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From: Olga Kornievskaia <olga.kornievskaia@gmail.com>
To: trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com, anna.schumaker@netapp.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] NFSv4.2: condition READDIR's mask for security label based on LSM state
Date: Thu,  5 Nov 2020 12:33:28 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201105173328.2539-2-olga.kornievskaia@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201105173328.2539-1-olga.kornievskaia@gmail.com>

From: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>

Currently, the client will always ask for security_labels if the server
returns that it supports that feature regardless of any LSM modules
(such as Selinux) enforcing security policy. This adds performance
penalty to the READDIR operation.

Instead, query the LSM module to find if anything is enabled and
if not, then remove FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL from the bitmask.

Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c       | 5 +++++
 fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c        | 3 ++-
 include/linux/nfs_xdr.h | 1 +
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 9e0ca9b2b210..774bc5e63ca7 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "nfs4_fs.h"
 #include "delegation.h"
@@ -4968,6 +4969,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_readdir(struct dentry *dentry, const struct cred *cred,
 		.count = count,
 		.bitmask = NFS_SERVER(d_inode(dentry))->attr_bitmask,
 		.plus = plus,
+		.labels = true,
 	};
 	struct nfs4_readdir_res res;
 	struct rpc_message msg = {
@@ -4977,10 +4979,13 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_readdir(struct dentry *dentry, const struct cred *cred,
 		.rpc_cred = cred,
 	};
 	int			status;
+	int sec_flags = LSM_FQUERY_VFS_XATTRS;
 
 	dprintk("%s: dentry = %pd2, cookie = %Lu\n", __func__,
 			dentry,
 			(unsigned long long)cookie);
+	if (!security_func_query_vfs(sec_flags))
+		args.labels = false;
 	nfs4_setup_readdir(cookie, NFS_I(dir)->cookieverf, dentry, &args);
 	res.pgbase = args.pgbase;
 	status = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(dir)->client, NFS_SERVER(dir), &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
index c6dbfcae7517..585d5b5cc3dc 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1605,7 +1605,8 @@ static void encode_readdir(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs4_readdir_arg
 			FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP|FATTR4_WORD1_RAWDEV|
 			FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED|FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS|
 			FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_METADATA|FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY;
-		attrs[2] |= FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
+		if (readdir->labels)
+			attrs[2] |= FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
 		dircount >>= 1;
 	}
 	/* Use mounted_on_fileid only if the server supports it */
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h b/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
index d63cb862d58e..95f648b26525 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
@@ -1119,6 +1119,7 @@ struct nfs4_readdir_arg {
 	unsigned int			pgbase;	/* zero-copy data */
 	const u32 *			bitmask;
 	bool				plus;
+	bool				labels;
 };
 
 struct nfs4_readdir_res {
-- 
2.18.2


  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-05 17:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-05 17:33 [PATCH 1/2] [lsm] introduce a new hook to query LSM for functionality Olga Kornievskaia
2020-11-05 17:33 ` Olga Kornievskaia [this message]
2020-11-05 18:55   ` [PATCH 2/2] NFSv4.2: condition READDIR's mask for security label based on LSM state Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-11-05 19:51     ` Olga Kornievskaia
2020-11-05 20:24       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-11-05 21:18       ` Trond Myklebust
2020-11-05 21:43         ` Olga Kornievskaia
2020-11-06  8:47           ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-11-05 23:06   ` kernel test robot
2020-11-05 23:06     ` kernel test robot
2020-11-05 19:39 ` [PATCH 1/2] [lsm] introduce a new hook to query LSM for functionality Casey Schaufler
2020-11-07  1:33 ` James Morris
2020-11-14 10:12 ` kernel test robot

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