From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1FB7CC63798 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8C8820782 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="P3bKeuXg" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org A8C8820782 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57C78100EB827; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 01:29:40 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=198.145.29.99; helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=rppt@kernel.org; receiver= Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C006100EB821 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 01:29:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08D202073C; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606210177; bh=iTkMZLIpRtTWQfDGIB3Vl3mRtp/b8gkTxfVBLDleW2s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P3bKeuXgUqKvyJMqI2t3WocMqVtq5rV80ChLv9RkXZobErCnfHPcZXypQS/ff8OIc k9Yt6nSUwbnDnaqXryHrQQDoC3ltsZJwF2Txq8wR9gdzisTN7cFmPk0qphW+f2nwAw 8OtVd4ZVVbsESt0E2Fi0gLuo0Co6IDESghVXVkF8= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Message-ID-Hash: YMXBL3LVYNG5BJUIZ3SFHBQLPU6FSCPU X-Message-ID-Hash: YMXBL3LVYNG5BJUIZ3SFHBQLPU6FSCPU X-MailFrom: rppt@kernel.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Linux API
  • , linux-arch , linux-arm-kernel , Linux FS Devel , Linux-MM , LKML , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , linux-nvdimm , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with > the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 > for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in > general. Ok, let's move forward without UC. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 533F5C64E7A for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F164520782 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="P3bKeuXg" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731188AbgKXJ3j (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:39 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:38102 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727901AbgKXJ3i (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:38 -0500 Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08D202073C; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606210177; bh=iTkMZLIpRtTWQfDGIB3Vl3mRtp/b8gkTxfVBLDleW2s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P3bKeuXgUqKvyJMqI2t3WocMqVtq5rV80ChLv9RkXZobErCnfHPcZXypQS/ff8OIc k9Yt6nSUwbnDnaqXryHrQQDoC3ltsZJwF2Txq8wR9gdzisTN7cFmPk0qphW+f2nwAw 8OtVd4ZVVbsESt0E2Fi0gLuo0Co6IDESghVXVkF8= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Linux API , linux-arch , linux-arm-kernel , Linux FS Devel , Linux-MM , LKML , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , linux-nvdimm , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with > the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 > for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in > general. Ok, let's move forward without UC. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6830C56201 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:30:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 26D5A2073C for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:30:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="cjDO4C0q"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="P3bKeuXg" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 26D5A2073C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References:Message-ID: Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=8A5qyvgQS3ifafZFTONPvNeqeGiwwbEV8rH4iWkQN5Q=; b=cjDO4C0q5bWR7mjzhfFlYuCps 5OQbZGHtNWLgsrZ8MDUWbYq28n1nAh28PNHUf0Gy/rCDms53mayBbSsKovdO7g4PyJjDoxnxSFKqb 1L4rCTOw/pudGDwTxzjxhKn3FtbKOSWefvF5J+qk2qyjyNXRLhZObBfHXzTFS4o6nBIdmrJXNZjvo pCLRtRiV9TxsLYha3kDUz3dWDsqPnkwyxtGGSNveDs3/SgQwdem9YQMHPJbogRn2TVFOVzvSgkEI6 o8Sxeh32Ow7/lhDjCistbfi1DTsrUa2OCqS7xEPmN9vd5t9Wf98DEHTDENqJdZqY6hcTGrOFr0d79 wBW4Ul3fA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1khUeI-0006ca-CQ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:30:10 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1khUdm-0006Iu-3K; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:39 +0000 Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08D202073C; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606210177; bh=iTkMZLIpRtTWQfDGIB3Vl3mRtp/b8gkTxfVBLDleW2s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P3bKeuXgUqKvyJMqI2t3WocMqVtq5rV80ChLv9RkXZobErCnfHPcZXypQS/ff8OIc k9Yt6nSUwbnDnaqXryHrQQDoC3ltsZJwF2Txq8wR9gdzisTN7cFmPk0qphW+f2nwAw 8OtVd4ZVVbsESt0E2Fi0gLuo0Co6IDESghVXVkF8= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201124_042938_347759_73053E0D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 22.52 ) X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , Linux-MM , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch , Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm , Will Deacon , X86 ML , Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel , Linux API , LKML , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , Linux FS Devel , Andrew Morton , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with > the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 > for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in > general. Ok, let's move forward without UC. