From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE92AC433E0 for ; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 01:02:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75F4F2313F for ; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 01:02:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728797AbhAMBCO (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:02:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:32806 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728163AbhAMBBr (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:01:47 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org (ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45D0BC061786 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 17:01:06 -0800 (PST) Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DFpz46T7nz9sVy; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:00:48 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610499649; bh=tHyp3lLQuiadcdd7kmXJVsnCWsUjem1K5rL1oXG0wIU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Ebb3uB1Kz2exZ1qXiKaI9B9IJWt/WOQcxgxHm3xCy1B8WlqOz2obkF94qQWN1e0lp e2bwJ+DY6Te8sVM2N9J/YmkLqJVl5+cRP1V0Auoms3LChsTcVWjcEbWi8zKDTqxu0y wHm2J/F3trbwNRCWvC67H5YLoS3CjA385Ox+Vk2Q= Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 11:50:32 +1100 From: David Gibson To: Greg Kurz Cc: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Marcelo Tosatti , frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, Christian Borntraeger , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= , Marcel Apfelbaum , Eduardo Habkost , david@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck , mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property Message-ID: <20210113005032.GA435587@yekko.fritz.box> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112044508.427338-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="6TrnltStXW4iwmi0" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org --6TrnltStXW4iwmi0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 11:59:59AM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote: > On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:00 +1100 > David Gibson wrote: >=20 > > Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we > > get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the > > hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's > > not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator. > >=20 > > In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is > > almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled. > >=20 > > So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets > > this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we > > keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of > > the new property. >=20 > Do we really want to keep "memory-encryption" in the long term ? If > not, then maybe engage the deprecation process and add a warning in > machine_set_memory_encryption() ? Hmm.. I kind of think that's up to the SEV people to decide on the timetable (if any) for deprecation - it's their existing option. In any case I'd prefer to leave that to a separate patch. Dave (Gilbert), any opinions? > Apart from that, LGTM: >=20 > Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz >=20 > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson > > --- > > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 5 +++-- > > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 +++-- > > hw/core/machine.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > > include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- > > include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +- > > target/i386/sev.c | 32 ++------------------------------ > > 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) > >=20 > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > index 260ed73ffe..28ab126f70 100644 > > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > @@ -2181,8 +2181,9 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > > * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the me= mory > > * encryption context. > > */ > > - if (ms->memory_encryption) { > > - ret =3D sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption); > > + if (ms->cgs) { > > + /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ > > + ret =3D sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs); > > if (ret < 0) { > > goto err; > > } > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > index 5db9ab8f00..3d4787ae4a 100644 > > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ > > #include "qemu-common.h" > > #include "sysemu/sev.h" > > =20 > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > > { > > - return -1; > > + /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ > > + g_assert_not_reached(); > > } > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c > > index 8909117d80..94194ab82d 100644 > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c > > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" > > #include "migration/global_state.h" > > #include "migration/vmstate.h" > > +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" > > =20 > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_2[] =3D {}; > > const size_t hw_compat_5_2_len =3D G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_2); > > @@ -427,16 +428,37 @@ static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object= *obj, Error **errp) > > { > > MachineState *ms =3D MACHINE(obj); > > =20 > > - return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption); > > + if (ms->cgs) { > > + return g_strdup(object_get_canonical_path_component(OBJECT(ms-= >cgs))); > > + } > > + > > + return NULL; > > } > > =20 > > static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *val= ue, > > Error **errp) > > { > > - MachineState *ms =3D MACHINE(obj); > > + Object *cgs =3D > > + object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), value= ); > > + > > + if (!cgs) { > > + error_setg(errp, "No such memory encryption object '%s'", valu= e); > > + return; > > + } > > =20 > > - g_free(ms->memory_encryption); > > - ms->memory_encryption =3D g_strdup(value); > > + object_property_set_link(obj, "confidential-guest-support", cgs, e= rrp); > > +} > > + > > +static void machine_check_confidential_guest_support(const Object *obj, > > + const char *name, > > + Object *new_targe= t, > > + Error **errp) > > +{ > > + /* > > + * So far the only constraint is that the target has the > > + * TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT interface, and that's checked > > + * by the QOM core > > + */ > > } > > =20 > > static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > @@ -836,6 +858,15 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, vo= id *data) > > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "suppress-vmdesc", > > "Set on to disable self-describing migration"); > > =20 > > + object_class_property_add_link(oc, "confidential-guest-support", > > + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, > > + offsetof(MachineState, cgs), > > + machine_check_confidential_guest_su= pport, > > + OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG); > > + object_class_property_set_description(oc, "confidential-guest-supp= ort", > > + "Set