
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    printk_ratelimit()) {
+		unsigned int max_err;
+		unsigned long ssp;
+
+		max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+		if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+			error_code = 0;
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+		pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+			tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+			control_protection_err[error_code]);
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
+	}
+
+	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
+			(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
+	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+#endif
+
 static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	int res;
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..91e10cbe3bb0 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ACCADI	5	/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
 #define SEGV_ADIDERR	6	/* Disrupting MCD error */
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	7
+#define SEGV_CPERR	8	/* Control protection fault */
+#define NSIGSEGV	8
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-25 16:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-25 14:56 [PATCH v13 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-02  2:06   ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02  2:06     ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 15:58     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-02 22:52       ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 22:52         ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 22:57         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu

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