From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87EC8C433E0 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:46:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 542F0221FE for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:46:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732238AbhALEqB (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:46:01 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:54409 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732097AbhALEqA (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:46:00 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DFJ0S1qsDz9t15; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:12 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610426712; bh=XAe7Xx+YpNUPHcyhxW/cHKgMuEbgQoNbc1c/1ol/ah8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gsgUbwoe/uiSnZj4VGfKpGe5Ib+aKheRMxqeX9Ln6sYcVvmJg1D53AAky24w2MF96 VvM0yqUgiQzuZbqTtB08ba0jsQBdyg8VlrWvHr6WVAKfeNyns5k4kRX/oyZwG5X4Ox QE3wVg4PCZ3eUco9uBmCLYgUm08Epv/kF+W/HQTA= From: David Gibson To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Marcelo Tosatti , David Gibson , Greg Kurz , frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, Christian Borntraeger , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= , Marcel Apfelbaum , Eduardo Habkost , david@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck , mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:04 +1100 Message-Id: <20210112044508.427338-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Now that we've implemented a generic machine option for configuring various confidential guest support mechanisms: 1. Update docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt to reference this rather than the earlier SEV specific option 2. Add a docs/confidential-guest-support.txt to cover the generalities of the confidential guest support scheme Signed-off-by: David Gibson --- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +- docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt index 80b8eb00e9..145896aec7 100644 --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +++ b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ complete flow chart. To launch a SEV guest # ${QEMU} \ - -machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 Debugging diff --git a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2790425b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +Confidential Guest Support +========================== + +Traditionally, hypervisors such as qemu have complete access to a +guest's memory and other state, meaning that a compromised hypervisor +can compromise any of its guests. A number of platforms have added +mechanisms in hardware and/or firmware which give guests at least some +protection from a compromised hypervisor. This is obviously +especially desirable for public cloud environments. + +These mechanisms have different names and different modes of +operation, but are often referred to as Secure Guests or Confidential +Guests. We use the term "Confidential Guest Support" to distinguish +this from other aspects of guest security (such as security against +attacks from other guests, or from network sources). + +Running a Confidential Guest +---------------------------- + +To run a confidential guest you need to add two command line parameters: + +1. Use "-object" to create a "confidential guest support" object. The + type and parameters will vary with the specific mechanism to be + used +2. Set the "confidential-guest-support" machine parameter to the ID of + the object from (1). + +Example (for AMD SEV):: + + qemu-system-x86_64 \ + \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 + +Supported mechanisms +-------------------- + +Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are: + +AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) + docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt + +Other mechanisms may be supported in future. -- 2.29.2 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94E31C433DB for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:51:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C637221FE for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:51:48 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4C637221FE Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:52294 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzBel-0008SD-Em for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:51:47 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:50432) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzBYd-0002Hq-47; Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:45:27 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([2401:3900:2:1::2]:38301 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kzBYb-000800-Do; Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:45:26 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DFJ0S1qsDz9t15; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:12 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610426712; bh=XAe7Xx+YpNUPHcyhxW/cHKgMuEbgQoNbc1c/1ol/ah8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gsgUbwoe/uiSnZj4VGfKpGe5Ib+aKheRMxqeX9Ln6sYcVvmJg1D53AAky24w2MF96 VvM0yqUgiQzuZbqTtB08ba0jsQBdyg8VlrWvHr6WVAKfeNyns5k4kRX/oyZwG5X4Ox QE3wVg4PCZ3eUco9uBmCLYgUm08Epv/kF+W/HQTA= From: David Gibson To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:04 +1100 Message-Id: <20210112044508.427338-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: thuth@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck , =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= , frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mst@redhat.com, Marcelo Tosatti , richard.henderson@linaro.org, Greg Kurz , Eduardo Habkost , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Paolo Bonzini , David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" Now that we've implemented a generic machine option for configuring various confidential guest support mechanisms: 1. Update docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt to reference this rather than the earlier SEV specific option 2. Add a docs/confidential-guest-support.txt to cover the generalities of the confidential guest support scheme Signed-off-by: David Gibson --- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +- docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt index 80b8eb00e9..145896aec7 100644 --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +++ b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ complete flow chart. To launch a SEV guest # ${QEMU} \ - -machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 Debugging diff --git a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2790425b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +Confidential Guest Support +========================== + +Traditionally, hypervisors such as qemu have complete access to a +guest's memory and other state, meaning that a compromised hypervisor +can compromise any of its guests. A number of platforms have added +mechanisms in hardware and/or firmware which give guests at least some +protection from a compromised hypervisor. This is obviously +especially desirable for public cloud environments. + +These mechanisms have different names and different modes of +operation, but are often referred to as Secure Guests or Confidential +Guests. We use the term "Confidential Guest Support" to distinguish +this from other aspects of guest security (such as security against +attacks from other guests, or from network sources). + +Running a Confidential Guest +---------------------------- + +To run a confidential guest you need to add two command line parameters: + +1. Use "-object" to create a "confidential guest support" object. The + type and parameters will vary with the specific mechanism to be + used +2. Set the "confidential-guest-support" machine parameter to the ID of + the object from (1). + +Example (for AMD SEV):: + + qemu-system-x86_64 \ + \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 + +Supported mechanisms +-------------------- + +Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are: + +AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) + docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt + +Other mechanisms may be supported in future. -- 2.29.2