confidential guest sche= me to support"); > > + > > + /* For compatibility */ > > object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption", > > machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption); > > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption", > > @@ -1158,9 +1189,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) > > cc->deprecation_note); > > } > > =20 > > - if (machine->memory_encryption) { > > + if (machine->cgs) { > > /* > > - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real > > + * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real > > * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge > > * areas. > > */ > > diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h > > index 17b1f3f0b9..1acd662fa5 100644 > > --- a/include/hw/boards.h > > +++ b/include/hw/boards.h > > @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ struct MachineState { > > bool iommu; > > bool suppress_vmdesc; > > bool enable_graphics; > > - char *memory_encryption; > > + ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs; > > char *ram_memdev_id; > > /* > > * convenience alias to ram_memdev_id backend memory region > > diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h > > index 7335e59867..3b5b1aacf1 100644 > > --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h > > +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h > > @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ > > =20 > > #include "sysemu/kvm.h" > > =20 > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id); > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs); > > int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp); > > int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret, > > uint64_t gpa, Error **errp); > > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > > index 2a4b2187d6..5399a136ad 100644 > > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > > @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info =3D { > > } > > }; > > =20 > > -static SevGuestState * > > -lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) > > -{ > > - Object *obj; > > - SevGuestState *info; > > - > > - obj =3D object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), i= d); > > - if (!obj) { > > - return NULL; > > - } > > - > > - info =3D (SevGuestState *) > > - object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > > - if (!info) { > > - return NULL; > > - } > > - > > - return info; > > -} > > - > > bool > > sev_enabled(void) > > { > > @@ -682,10 +662,9 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, Run= State state) > > } > > } > > =20 > > -int > > -sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > > { > > - SevGuestState *sev; > > + SevGuestState *sev =3D SEV_GUEST(cgs); > > char *devname; > > int ret, fw_error; > > uint32_t ebx; > > @@ -698,13 +677,6 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > return -1; > > } > > =20 > > - sev =3D lookup_sev_guest_info(id); > > - if (!sev) { > > - error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object", > > - __func__, id, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > > - goto err; > > - } > > - > > sev_guest =3D sev; > > sev->state =3D SEV_STATE_UNINIT; > > =20 >=20 --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson --6TrnltStXW4iwmi0 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEdfRlhq5hpmzETofcbDjKyiDZs5IFAl/+Q9YACgkQbDjKyiDZ s5Itqg//dvbFemq8fGIAOo6kUOxQMboUPav00y5lzKkXkhToC8W3++z1mihjKge5 K1CkwtChyudBrhIO7mNbwZdWMkW+7BWzxmJgMw5u8mgeyPiA96RYnTZOKqI8Mmgs 7hCr1LJsWOQjuN+fvXM92u/ePxzdAVeeKtWYxvBANKXb6Ez3KzpxlfiW7/wmDrIc T6Kk8ZZipjFIbMihbl/wt80BoMQEiyAvngx0mGgHoF9XnICPqjVXxqtQaSSqSEOU DNpz3NCxSQJG3LVZvRGBiDA6E8Vw/cHrEPtb1tjkCRgBWz0UvhoN4uRirXaKYrL2 wXKpmgbbZtN5fov1R96YXSyfvXE6byWOpwJ448kwvKdFlMTWMJMYDtZMcKtjZ1Xz 5HSyzz2NAqMtCDxNkBvTSD7SYl1pMSjJ1aZ0UuvW2hN8pBZ90pi0Al2ksjq6Pj8J ZrZC6mPEQ4wXGx10wqY14vAYsH35GcupffOmoNigAKr0ZT8CudDDgb4jGHTQR1Zm mdEW724C95/CtqWeDhIknmLLpvTOziVyszc2g0SZ7PlJ1yrQZdGSAA9n8M5H4/ji Bp/sRMWLDibOETZYzeK9OtXHG+xgTDYrMYnrpOxn85aJ0B9h+N2bEutT8olVtlyp 6Eengd4+E38O0ZlY02plbor/UK2fJIkGW9xFjBF+SK4o3Db6EOw= =SS0Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --6TrnltStXW4iwmi0-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3186EC433E0 for ; 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Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:01:15 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DFpz46T7nz9sVy; Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:00:48 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610499649; bh=tHyp3lLQuiadcdd7kmXJVsnCWsUjem1K5rL1oXG0wIU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Ebb3uB1Kz2exZ1qXiKaI9B9IJWt/WOQcxgxHm3xCy1B8WlqOz2obkF94qQWN1e0lp e2bwJ+DY6Te8sVM2N9J/YmkLqJVl5+cRP1V0Auoms3LChsTcVWjcEbWi8zKDTqxu0y wHm2J/F3trbwNRCWvC67H5YLoS3CjA385Ox+Vk2Q= Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 11:50:32 +1100 From: David Gibson To: Greg Kurz Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property Message-ID: <20210113005032.GA435587@yekko.fritz.box> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112044508.427338-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="6TrnltStXW4iwmi0" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, Marcelo Tosatti , brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, mst@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , andi.kleen@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com, Eduardo Habkost , richard.henderson@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= , Cornelia Huck , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --6TrnltStXW4iwmi0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 11:59:59AM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote: > On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:00 +1100 > David Gibson wrote: >=20 > > Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we > > get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the > > hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's > > not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator. > >=20 > > In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is > > almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled. > >=20 > > So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets > > this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we > > keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of > > the new property. >=20 > Do we really want to keep "memory-encryption" in the long term ? If > not, then maybe engage the deprecation process and add a warning in > machine_set_memory_encryption() ? Hmm.. I kind of think that's up to the SEV people to decide on the timetable (if any) for deprecation - it's their existing option. In any case I'd prefer to leave that to a separate patch. Dave (Gilbert), any opinions? > Apart from that, LGTM: >=20 > Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz >=20 > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson > > --- > > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 5 +++-- > > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 +++-- > > hw/core/machine.