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFC09C2D0E4 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2676E2075A for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="P3bKeuXg" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2676E2075A Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 92C876B005D; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:39 -0500 (EST) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 8B30E6B006E; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:39 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 77AF76B0070; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:39 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0142.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.142]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E6C76B005D for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 04:29:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpin10.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BEC9180AD815 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:39 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 77518789278.10.swim55_58033822736d Received: from filter.hostedemail.com (10.5.16.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.16.251]) by smtpin10.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D084E16A4AC for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:38 +0000 (UTC) X-HE-Tag: swim55_58033822736d X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 4045 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by imf35.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08D202073C; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606210177; bh=iTkMZLIpRtTWQfDGIB3Vl3mRtp/b8gkTxfVBLDleW2s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P3bKeuXgUqKvyJMqI2t3WocMqVtq5rV80ChLv9RkXZobErCnfHPcZXypQS/ff8OIc k9Yt6nSUwbnDnaqXryHrQQDoC3ltsZJwF2Txq8wR9gdzisTN7cFmPk0qphW+f2nwAw 8OtVd4ZVVbsESt0E2Fi0gLuo0Co6IDESghVXVkF8= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Linux API , linux-arch , linux-arm-kernel , Linux FS Devel , Linux-MM , LKML , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , linux-nvdimm , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with > the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 > for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in > general. Ok, let's move forward without UC. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 359B0C2D0E4 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:31:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD8A52073C for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:31:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="c15FA6CU"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="P3bKeuXg" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AD8A52073C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References:Message-ID: Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=KSFc/emOGjCqEC+UxF7tGPU/DNqNOFKYTRXqeNdC/oo=; b=c15FA6CUyfYgySgkyTlLt/MtR d2eYt/0/+OnDSF0gPJmNpEckta2ETTEhQnJX6ITLJdltJtyJaYTJvtb6KWabgEAYF9hngkLO7qVVF bY0iTNRSjR+YOgvRbrOAax3RBht4WXsVrciCekfDzr6dWScRtRHzkj9d1Fh6RxaZp7MuEyqhTZllq M9rcJWRlEh15doeXuSFi3aTxTAQHLaNiXwIletMPDMe/57VnYrR/L/GpnIqwC6YeFxnx43AKE2c3n PWU7+c1ejTR82uMQidXHwCS4xtlnISPeXN2qjvStm8AYIY7gdGx/J8KNC/i/auUprDyhtf+WNL7p2 Rt+1fDpCw==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1khUeC-0006WW-9x; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:30:04 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1khUdm-0006Iu-3K; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:39 +0000 Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08D202073C; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 09:29:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606210177; bh=iTkMZLIpRtTWQfDGIB3Vl3mRtp/b8gkTxfVBLDleW2s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P3bKeuXgUqKvyJMqI2t3WocMqVtq5rV80ChLv9RkXZobErCnfHPcZXypQS/ff8OIc k9Yt6nSUwbnDnaqXryHrQQDoC3ltsZJwF2Txq8wR9gdzisTN7cFmPk0qphW+f2nwAw 8OtVd4ZVVbsESt0E2Fi0gLuo0Co6IDESghVXVkF8= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> References: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201124_042938_347759_73053E0D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 22.52 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , Linux-MM , "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch , Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm , Will Deacon , X86 ML , Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel , Linux API , LKML , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , Linux FS Devel , Andrew Morton , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with > the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 > for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in > general. Ok, let's move forward without UC. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel