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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v17 04/26] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 13:30:31 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201229213053.16395-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201229213053.16395-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Introduce a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET, which indicates either Shadow
Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking (or both) is present.  Also introduce
related cpu init/setup functions.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |  5 ++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 292fe87b26b3..d1866659edbd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID		( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM		( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
 #define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF		( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
-/* free					( 3*32+29) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CET			( 3*32+29) /* Control-flow enforcement */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3	( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ	( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4d3b7ce509e5..86ac4a1c6d81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -71,9 +71,11 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET_USER
 #define DISABLE_SHSTK	0
 #define DISABLE_IBT	0
+#define DISABLE_CET	0
 #else
 #define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
 #define DISABLE_IBT	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31))
+#define DISABLE_CET	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CET & 31))
 #endif
 
 /*
@@ -82,7 +84,8 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK0	(DISABLE_VME)
 #define DISABLED_MASK1	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK2	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK3	(DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR)
+#define DISABLED_MASK3	(DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR| \
+			 DISABLE_CET)
 #define DISABLED_MASK4	(DISABLE_PCID)
 #define DISABLED_MASK5	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK6	0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index bcba3c643e63..a8df907e8017 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement */
+#define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 35ad8480c464..03c367f79adc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -510,6 +510,14 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
 __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+		return;
+
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
 /*
  * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
  * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -895,6 +903,12 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static void init_cet_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CET);
+}
+
 void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -960,6 +974,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
 		c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
 
+	init_cet_features(c);
 	init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
 	init_speculation_control(c);
 
@@ -1221,6 +1236,15 @@ static void detect_nopl(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+static void adjust_combined_cpu_features(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET_USER
+	if (test_bit(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared) &&
+	    test_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBT, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared))
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CET);
+#endif
+}
+
 /*
  * We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed
  * before parse_early_param().
@@ -1252,9 +1276,19 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 
+	/*
+	 * CET states are XSAVES states and options must be parsed early.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET_USER
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_shstk"))
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_ibt"))
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+#endif
+
 	arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (arglen <= 0)
-		return;
+		goto done;
 
 	pr_info("Clearing CPUID bits:");
 	do {
@@ -1272,6 +1306,9 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
 		}
 	} while (res == 2);
 	pr_cont("\n");
+
+done:
+	adjust_combined_cpu_features();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1591,6 +1628,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	x86_init_rdrand(c);
 	setup_pku(c);
+	setup_cet(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-12-29 21:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-29 21:30 [PATCH v17 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-19 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-19 18:10     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 03/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-01-11 17:56   ` [PATCH v17 04/26] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Borislav Petkov
2021-01-11 20:25     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-11 23:09   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-12  0:09     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-12 12:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-12 23:02       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-13 10:04         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-19 12:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-19 19:36     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-21 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-21 20:16     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-21 20:20       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-21 20:26         ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-21 20:44           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-21 20:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-21 21:40         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-21 22:16       ` David Laight
2021-01-21 22:19         ` Randy Dunlap
2021-01-21 22:32           ` David Laight
2021-01-22 21:54             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-25 18:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-25 21:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-25 21:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-25 22:18         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-26 10:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-26 16:45             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-26  8:46     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-01-26  9:40       ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-01-26 16:43         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 21:30 ` [PATCH v17 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-04 20:08 ` [PATCH v17 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu, Yu-cheng

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