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > > include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- > > include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +- > > target/i386/sev.c | 32 ++------------------------------ > > 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) > >=20 > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > index 260ed73ffe..28ab126f70 100644 > > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > > @@ -2181,8 +2181,9 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > > * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the me= mory > > * encryption context. > > */ > > - if (ms->memory_encryption) { > > - ret =3D sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption); > > + if (ms->cgs) { > > + /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ > > + ret =3D sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs); > > if (ret < 0) { > > goto err; > > } > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > index 5db9ab8f00..3d4787ae4a 100644 > > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > > @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ > > #include "qemu-common.h" > > #include "sysemu/sev.h" > > =20 > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > > { > > - return -1; > > + /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ > > + g_assert_not_reached(); > > } > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c > > index 8909117d80..94194ab82d 100644 > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c > > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" > > #include "migration/global_state.h" > > #include "migration/vmstate.h" > > +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" > > =20 > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_2[] =3D {}; > > const size_t hw_compat_5_2_len =3D G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_2); > > @@ -427,16 +428,37 @@ static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object= *obj, Error **errp) > > { > > MachineState *ms =3D MACHINE(obj); > > =20 > > - return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption); > > + if (ms->cgs) { > > + return g_strdup(object_get_canonical_path_component(OBJECT(ms-= >cgs))); > > + } > > + > > + return NULL; > > } > > =20 > > static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *val= ue, > > Error **errp) > > { > > - MachineState *ms =3D MACHINE(obj); > > + Object *cgs =3D > > + object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), value= ); > > + > > + if (!cgs) { > > + error_setg(errp, "No such memory encryption object '%s'", valu= e); > > + return; > > + } > > =20 > > - g_free(ms->memory_encryption); > > - ms->memory_encryption =3D g_strdup(value); > > + object_property_set_link(obj, "confidential-guest-support", cgs, e= rrp); > > +} > > + > > +static void machine_check_confidential_guest_support(const Object *obj, > > + const char *name, > > + Object *new_targe= t, > > + Error **errp) > > +{ > > + /* > > + * So far the only constraint is that the target has the > > + * TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT interface, and that's checked > > + * by the QOM core > > + */ > > } > > =20 > > static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > @@ -836,6 +858,15 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, vo= id *data) > > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "suppress-vmdesc", > > "Set on to disable self-describing migration"); > > =20 > > + object_class_property_add_link(oc, "confidential-guest-support", > > + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, > > + offsetof(MachineState, cgs), > > + machine_check_confidential_guest_su= pport, > > + OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG); > > + object_class_property_set_description(oc, "confidential-guest-supp= ort", > > + "Set confidential guest sche= me to support"); > > + > > + /* For compatibility */ > > object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption", > > machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption); > > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption", > > @@ -1158,9 +1189,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) > > cc->deprecation_note); > > } > > =20 > > - if (machine->memory_encryption) { > > + if (machine->cgs) { > > /* > > - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real > > + * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real > > * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge > > * areas. > > */ > > diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h > > index 17b1f3f0b9..1acd662fa5 100644 > > --- a/include/hw/boards.h > > +++ b/include/hw/boards.h > > @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ struct MachineState { > > bool iommu; > > bool suppress_vmdesc; > > bool enable_graphics; > > - char *memory_encryption; > > + ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs; > > char *ram_memdev_id; > > /* > > * convenience alias to ram_memdev_id backend memory region > > diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h > > index 7335e59867..3b5b1aacf1 100644 > > --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h > > +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h > > @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ > > =20 > > #include "sysemu/kvm.h" > > =20 > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id); > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs); > > int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp); > > int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret, > > uint64_t gpa, Error **errp); > > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > > index 2a4b2187d6..5399a136ad 100644 > > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > > @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info =3D { > > } > > }; > > =20 > > -static SevGuestState * > > -lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) > > -{ > > - Object *obj; > > - SevGuestState *info; > > - > > - obj =3D object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), i= d); > > - if (!obj) { > > - return NULL; > > - } > > - > > - info =3D (SevGuestState *) > > - object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > > - if (!info) { > > - return NULL; > > - } > > - > > - return info; > > -} > > - > > bool > > sev_enabled(void) > > { > > @@ -682,10 +662,9 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, Run= State state) > > } > > } > > =20 > > -int > > -sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > > { > > - SevGuestState *sev; > > + SevGuestState *sev =3D SEV_GUEST(cgs); > > char *devname; > > int ret, fw_error; > > uint32_t ebx; > > @@ -698,13 +677,6 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) > > return -1; > > } > > =20 > > - sev =3D lookup_sev_guest_info(id); > > - if (!sev) { > > - error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object", > > - __func__, id, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > > - goto err; > > - } > > - > > sev_guest =3D sev; > > sev->state =3D SEV_STATE_UNINIT; > > =20 >=20 --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. 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