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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
	andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com,
	cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com,
	conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
	kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
	ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
	npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
	rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com,
	mikko.ylinen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v40 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 17:04:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201105160424.GC25636@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201104145430.300542-11-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 04:54:16PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> 
> Background
> ==========
> 
> 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
>    via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
>    this series.
> 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
>    For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
>    copying data to an executable enclave page.
> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
>    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
> 
> This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
> vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
> or mprotect()).
> 
> The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
> declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
> intent can me immediately compared to the source data’s mapping and
> rejected if necessary.
> 
> The “intent” is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
> PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
> performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
> can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.
> 
> Problem
> =======
> 
> There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
> permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
> ->mprotect() hook.
> 
> Solution
> ========
> 
> Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
> inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
> 
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
>  mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

This needs an ACK from an mm person.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-05 16:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-04 14:54 [PATCH v40 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 01/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX architectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 02/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 03/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 18:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-04 19:04     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 19:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 19:12         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 04/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 05/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 06/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 08/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 09/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX page allocator functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05 15:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05 16:04   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-11-05 17:33     ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-06 10:04   ` Mel Gorman
2020-11-06 16:51     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-06 20:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 22:04         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-06 22:31           ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 17:43   ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-06 17:54     ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-07 15:09       ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-07 19:16         ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-12 20:58           ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-12 21:31             ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-12 22:41               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-12 22:41                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-16 18:00                 ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-19  1:39                   ` Haitao Huang
2020-11-20 17:31                     ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-15 18:59               ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-06 21:13     ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-11-06 21:23       ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-07 15:27       ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX misc driver interface Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05  1:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05  1:16     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05 16:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-05 17:57         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-05 18:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 16:07             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-06 17:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 22:01                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 16/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 17/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 18/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 19/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-08 18:24   ` Jethro Beekman
2020-11-08 20:08   ` Jethro Beekman
2020-11-08 20:26     ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-08 20:20   ` Jethro Beekman
2020-11-08 20:30     ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 20/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 21/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-08  3:56   ` Hillf Danton
2020-11-09 19:59     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 22/24] x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX kernel architecture Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-04 14:54 ` [PATCH v40 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-11-08 20:48 ` [PATCH v40 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jethro Beekman
2020-11-21 15:12 ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-21 16:25   ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-24 10:55     ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-24 17:49       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-21 18:36   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-24 18:40     ` Dr. Greg
2020-11-24 21:57       ` Andy Lutomirski

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