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From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/13] xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it
Date: Tue,  3 Nov 2020 15:13:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201103141321.20346-2-jgross@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103141321.20346-1-jgross@suse.com>

Today it can happen that an event channel is being removed from the
system while the event handling loop is active. This can lead to a
race resulting in crashes or WARN() splats when trying to access the
irq_info structure related to the event channel.

Fix this problem by using a rwlock taken as reader in the event
handling loop and as writer when deallocating the irq_info structure.

As the observed problem was a NULL dereference in evtchn_from_irq()
make this function more robust against races by testing the irq_info
pointer to be not NULL before dereferencing it.

And finally make all accesses to evtchn_to_irq[row][col] atomic ones
in order to avoid seeing partial updates of an array element in irq
handling. Note that irq handling can be entered only for event channels
which have been valid before, so any not populated row isn't a problem
in this regard, as rows are only ever added and never removed.

This is XSA-331.

This is upstream commit 073d0552ead5bfc7a3a9c01de590e924f11b5dd2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reported-by: Jinoh Kang <luke1337@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
 drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index e402620b8920..46cc722cf26a 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/irqnr.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -70,6 +71,23 @@ const struct evtchn_ops *evtchn_ops;
  */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(irq_mapping_update_lock);
 
+/*
+ * Lock protecting event handling loop against removing event channels.
+ * Adding of event channels is no issue as the associated IRQ becomes active
+ * only after everything is setup (before request_[threaded_]irq() the handler
+ * can't be entered for an event, as the event channel will be unmasked only
+ * then).
+ */
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(evtchn_rwlock);
+
+/*
+ * Lock hierarchy:
+ *
+ * irq_mapping_update_lock
+ *   evtchn_rwlock
+ *     IRQ-desc lock
+ */
+
 static LIST_HEAD(xen_irq_list_head);
 
 /* IRQ <-> VIRQ mapping. */
@@ -104,7 +122,7 @@ static void clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(unsigned row)
 	unsigned col;
 
 	for (col = 0; col < EVTCHN_PER_ROW; col++)
-		evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = -1;
+		WRITE_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[row][col], -1);
 }
 
 static void clear_evtchn_to_irq_all(void)
@@ -141,7 +159,7 @@ static int set_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned evtchn, unsigned irq)
 		clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(row);
 	}
 
-	evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = irq;
+	WRITE_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[row][col], irq);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -151,7 +169,7 @@ int get_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned evtchn)
 		return -1;
 	if (evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)] == NULL)
 		return -1;
-	return evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)];
+	return READ_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)]);
 }
 
 /* Get info for IRQ */
@@ -260,10 +278,14 @@ static void xen_irq_info_cleanup(struct irq_info *info)
  */
 unsigned int evtchn_from_irq(unsigned irq)
 {
-	if (WARN(irq >= nr_irqs, "Invalid irq %d!\n", irq))
+	const struct irq_info *info = NULL;
+
+	if (likely(irq < nr_irqs))
+		info = info_for_irq(irq);
+	if (!info)
 		return 0;
 
-	return info_for_irq(irq)->evtchn;
+	return info->evtchn;
 }
 
 unsigned irq_from_evtchn(unsigned int evtchn)
@@ -439,16 +461,21 @@ static int __must_check xen_allocate_irq_gsi(unsigned gsi)
 static void xen_free_irq(unsigned irq)
 {
 	struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(irq);
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!info))
 		return;
 
+	write_lock_irqsave(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
 	list_del(&info->list);
 
 	set_info_for_irq(irq, NULL);
 
 	WARN_ON(info->refcnt > 0);
 
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
 	kfree(info);
 
 	/* Legacy IRQ descriptors are managed by the arch. */
@@ -1234,6 +1261,8 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
 	int cpu = get_cpu();
 	unsigned count;
 
+	read_lock(&evtchn_rwlock);
+
 	do {
 		vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending = 0;
 
@@ -1249,6 +1278,7 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
 	} while (count != 1 || vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending);
 
 out:
+	read_unlock(&evtchn_rwlock);
 
 	put_cpu();
 }
-- 
2.26.2


  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-03 14:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask() Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] xen/netback: " Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] xen/scsiback: " Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] xen/pvcallsback: " Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] xen/pciback: " Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] xen/events: block rogue events for some time Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Greg KH

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